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Hranice významu a zdieľania jazyka

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EN
This paper highlights the influence of the publicity of meaning on Quine’s view on shared languages. According to Quine, publicly available behavioural evidence is not sufficient to fully determine meaning. If this is so, then the notion of shared language is problematic because there are no clear criteria for deciding whether two speakers ascribe the same meanings to the same expressions. The aim of this paper is to show that Quine was aware of this consequence and because of it: a) takes the notion of idiolects to be more fundamental than the notion of shared language; and b) prefers the notion of smooth communication to its alternatives, such as successful communication, that presuppose shared meanings.
SK
Tento článok zdôrazňuje vplyv verejnej povahy významu na Quinov pohľad na zdieľané jazyky. Podľa Quina nie je verejne dostupná behaviorálna evidencia dostatočná na úplné určenie významu. Ak je to tak, potom je pojem zdieľaného jazyka problematický, pretože neexistujú jasné kritériá na rozhodnutie, či dvaja hovorcovia pripisujú rovnaké významy tým istým výrazom. Cieľom tohto článku je ukázať, že Quine si bol vedomý tohto dôsledku a z tohto dôvodu a) považuje pojem idiolektov za fundamentálnejší ako pojem spoločného jazyka a b) uprednostňuje pojem plynulej komunikácie pred jeho alternatívami, k akým patrí napríklad úspešná komunikácia, ktorá predpokladá zdieľané významy.
DE
Im vorliegenden Artikel wird der Einfluss der öffentlichen Natur der Bedeutung auf Quines Ansicht zur gemeinsamen Sprache erörtert. Laut Quine ist die öffentlich zugängliche behaviorale Evidenz zur Bestimmung von Bedeutung nicht ausreichend. Wenn dies so ist, so ist der Begriff der gemeinsamen Sprache problematisch, da es keine klaren Entscheidungskriterien dahingehend gibt, ob zwei Sprecher gleichen Begriffen auch die gleiche Bedeutung zumessen. Ziel des Artikels ist es zu zeigen, dass Quine sich dieser Konsequenz bewusst war und dass er aus diesem Grunde a) den Begriff des Idiolekts für grundsätzlicher hält als den Begriff der gemeinsamen Sprache, und b) dass er den Begriff der flüssigen Kommunikation vor dessen Alternativen bevorzugt, beispielsweise der erfolgreichen Kommunikation, die gemeinsame Bedeutungen voraussetzt.
EN
This article focuses on a critical analysis of some feminist epistemological initiatives that have been inspired by W. V. O. Quine’s project to naturalise epistemology. It identifies the points of convergence between feminist and naturalistic approaches to the problem of knowledge and science, as well as the means whereby the similarities between these two approaches are reflected at the meta-epistemological level. It also looks at the empiricist focus of naturalising feminist approaches in order to highlight the fruitfulness of this epistemological strategy evolving in collaboration with empirical science. This aim of this study is to argue in favour of the view that the naturalistic perspective is particularly suited to feminist epistemological projects that offer critical reflections on science.
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Empirismus, naturalismus a ideje

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EN
The author analyses the modern reception of key themes in Hume’s philosophy during the past century. The first part presents Hume’s version of three such themes – empi­ricism, naturalism and the theory of ideas. The following three parts give an exposition of modern forms of each of these themes, with the choice of modern reception being directed to those contemporary authors who not only developed Hume’s motifs in the most original way, but who also explicitly traced the origin of their modern theory to Hume. For this reason, in the second part, which deals with the reception of empiricism in logical positivism, Hans Reichenbach and his treatment of Hume’s problem of inductive knowledge is discussed. In the third part, dealing with naturalism, the obvious choice is the most influential version of this doctrine in the work of W. V. O. Quine. The fourth part deals with the modern reception of Hume’s theory of ideas in a recent monograph by Jerry Fodor. The author considers Hume’s naturalism as the most live part of Hume’s legacy. Empirismus has, after all, been considerably transformed in content, or has even been rejected by later philosophers; while Fodor’s updating of the theory of ideas does not offer an adequate answer to the question of the place of thinking and intentionality in the material world.
PL
Although Łukasiewicz and Quine do not share many common views, they agreed on one important point in the 1950s: they both denied the distinction between empirical and a priori sciences. This agreement might be surprising as this denial was rather controversial at that time. This paper focuses on Quine’s and Łukasiewicz’s denials of the distinction between empirical and a priori sciences, and proposes three possible answers to the question of why both formulated the same conclusion at a similar time. Firstly, it discusses Quine’s possible influence on Łukasiewicz as Łukasiewicz agreed with Quine’s criticism of modality at that time. Secondly, it considers the possibility that Quine was affected by Łukasiewicz via his debates with Łukasiewicz’s student, Tarski. Lastly, it takes into account the possibility that both philosophers were inspired by an external source, namely the rise of quantum mechanics.
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