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PL
Adolf Maria Bocheński (1909-1944) był jednym z najważniejszych konserwatywnych publicystów w Polsce międzywojennej. Tematem artykułu jest stosunek Bocheńskiego wobec Węgier. W jego słynnej książce „Między Niemcami a Rosją”, opublikowanej w 1937 r., stwierdził on, że najgorsza sytuacja dla Polski to jakiekolwiek porozumienie pomiędzy Berlinem a Moskwą. Zapewniał, że różnice ideologiczne nie będą wieczną barierą w relacjach pomiędzy Niemcami nazistowskimi a Związkiem Sowieckim. Historia pokazała, że miał tutaj rację. Dlatego wzywał do tymczasowego sojuszu z Niemcami aby rozbić ZSRS i podzielić na kilka państw. W ten sposób główny wróg Polski zostałby wyeliminowany. Gdyby sojusz z Niemcami był niemożliwy, Bocheński wzywał do przebudowy Europy Środkowej oraz podzielenia Czechosłowacji. Argumentował, że Czechy, pozbawione Słowacji oraz Rusi Zakarpackiej, będą zmuszone do sojuszu z Polską przeciwko Niemcom. Wierzył też, że Węgry oraz Rumunia sprzymierzą się z Polską w celu sformułowania antysowieckiej koalicji.
EN
Adolf Maria Bocheński (1909-1944) was one of the most important Polish conservative journalists of the interwar period. The subject of the article is his attitude towards Hungary. In his famous book titled “Między Niemcami a Rosją” (Between Germany and Russia), published in 1937, he declared that the worst situation for Poland would be any agreement between Berlin and Moscow. He firmly believed that the ideological differences between the two would not always be an obstacle in the relations between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Later historical developments have vindicated his views. He therefore called for a tactical alliance with Germany against the Soviet Union in order to partition its territory between neighbouring states, leading to the elimination of one of Poland’s most dangerous enemies. However, he was also aware of an imminent conflict between Poland and Germany. Should an alliance with Germany prove impossible, Bocheński called for the restructuring of Central Europe by partitioning Czechoslovakia. He argued that Czech lands alone, without Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, would be forced into an alliance with Poland against Germany. He also believed that Hungary and Romania would join Poland in order to form an anti-Soviet coalition.
EN
In the first half of the 1920s, the Hungarian political elite had to handle the situation created by the Trianon Treaty, although the Hungarian foreign politics had very little room for manoeuvres against the Little Entente and for the revision of the Trianon Treaty. The question arose that without the support of a major power how realistic the plans for breaking the ring of the Little Entente around Hungary were, or whether it was worth attempting a foreign political action against any Little Entente member state with a minimum chance of success without the support of a major power. There were three possible responses to the question: (1) waiting and avoiding any unilateral Hungarian speculative actions until the support of a major power was given; (2) active Hungarian actions without the support of a major power; (3) taking maximum advantage of all changing international circumstances while seeking the support of a major power. This article analyses the three options and those groups that supported them. The conclusion is that the Sopron referendum, which managed to alter the Treaty of Trianon, demonstrated that the Treaty of Trianon borders could be partly modified with the support of major powers and that the right for self-determination of the people based on the Wilsonian principles could not be swept completely under the rug partially and slightly. However, we should not forget that the referendum that attempted to remedy the territorial disputes accompanied by armed clashes between the two defeated nations, was a solution which could not be implemented at the beginning of the 1920s with the other victorious successor states. As it turned out, this solution was not even applicable later. The referendum was not supported by the major powers, neither by the successor states. The latter firmly rejected it. With the rejection of the idea of referendums, it was exactly that resolution and crisis management method, which was eliminated from the options list, the one which could have offered a peaceful and comforting solution for all the parties concerned to heal the wounds caused by Trianon.
Porównania
|
2013
|
vol. 13
179-189
EN
The Hungarian resentiments which were the result of the historic domination of the Hungarian nation over the territories of the Kingdom of Hungary before the treaty of Trianon, muted during the communist times, revived after 1989. The explosion of a painful collective memory of imperial Hungary resulted in symbolic neocolonial attempts at restoring the lost lands. The nostalgia is particularly visible in the valuative images of the Romanian Transylvania which is eagerly explored in the contemporary Hungarian cinema. The analysis of the newest films whose location was in Transylvania, is aimed at revealing the means of expression used to mentally objectify this region.
PL
Po roku 1989 na Węgrzech odżyły wytłumione w czasach komunizmu resentymenty, będącespadkiem po historycznym okresie dominacji narodu węgierskiego nad terytorium KrólestwaWęgier sprzed traktatu w Trianon. Eksplozja bolesnej, zbiorowej pamięci imperialnej Węgrówzaowocowała próbami symbolicznej, neokolonialnej restytucji utraconych ziem. Narodowetęsknoty uwidoczniły się szczególnie jaskrawo w specyficznych, wartościujących przedstawieniachrumuńskiego Siedmiogrodu, chętnie eksplorowanego we współczesnym kinie węgierskim.Analiza najnowszych filmów usytuowanych w Transylwanii, ma na celu odsłonięcie środków wyrazu, służących mentalnemu upodrzędnieniu owego regionu.
EN
4 June 1920 was written in the memory of the Hungarian nation as the day of national trauma. On that day, the powers that won the First World War imposed humiliating conditions of peace on the defeated Hungarians. The area of the Kingdom of Hungary was cut from 325.000 km2 up to 92.000 km2 while the population was reduced from 21 million to 8 million. A huge part of the Hungarian diaspora was located in neighbouring countries: in Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). Despite three attempts at revision made in 1938–1940 (the first and second Vienna arbitration and changes in Transcarpathian Ruthenia), the shape of the state and demographic profile imposed on Trianon remained unchanged. On the 100th anniversary of this event, the votes of the most important people in the Hungarian state could not be missing. The aim of the article is to present the speeches expressed in the Parliament by the President of Hungary and the President of the National Assembly, and to supplement it with the declaration of the Prime Minister. All three statements eloquently show that the specter of Trianon remains present in contemporary politics.
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