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PL
For a growing group of voters the UKIP party ceases to be a second choice, and it becomes a main party. But, contrary to popular belief, its electoral success is only partly due to its Eurosceptic program. Its growing support is rather the result of disappointment in policies of the main parties and a sense of alienation of a growing social group, failing to find its way in a liberal, multicultural society. Note, however, that the UK electoral system rewards parties that have geographically concentrated support, yet in case of UKIP it is distributed fairly evenly. For this reason, even a significant popular support will translate only in a small degree into the seats in the House of Commons. UKIP electoral successes has forced the major political parties to modify their policies, which manifested mainly in radicalization of their programs in the area of immigration and asylum policy, as well as their attitude towards the UK’s membership in the European Union.
PL
Tematyką artykułu jest narastające dynamicznie zjawisko eurosceptycyzmu, reprezentowane przez partie polityczne dwóch najważniejszych członków UE: Republiki Federalnej Niemiec i Wielkiej Brytanii. Celem pracy jest pokazanie genezy, analiza założeń, struktur i programów dwóch partii eurosceptycznych – AfD oraz UKIP, działających ofensywnie zarówno na krajowej, jak i europejskiej scenie politycznej. Ukazano je na tle otoczenia politycznego, analizując jego systemy partyjne i czynniki mające wpływ na ewolucję „buntu obywateli” wobec systemu wspólnotowego. Autor próbuje odpowiedzieć na pytania, czy omówione partie są w stanie wpłynąć w sposób bezpośredni na dotychczasową politykę europejską tych dwóch państw i zmienić perspektywę UE na najbliższe lata.
EN
The aim of the study is to analyse the programme of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which created the Eurosceptic discourse in the UK in the 21st century. The main hypothesis of the study is that the party’s programme was based on three key foundations, not just Euroscepticism. The essential timeframe for the research was set for the period 2006-2016, although references to the earlier and later period of the party’s activity are occasionally included. The basis for the research was the examination of manifestos and other party documents, but also broadly understood activities of politicians, including statements of party leaders, taking into account their functions in gaining voters’ support. It was concluded that the party’s programme appeal was based on Euroscepticism, hostility to immigration and populist antielitism. The analysis was complemented by an indication of the special role of the European Parliament, avoidance of accusations of racism and a populist approach to security issues. It also presents an assessment of the position of UKIP in 2016-2019 as a return to the status of a marginal party whose further existence is unsure.
EN
This article explores how UKIP and Nigel Farage used social media to amplify their message. Mainly digital sources, such as websites and social media, were the preferred source type of both profiles, but more for UKIP than for N. Farage. The most shared digital content of both profiles was websites and social media accounts of their political parties. The second most used source type was print media – mainly national newspapers. Radio stations were the least used source by UKIP, while TV channels the least used source by N. Farage. The higher use of radio sources concerns links to LBC Radio, where he presented a show between 2019 and 2020. TV channels and radio were largely ignored by both profiles as sources. In terms of ownership, sources used by either profile were in their vast majority private due to prevailing type of ownership in the UK. Both profiles relied more on quality newspapers and magazines rather than tabloids but this was often accompanied by a critical approach to the content of such sources. The analysis found that Farage’s profile has only four reciprocal connections. In contrast, UKIP had a much larger reciprocal network of 25 different pages. While in terms of reciprocity the two profiles maintained different networks, the analysis of centrality showed a significant number of 63 pages shared the profiles of both UKIP and Nigel Farage. Although the profile of N. Farage had a much smaller reciprocal network and the number of shares of the two profiles by the central groups disseminating their messages was roughly equal, yet, the Brexit Party and N. Farage were the more successful political actors in the period of interest to this study – in the 2019 European Parliamentary elections.
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