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EN
This note is motivated by Whitehead’s researches in inclusion-based point-free geometry as exposed in An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge and in The concept of Nature. More precisely, we observe that Whitehead’s definition of point, based on the notions of abstractive class and covering, is not adequate. Indeed, if we admit such a definition it is also questionable that a point exists. On the contrary our approach, in which the diameter is a further primitive, enables us to avoid such a drawback. Moreover, since such a notion enables us to define a metric in the set of points, our proposal looks to be a good starting point for a foundation of the geometry metrical in nature (as proposed, for example, by L.M. Blumenthal).
EN
This paper is an adventure of ideas. More specifically, it is a continuation of the adventure of ideas concerning the relations between creativity and logic at the level of being one finds in the work of Whitehead and his interpreters/inheritors. The “argument” of the paper, such as it is, is that ontological creativity may be fruitfully described by two logical functions, one exploding the movement from possibility to actuality, and the other from actuality to possibility. The paper explores both functions, or “senses,” as fruitful ways of understanding ontological creativity, especially within processual (Whiteheadian and Bergsonian) thought. The two senses of creativity, the paper also argues, ought to be understood as primitive and inexorably “together.”
EN
At the turn of the twentieth century, the debate between supporters of internal and external relations showed how our assumptions on the nature of relations result in ontological, epistemic, and ethical commitments. In this debate, Alfred North Whitehead provided the most articulated and satisfying account through his “philosophy of the organism,” which holds relations to be internal yet vectorial, without excluding completely external relations. Today, the debate has become once again topical and constitutes a core issue for speculative realism. This paper aims to show how the theory of external relations endorsed by some leading figures of speculative realism (Meillassoux, Harman, Bryant) does not suffice to preserve the desiderata it was designed for, and how a more serious consideration of Whitehead’s theory would have beneficial effects on the ontological and ethical issues of this rejuvenated metaphysical discourse.
EN
My proposal of an Ecozoics of the Deity seeks to find the ground of ecology of the world in the fact that God is loyal to the place / Eco of emptiness as it empties itself, thereby paradoxically manifesting God as the only one in the universe who can and does actually evoke loyalty / life (Gr., Zoe) in us creatures. Thus, it endeavors to give a theological rationale to Thomas Berry’s idea of the Ecozoic Era. The proposal of Divine Ecozoics challenges Sallie McFague’s idea of the world as “God’s body” by advocating that God has God’s own secret indwelling place before entertaining the world as God’s visible body. The present essay, however, is endowed with the Johannine-Whiteheadian idea of the Great Friend with which to critically qualify my general argument for Divine Ecozoics. The vision of the Great Friend transmutes the general view of the reality into its unity of appearance, or the co-resurrection of the Son and of us creatures.
EN
Usually philosophers worry about the existence of mind, or consciousness, or persons, or other difficult-to-explain phenomena. Having posited matter or nature, or fields, they wonder where can person or consciousness originate? This kind of thinking is backward. Only persons ask such questions. Persons exist. I turn the tables on the traditional problem of person by asking whether anything impersonal really exists. I argue that the impersonal almost exists, using the theory of feeling of Max Scheler and supplementing it with insights from Alfred North Whitehead and Josiah Royce. Even though feeling almost succeeds in divesting itself of the pre-supposed act of the person, but its concrete actuality blocks such complete self-abstraction.
EN
Three issues of Życiński’s philosophy are inspired by the process philosophy of A.N. Whitehead’s and his followers: (i) a comprehension of event-dynamic structure of nature as a creative process towards novelty, (ii) a link between the rationality field hypothesis and Whitehead’s concepts of eternal objects and potentiality, (iii) a panentheistic idea of God that emerges from the theory of God’s two natures (aspects). Starting from an analysis of the ontic structure of nature and heading for a grasp of the world’s immanent aspect of God, Życiński follows the neoclassical path of natural theology that is close to processualism. A discovering of transcendent God, that reveals himself in natural processes as the rationality field, brings important consequences for an explanation of God’s attributes and His relation to relatively autonomous creatures. Multithreaded processual inspirations enable us to see those aspects of Życiński’s philosophy and theology in a broad metaphysical context.
XX
Trzy zagadnienia filozofii Życińskiego są inspirowane filozofią procesu A.N. Whiteheada i jego kontynuatorów: (i) rozumienie zdarzeniowo-dynamicznej struktury przyrody jako kreatywnego procesu w stronę nowości, (ii) powiązanie hipotezy pola racjonalności z Whiteheada koncepcją bytów wiecznych i pojęciem potencjalności, (iii) panenteistyczna koncepcja bytu Bożego wypływająca z teorii dwóch natur (aspektów) Boga. Wychodząc od analizy ontycznej struktury przyrody i zmierzając w stronę uchwycenia immanentnego światu aspektu Boga, podąża Życiński neoklasyczną drogą teologii naturalnej, która jest bliska procesualizmowi. Odkrywanie transcendentnego Boga, który przejawia się w procesach naturalnych jako pole racjonalności, niesie ważne konsekwencje dla wyjaśniania atrybutów bytu Bożego, jak i Jego relacji do względnie autonomicznego stworzenia. Wielowątkowe inspiracje procesualne pozwalają postrzegać te aspekty filozofii i teologii Życińskiego w szerokim kontekście metafizycznym.
EN
Thomas Aquinas’ intentions in his position that God acts through secondary causes are both laudable and correct. In affirming God’s action within secondary causes Thomas intended to affirm true freedom and contingency in the world and the creatures’ limited participation in God’s creative power. But his interpretation of these topics rests on assumptions about divinity that subvert his intentions. This article summarizes Thomas’ analysis and discusses the principal difficulties with his interpretation of God’s action. It then presents an interpretation of how Alfred North Whitehead’s position on divine action avoids these difficulties and achieves a more coherent understanding of God’s action in the world, even though it too requires revision. If Whitehead’s metaphysics is revised to think of creativity as the divine life rather than as ultimately distinct from God, then it, too, presents God as sharing the divine life with creatures by endowing them with the creativity and freedom to create themselves on the divinely-given ground of possibility. Thomas’ intentions and a revised Whiteheadian interpretation of divine action are compatible and complement each other on the topic of divine action in and through creatures and on the idea of existence as participation in the divine life.
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