The Kaiser’s Days and consecration of the church in the High Castle in Malbork in 1902 In 1882–1901, the High Castle in Malbork was reconstructed under supervision of Con¬rad Steinbrecht. The end of the works was celebrated with consecrating the church of the Blessed Virgin Mary during the Kaiser’s Days in 1902. The celebration was an important element of the German state’s historically-oriented policy adopted by Wilhelm II which included also the history of the Teutonic Order in Prussia. The celebration was held in a lofty atmosphere and attended by the most important representatives of the authorities, guests from abroad including representatives of the Order of St. John and the Order of Brothers of the German House from Vienna as well as members of the imperial family. The official part of the celebration was held in the church while a banquet was held in the Middle Castle, the eastern wing and the Grand Refectory. The words uttered during the party by the monarch had considerable repercussions throughout Europe, especially among Polish people.
The study analyses the German foreign policy after ascension of the German Emperor and Prussian King Wilhelm II, in detail its relations with the Russian Empire and the transformation of the alliance system. It analyses the causes of the deterioration of the German‑Russian relations through observing the foreign‑political, economic and personal aspects. It answers the questions, why the German leadership did not continue in Bismarck’s alliance system, why it refused a treaty relationship with Russia based on the Reinsurance Treaty, and who specifically was responsible for that decision in the ranks of the German governing elite. The author claims that the German foreign policy was not able to timely notice the Russian shift of interest from the Balkans to Middle Asia. At the same time the author points out that even before Bismarck’s departure the German‑Russian trade war had raged, the significance of the Reinsurance Treaty had declined and the later cancelling of the treaty was not the beginning but the end of the disrupted relations between Petersburg and Berlin. The false impression of German diplomats that Great Britain wanted to give up its ‘splendid isolation’ and join the Triple Alliance can be seen as the other important impulse leading to the breakdown of the treaty.
The study analyses the influence of Wilhelm II, German Emperor on the personnel policy in the armed forces between 1888–1918. It also describes the most crucial events in connection with the level of institutions of the Empire and highest Prussian institutions. The study looks for main actors of individual appointments and examines who was instrumental in key personnel appointments. The study’s conclusions are primarily based on analysing non-published sources from the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin-Dahlem, namely the Brandenburg-Preußisches Hausarchiv, Repositur 53, Kaiser Wilhelm II. und Familie. It is also based on reports of Austrian-Hungarian ambassadors in Berlin saved in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien, namely Abteilung III. (Preußen). The author concludes that Wilhelm II’s personnel policy had three stages of development. At the beginning of his rule, he excitedly grasped the chance to “rejuvenate” the corps of generals of the armed forces and to surround himself with people who suited him — people who admired him, did not criticize him, and did not argue with him. From this perspective, he negatively influenced the state of the armed forces because (unlike his predecessors) he focused more on subjective factors rather than objective criteria when assessing the abilities of the members of the armed forces. After 1900, the second stage began, during which the Emperor accepted suggestions for promotions. The third stage — the significant decline of the Emperor’s influence on the personnel policy of armed forces — started after the scandals in 1907 and after the beginning of World War I. Wilhelm II’s influence on the personnel policy of armed forces can be (similarly to his influence on foreign and internal policies) described as chaotic, unsystematic, and in some instances even destructive, which is why he is partly responsible for the developments during World War I, including the takeover of political decisions by the leaders of the armed forces.
W czasie I wojny światowej rząd holenderski przyjął doktrynę o zbrojnej neutralności. Nieograniczona wojna podwodna zadeklarowana przez Niemców i blokada morska zastosowana przez Anglię i Francję wymagała balansowania pomiędzy walczącymi stronami. Po przystąpieniu do wojny Stanów Zjednoczonych Holandia została odcięta od swoich kolonii i odczuwała trudności zaopatrzeniowe. Neutralność miała swoje patologie (przemyt, działalność szpiegowska), ale też zaoszczędziła mieszkańcom Holandii okrucieństw wojny toczącej się na terytorium państw sąsiedzkich. During the First World War the Dutch government adopted the doctrine of armed neutrality. An unrestricted underwater war declared by the German and a sea blockade imposed by Britain and France required balancing between the fighting parties. After the United States joined the war, Holland was cut off from its colonies and experienced supply difficulties. Neutrality had its pathologies (smuggling, espionage), but it also spared the Dutch people atrocities suffered by peoples of neighbouring countries.
Since the very beginning of his accession to the throne in June, 1888, German emperor William II strived to develop Germany’s naval potential, as an integral element of so called “world policy” Weltpolitik. He regarded the transition of the German Reich into a full-scale naval great power as one of the crucial aims of his reign. In his eyes a new fleet should perform many important tasks such as improving Germany’s international position and appeal as a potential ally. This would widen its freedom of movement and help gain new colonial acquisitions. In addition, a German fleet was needed to protect her growing overseas trade and defend communication lines with German colonies. The pride of a new, powerful navy should also help to establish a real unification of German society and to fight back the socialist influence within the working-class, which challenged the existing political and social status quo. In economic terms, this largescale naval armament program should improve Germany’s economic situation, acting as an important catalyst for developing branches of modern industry and for boosting employment. To convince German public opinion of the necessity of naval armaments, the German government started a huge, unprecedented, modern PR-campaign. A key figure of the whole project was Admiral Alfred Tirpitz, nominated in 1897 to the post of State Secretary of the Naval Office. Tirpitz framed the conception of “the risk fleet”. In his opinion Germany should possess a fleet so strong that it would discourage potential aggressor. Mainly, thanks to his efforts in 1898, the German parliament voted in favor of a naval bill. In the following years, until 1912, this law was amended four times. The aspirations of this project were quashed. Instead of strengthening the German international position among the great powers, this program lead to the isolation of Germany among them. Especially, the British politicians and British public opinion were convinced that the German battle fleet stationed permanently in home waters within striking distance of their islands could have only one meaning, namely that such a fleet was built to challenge British naval supremacy and prepare the way for the eventual German invasion. Great Britain was keen to maintain her naval preponderance, which it regarded as indispensable for defending the British Islands and maintaining its vast overseas empire. In vain they tried to work out a compromise with Germans on that issue. But William II was determined to not allow any foreign intrusion in his naval-building program. The last attempt of finding a compromise was the failed mission to Germany of lord Richard Haldane at the beginning of 1912. Thus Great Britain seemed to have no choice but to try to tighten political and military relations with countries regarded, until now, as potential enemies, namely France and Russia. The cost of the program weighed down the German state budget, thus necessitating financial reform and new taxes. During the First World War, the German battleship fleet did not play a substantial role in military operations and after the war was handed over to the victorious allies.
PL
Od momentu wstąpienia na tron w czerwcu 1888 roku cesarz Wilhelm II dążył do rozbudowy potencjału morskiego Niemiec jako integralnej części tzw. Weltpolitik (polityki światowej). Uznawał on przekształcenie Niemiec w mocarstwo morskie za jeden z kluczowych celów swego panowania. W jego ocenie nowa flota powinna spełniać wiele istotnych funkcji, m.in. poprawić międzynarodową pozycję Niemiec, uczynić z nich atrakcyjnego sojusznika i ułatwić pozyskanie nowych zdobyczy kolonialnych. Dodatkowo była potrzebna do ochrony handlu zamorskiego i szlaków komunikacyjnych z niemieckimi koloniami. Duma z nowej, potężnej floty miała pomóc w unifikacji społeczeństwa niemieckiego i przyczynić się do zwalczenia wśród klasy robotniczej wpływów podważającej polityczne i społeczne status quo socjaldemokracji. W aspekcie ekonomicznym zakrojony na szeroką skalę program zbrojeń morskich przyczynić się miał do poprawy sytuacji ekonomicznej w Niemczech, dając ważny impuls do rozwoju nowoczesnych gałęzi przemysłu i stymulując wzrost zatrudnienia. Aby przekonać niemiecką opinię publiczną do konieczności zbrojeń morskich, rząd niemiecki zainicjował bezprecedensową, nowoczesną kampanię propagandową. Kluczową postacią całego projektu stał się nominowany w 1897 roku na stanowisko sekretarza stanu w Urzędzie ds. Marynarki Alfred von Tirpitz. Opracował on tzw. koncepcję ryzyka. W jego ocenie Niemcy powinny posiadać flotę na tyle silną, aby odstraszyć potencjalnego agresora. Głównie dzięki jego wysiłkom Reichstag w 1898 roku przegłosował ustawę morską. W kolejnych latach, aż do 1912 roku, była ona aż czterokrotnie nowelizowana. Pokładane w projekcie nadzieje nie zostały spełnione. Zamiast wzmocnić pozycję międzynarodową Niemiec, program rozbudowy floty doprowadził do ich izolacji w gronie wielkich mocarstw. Zwłaszcza brytyjscy politycy i opinia publiczna byli przekonani, że stacjonująca na stałe w bazach nad Morzem Północnym niemiecka flota była budowana tylko w jednym celu, a mianowicie po to, aby zagrozić brytyjskiej dominacji na morzach i przygotować ewentualną inwazję. Wielka Brytania była zdeterminowana do zachowania swojej przewagi morskiej, którą uznawała za niezbędny warunek obrony Wysp Brytyjskich i utrzymania rozległego imperium kolonialnego. Brytyjczycy bezskutecznie próbowali wypracować kompromis z Niemcami w tej kwestii. Jednak cesarz Wilhelm II był zdecydowany, by nie pozwolić na jakąkolwiek obcą ingerencję w program budowy floty. Ostatnią próbą znalezienia kompromisu była nieudana misja lorda Richarda Haldane w Niemczech, podjęta w lutym 1912 roku. Wielkiej Brytanii nie pozostał zatem inny wybór niż zacieśnienie swych politycznych i wojskowych więzi z państwami uznawanymi dotąd za potencjalnych wrogów, czyli z Francją i Rosją. Koszty programu bardzo obciążyły niemiecki budżet, czyniąc koniecznymi reformy finansowe i wprowadzenie nowych podatków. Podczas pierwszej wojny światowej niemiecka flota pancerna nie odegrała znaczącej roli w operacjach wojskowych, a po jej zakończeniu została wydana zwycięzcom.
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