The Castle of Visegrad is one of the best known and most popular places of memory of Hungarian national past. It is far less known, howewer, that the exploration of the ruins at Visegrad and their transformation into a Hungarian place of memory was initiated and completed by Jozef Viktorin, who in 1848 was locked up in prison for half a year by the Hungarian authorities on charges of Panslavism, is known in Slovak scholarship for his Slovak national zeal, and moreover, is regarded as one of the most talented promoter of Slovak litarature in this time. What exactly Viktorin had in mind when, as an engaged champion of Slovak nationalism, he set about the creation of what soon became one of the most important places of Hungarian historical memory, cannot be reconstructed, of course. What seems certain, however, is that the possible answer should be looked for in a conceptional framework constituted by the ancient Slav past of Visegrad, the symbolic and hidden layers of Slovak‐Hungarian compromise, Viktorin´s trust in Hungarian liberalism, and by the idea of an life spent in a constitutional fatherland.
The central theme of my work is the International Visegrad Fund (IVF), which is the first step in the institutionalization of the Visegrad Cooperation. My goal is primarily to present the creation, goals, operation, and results of this organization, for which, I must first explain the main antecedents of the creation of the Visegrad Cooperation and the peculiarities of its operation. The Visegrad Cooperation, established in 1991, acts as an intergovernmental interest conciliation forum that has not been institutionalized. It is run by annual rotating presidencies and meetings held by epresentatives - of different levels - of the Member States, which allow it to have flexible and voluntary based cooperation and the conciliation of shared interests between the Member States before meetings of international organizations, thus acting more effectively. The primary task of the International Visegrad Fund, established in 2000, with headquarters in Bratislava, is to support cultural, educational, scientific, and research activities and mobility between the Member States, using the financial means at its disposal, which it implements primarily in various grants and scholarships. Today, it operates not only in the Visegrad region, but it formed a cooperation with other countries. Of these, it provides significant subsidies to the states of the Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans. The scope of duties of the Fund and the financial background required for this are constantly expanding, which is a good indication of the organization's success.
Po 2004 r. wydawało się, że wobec osiągnięcia wspólnego celu, jakim była integracja z UE i NATO, formuła Grupy Wyszehradzkiej ulega stopniowemu wyczerpaniu. Wspólny i bezkompromisowy (jakkolwiek by nie oceniać jego moralnej słuszności) sprzeciw wobec tzw. kwot na migrantów stwarza dziś wrażenie istnienia wspólnej platformy interesów krajów V4. Czy jednak platforma ta jest stała i Wyszehrad może integrować się również wobec idei „pozytywnych”. Problem jedności krajów regionu rozważę w niniejszym tekście w kontekście ich postawy w czasie kryzysu ukraińskiego, a także polityki wobec Rosji i Chin. Kryzys ukraiński w 2014 r. stwarzał bowiem zdaniem wielu ekspertów ryzyko rozpadu Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Było to wynikiem braku wsparcia dla Ukrainy zwłaszcza ze strony Czech i Węgier przy tradycyjnie prometejskim stanowisku ówczesnego polskiego rządu. Czy od 2014 r. udało się odbudować wspólną agendę? Czy Rosja może skutecznie stosować w regionie zasadę divide et impera? Na te pytania będę chciał odpowiedzieć, analizując politykę krajów regionu wobec kryzysu z uwzględnieniem całego kontekstu polityki analizowanych państw.
EN
After 2004, in the whole V4 region it was the conviction that Visegrad formula is exhausted. However, this situation began changed after common strong opposition against migrant quota. But is the common “positive” idea exist? The problem of regional unity will be analysed in the context of policy towards Russia, China and Ukrainian crisis. During Ukrainian crisis in 2014 it might seem that the Visegrad project may finally collapsed. Poland traditionally strongly supported Ukraine but Czech Republic and Hungary tried to avoid the clear statements. The question is if today, 3 years after Russian aggression, Visegrad states have more of common interests? And does Russia have the instruments to successfully divide our region? Each state’s policy will be analysed separately in the context of general ideas in foreign policy and attitude to Ukrainian crisis.
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