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1

VALUE PERCEPTION IN THE ULTIMATUM GAME: A BLINDED RANDOMIZED TRIAL

100%
Fiala J., Starý O., Fialová M., Holasová A., Mejzlíková T., Bemš J.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
|
2016
|
vol. 64
|
issue 6
519 – 538
EN
In a blinded, randomized Ultimatum game we study the decision rates using two different reward systems. We discuss the individual value perception and explain why we decided to test a non-monetary reward against the standard low stake monetary reward. We demonstrate that the value systems based on two different, inconvertible currencies lead to different decision rates in the same population. We provide the details of our single blind randomized protocol and discuss other protocol modifications designed to demonstrate the variability of the offer and/or response rates in the Ultimatum games. We provide our concept of rational, non-rational and irrational components contributing to the decision making process in different accord depending on the individual perception of the reward value and confront our experimental findings with the key assumptions provided by other authors.
2

ULTIMATUM GAME WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: A STUDY OF DECEPTION AND FAIRNESS

88%
Veselý Š.
Studia Psychologica
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2014
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vol. 56
|
issue 1
53 – 66
EN
The task of the experiment is reported here to examine decision making in ultimatum games with symmetric and asymmetric information. In the asymmetric information condition, subjects (n = 134) were given an opportunity to deceive their playing partner. The author found that participants indeed deceived their partners, specifically: While subjects were given on average 108.06 (probabilistic) CZK (Czech Koruna) to divide among themselves and their partner, in the asymmetric condition they reported to their partner that they were given 59.05 CZK only. Subsequently, they allocated only 30.19 CZK to their partner in the asymmetric information ultimatum game, whereas in the symmetric information game, where deception was not possible, they allocated 48.65 CZK. The larger the surplus to be divided, the more deception was present. Women deceived significantly more than men and allocated less money to their partner in the asymmetric information ultimatum game (the effect size of gender was small, though).
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