Search results

1

Nedorozumění

100%

Beran O.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2009

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vol. 57

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issue 5

683-708

EN

The text concerns the question of misunderstanding in the context of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Misunderstanding is analysed in the first place as a language-game situation having “external criteria” – incapacity to adopt the whole habitus (“life-form”) of someone who is a stranger to me, or to orientate in it. A detailed attention is paid to the importance of the emancipation of “external” criteria with respect to “inner” process understood as accessible only indirectly, with difficulty, or not at all. A particular problem is then represented by the language game of lying/pretending, where the situation of misunderstanding is intentionally produced. The philosophical analysis of the concept “pretending” (linking it to its outer criteria – detectability) is shown to contradict the basic motivation usually connected with the language game of pretending (to block the correct understanding).

2

Idea, číslo, pravidlo

100%

Kolman V.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2009

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vol. 57

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issue 5

709-732

EN

The subject of this paper is the general question of what role mathematics, or more particularly the philosophy of mathematics, plays in the work of Wittgenstein, and, also, in philosophy generally; a question I have tackled in a more extensive form, and not always very explicitly, in the book Filosofie čísla (The Philosophy of Number). Just as there, I take as my starting point Frege’s linguistic turn, beginning with the question “what is number?”, and I develop this is in a free relation (1) to Plato’s theory of ideas with mathematical objects as the middle entities, (2) Kant’s anchoring of mathematics in the pure intuitions of space and time, and (3) Wittgenstein’s conception of mathematics as one of many language-games, stemming from the understanding of a concept as rule.

3

Philosophy without Psychology: a case of wishful thinking?

100%

Glock H.-J.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2019

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vol. 47

5-29

EN

The topic of this lecture is the relation between Wittgenstein’s thought and Wittgensteinian philosophy on the one hand, psychology and psychologism on the other. It will start by clarifying how the label ‘psychologism’ should be understood in this context, opting for a neutral rather than derogatory conception. Next it discusses the relation between Frege’s anti-psychologism and that of the early Wittgenstein. The main focus will be on Wittgenstein’s denial that assertion and judgement are of logical relevance. The final sections turn to Wittgenstein’s later thought. Can it avoid the intrusion of psychology concerning the following areas: – meaning – philosophical psychology – philosophical method? Giving short shrift to psychological notions like understanding, perception, judgement and belief is impossible even in philosophy of language and epistemology, given their connections to notions like meaning and knowledge. If Wittgensteinian philosophizing were a kind of psychotherapy, it would also be wholly irresponsible to ignore psychological theories. Fortunately it isn’t. Nevertheless it is neither feasible nor desirable to insulate the clarification of philosophical problems and contested concepts against empirical considerations. I shall substantiate this claim by looking at the problem of animal minds and the role that abilities play for mental and epistemic phenomena. If conceptual analysis is to serve as an instrument of critical thinking, it had better be impure.

4

How Could Boltzmann Have Inspired the Early Wittgenstein?

85%

Sady W.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2021

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vol. 55

67-76

EN

In 1931, when writing about those who had inspired him, Wittgenstein singled out Boltzmann; nobody seems to know why, however. Most commentators have ignored this remark, while a few have tried to guess what the inspiration might have been by searching the popular and philosophical writings of Boltzmann. In this article, I hypothesize that Wittgenstein may have been inspired by Boltzmann’s scientific research program from his famous 1877 article. This hypothesis is not confirmed-or rejected-by any surviving documents. But to some extent (considering the role of Fleck’s creative misunderstandings) there are two explanations for the origins of the two strange theorems underlying the Tractatus’s ontology: (1) each situation can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same; (2) the facts are not subject to the laws of nature. My hypothesis also makes it understandable why Wittgenstein developed his logical theory of probability. So, let’s keep it in mind.

5

O możliwych kierunkach nauczania filozofii

85%

Soin M.

Filozofia i Nauka

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2014

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vol. 2

47-64

EN

The paper attempts to respond to the postulates included in the National Frameworks of Qualifications. Those require syllabuses in higher education be shaped by “abilities of autonomous and responsible actions”. The Author considers the usefulness of various fields of teaching of philosophy for this goal, and he concludes that the greatest prospects for its attaining lie in the teaching of critical thinking in the version based on Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations. The syllabuses of such teaching are not being reduced to the logical analysis of argumentation, but embrace among others problems of polysemousness of concepts and the verbal disputes emerging when differences between various ways of language use are neglected. The teaching of critical thinking at an advanced level can be engaged in the problem of truth: the diversification of criteria of truthfulness, abilities of differentiating empirical and grammatical statements, and the comparative role of samples in research practices in various domains of science.

PL

Artykuł jest próbą odpowiedzi na postulaty wprowadzone w Krajowych Ramach Kwalifikacji, wymagające by programy nauczania na poziomie wyższym kształtowały „zdolności do autonomicznego i odpowiedzialnego działania”. Autor rozważa przydatność różnych kierunków nauczania filozofii do tego celu, dochodząc do wniosku, że największe szanse na jego osiągnięcie ma nauczanie krytycznego myślenia w wersji wzorowanej na dociekaniach filozoficznych Wittgensteina. Program tak rozumianego nauczania nie sprowadza się do logicznej analizy argumentacji i obejmuje między innymi problematykę wieloznaczności pojęć i wynikających z niej sporów werbalnych, a także umiejętność unikania trudności wynikających z niedostrzegania różnic między rozmaitymi sposobami użycia języka. Nauczanie myślenia krytycznego na poziomie zaawansowanym dotyczyć mogłoby natomiast problematyki prawdy: zróżnicowania kryteriów uznawania prawdziwości zdań, umiejętności odróżniania wypowiedzi empirycznych i gramatycznych oraz porównawczej roli wzorców w praktyce badawczej różnych dziedzin nauki.

6

Istoty a skeptický problém

80%

Koreň L.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2013

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vol. 61

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issue 5

643-680

EN

The aim of the article is to develop the dialectics and potential of a specific philosophical approach to the problem of epistemological scepticism: Wittgenstein’s ideas about the function of fundamental certainties in our epistemic practices. I begin with an excursion into the problematic of sceptical arguments and explain G. E. Moore’s anti-sceptical strategy, which influenced Wittgenstein’s thoughts in On Certainty. I then offer a reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian approach that I favour. On this basis I argue that although there is a grain of truth in scepticism, the idea of an indefinitely-iterated doubt and request for reasons (driving the Pyrrhonian-style of scepticism), as well as the idea of a hyperbolic doubt (driving Cartesian-style scepticism), are philosophical illusions from the perspective of the rules and standards of our epistemic operating - the would-be sceptic offers us no compelling alternative.

7

Czym są tak zwane tezy Traktatu? Drabina Wittgensteina

80%

Wawrzyniak J.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2017

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vol. 38

21-38

EN

The main objective of my article is the presentation and critical analysis of two possible interpretations of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I juxtapose the so-called resolute reading with the metaphysical reading. The crucial dissimilarity between these interpretations is that they ascribe different roles to the sentences contained in the Tractatus. According to the metaphysical reading, these sentences – although they are nonsensical from the point of view of the Tractatus – attempt to express a certain view of reality and language, whereas according to the resolute reading, these sentences are mere nonsense and only seem to make sense; they exemplify nonsense and therefore show the nonsensicality of philosophical theories. I consider the objections against both interpretations and point out that although the resolute reading adequately presents and explains many questions concerning Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, it requires essential modifications. In the last part of my article, I suggest that the sentences of the Tractatus do not function as propositions but as rules of translation.

8

Wittgenstein’s and islamic concept of religious belief

80%

Riyaz A.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

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2015

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vol. 27

361-372

EN

This paper is divided into two sections. In the first section I discuss the concept of religious beliefs according to Wittgenstein and Islam. In the second section of the paper I discuss the points of similarity between Islamic and Wittgenstein’s concepts of religious beliefs.

9

Meaning under the threat of paradox on two fronts

71%

Ramirez Calle O.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2020

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vol. 50

5-17

PL

The paper defends the argument that the Resemblance Paradox (RP), or the problem of the ‘under-determination of meaning’, and the Rule-Following Paradox (RFP) are two sides of the same paradox threatening meaning from opposite extremes. After presenting the case, the paradox is reconsidered anew and the supposition that the threat is a pervasive one challenged.

10

Wittgenstein 1929–1930 – problem dwóch kolorów w tym samym miejscu

71%

Nowak S.

Diametros

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2015

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issue Diametros 46

55-73

EN

The colour incompatibility claim was first introduced by Wittgenstein in the Tractaus. It states that there can be only one colour in one place and time. It is commonly believed that Wittgenstein abandoned his conception of logical atomism after he had understood the consequences of his colour incompatibility claim. The main goal of this article is to provide an interpretation of the colour incompatibility claim in terms of Wittgenstein's phenomenology. I will focus on two works which are of great significance for the colour incompatibility claim, namely, Some Remarks on Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks. The period between 1929 and 1930 is the time when these two works came into existence, and it is the beginning of the “middle period” of Wittgenstein's philosophy. My attention will not only concern the fact that Wittgenstein formulated the colour incompatibility claim, but I will also address the issue of how this claim was justified. The grasp of Wittgenstein's justification of the colour incompatibility claim will help to understand his phenomenology and his theory of philosophical grammar.

PL

Już w Traktacie Wittgenstein sformułował tezę o ekskluzji kolorów. Głosiła ona, że w jednym miejscu i czasie może być tylko jeden kolor. Powszechnie uważa się, że ponowne przemyślenie tej właśnie tezy skłoniło Wittgensteina do odrzucenia podstawowych założeń logicznego atomizmu. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie filozoficznej interpretacji tezy o ekskluzji kolorów. W naszych dociekaniach skupimy się na dziełach, w których problem ekskluzji kolorów zajmuje szczególne miejsce. Pierwszym jest artykuł Kilka uwag o formie logicznej, drugim natomiast obszerniejszy tekst pod angielskim tytułem Philosophical Remarks. Lata 1929–1930, czas powstania obu dzieł, zapoczątkowały tak zwany „średni okres” filozofii Wittgensteina. Przede wszystkim zwrócimy uwagę na sposób, w jaki teza o ekskluzji kolorów była uzasadniania w Kilku uwagach o formie logicznej, a w jaki w Philosophical Remarks. Sposób uzasadniania tej tezy przez Witgensteina będzie miał istotne znaczenie dla kształtowania się jego koncepcji fenomenologii oraz gramatyki filozoficznej.

11

Aphantasia and the Language of Imagination: A Wittgensteinian Exploration

71%

Fox-Muraton M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2021

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vol. 55

5-24

EN

Congenital aphantasia, or the complete absence of mental imagery, is a topic that has recently aroused the interest of researchers in many fields including philosophy, psychology and cognitive sciences. While it is generally supposed that we all have rich mental lives full of imaged representations, estimates suggest 2-3% of the population may have never formed an image or seen ‘in the mind’s eye.’ This paper aims to address the scepticism surrounding aphantasia, the challenges in communicating about mental imagery, and the research methods used in cognitive sciences today through the lens of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The paper argues that 1) communicating about mental imagery involves language games that persons with aphantasia may not be able to play (i.e., makes reference to expressions and concepts that are meaningless for them, such as ‘visualise,’ ‘form an image,’ etc.); 2) that as a consequence aphantasia, in present research, is only describable negatively (as lack or incapacity); 3) that rather than a cognitive or a psychological issue, aphantasia should be understood as a grammatical one; and 4) that we need to invent new language games in order to come to a better understanding of conditions such as aphantasia, and to be able to appreciate the rich diversity and variability of human experience.

12

Wittgenstein and the Pseudo-Problem of Evil

71%

Noaparast Z. B.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2021

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vol. 55

49-66

EN

Theists believe that our world was created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. If God with such traits creates a world, we would expect that the world to have certain features. Such features should be compatible with God’s traits. We do not expect a God who is omnipotent and omniscient to create a poorly-designed world. If we believe that our world is created by God with the aforementioned traits and yet our world is poorly designed, we would either abandon our belief that our world was created by God or we would preserve our belief. If we wish to preserve our belief we would either revise the traits we attribute to him, or we would find a way to justify the co-existence of God with such traits as the creator and a poorly-designed world. In the history of philosophy one feature of our world has been subject to a great many debates, namely ‘evil’. By evil we have all the pain and sufferings that sentient beings go through. God is said to be omnibenevolent, as a result he would not want us to go through pain and suffering. He is also omniscient and omnipotent and therefore he has the knowledge and power to do so. Yet we are facing pain and suffering in this world. For the theists reconciling the existing evil in this world with God is a great challenge and atheists try to argue from evil and prove the non-existence of God. The debate between theists and atheists surrounding the problem of evil presupposes a certain conception of God. The presupposition is that God is a person who possesses a mind, will power and has a moral character. For Wittgenstein attributing personhood to God is a confusion. As a result, for Wittgenstein there can be no ‘problem of evil’ and the debates between the theists and atheists is not engaging with a real problem but a pseudo-problem. The problem of evil does not need a solution and smart arguments and counter-arguments, rather it needs therapy.

13

Wittgenstein o rozjaśnianiu myśli. Wstęp do lektury „Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego"

71%

Bogucki K.

Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris

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2018

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vol. 41

|

issue 2

147-165

EN

In this article I examine some remarks from Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus about the point and the method of his work. First part of the article concerns relationships between Frege‘s conception of elucidation and Wittgenstein‘s conception of philosophy. Second part of the article is about Wittgenstein‘s attitude to science and the role of science in philosophy. Third part of my article concerns the ethical purpose of Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus.

14

Wittgenstein 1929-1930 – problem dwóch kolorów w tym samym miejscu

71%

Nowak S.

Diametros

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2015

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issue Diametros 43

118-136

EN

Wittgenstein introduced his claim about colour incompatibility originally in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, where he stated that there could be only one colour in one place and time. It is commonly believed that Wittgenstein abandoned his conception of logical atomism when he realized the consequences of this claim. The aim of this article is to provide an interpretation of the colour incompatibility claim in terms of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology. I will focus on two works of great significance for the claim: Some Remarks on Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks. These two works were written between 1929 and 1930, which is the beginning of the “middle period” in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I will focus not only on Wittgenstein’s formulation of the colour incompatibility claim, but also on how this claim was justified. The explanation of Wittgenstein’s justification of this claim will help to understand his phenomenology and theory of philosophical grammar.

PL

Już w Traktacie Wittgenstein sformułował tezę o ekskluzji kolorów. Głosiła ona, że w jednym miejscu i czasie może być tylko jeden kolor. Powszechnie uważa się, że ponowne prze-myślenie tej właśnie tezy skłoniło Wittgensteina do odrzucenia podstawowych założeń logicznego atomizmu. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie filozoficznej interpretacji tezy o ekskluzji kolorów. W naszych dociekaniach w sposób szczególny skupimy się na dziełach, w których problem ekskluzji kolorów zajmuje szczególne miejsce. Pierwszym jest artykuł Kilka uwag o formie logicznej, drugim natomiast obszerniejszy tekst pod angielskim tytułem Philosophical Remarks. Lata 1929–1930, czas powstania obu dzieł, zapoczątkowały tak zwany „średni okres” filozofii Wittgen-steina. W sposób szczególny zwrócimy uwagę na sposób, w jaki teza o ekskluzji kolorów była uza-sadniania w Kilku uwagach o formie logicznej, a w jaki w Philosophical Remarks. Sposób, w jaki owa teza była przez Witgensteina uzasadniania, będzie miał istotne znaczenie dla kształtowania się Wittgensteinowskiej koncepcji fenomenologii oraz gramatyki filozoficznej.

15

Wobec niewyrażalnego: Krystyna Miłobędzka, Julian Kornhauser, Marcin Świetlicki

71%

Dzień M.

Świat i Słowo

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2021

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vol. 37

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issue 2

135-144

EN

The sketch is an attempt to describe the category of “inexpressible” at the meeting point of critical-literary, philosophical and theological discourse. Three works by Krystyna Miłobędzka, Julian Kornhauser and Marcin Świetlicki were analyzed. The category of the “inexpressible” turns out to be an undefinable, aporetic concept that contains the mystery of meaning.

PL

Szkic jest próbą opisania kategorii „niewyrażalnego” na styku dyskursu krytycznoliterackiego, filozoficznego a także teologicznego. Analizie poddane zostały trzy utwory: Krystyny Miłobędzkiej, Juliana Kornhausera i Marcina Świetlickiego. Kategoria „niewyrażalnego” okazuje się pojęciem niedefiniowalnym, aporetycznym, w którym mieści się tajemnica sensu.

16

Ethics, Religion, and the Problem of Life: Tolstoy’s Influence on Wittgenstein’s Thinking about the Meaning of Life

71%

Roszyk M.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2023

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vol. 71

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issue 2

129-146

PL

W niniejszym artykule staram się pokazać, jaki wpływ na myślenie Wittgensteina o zagadnieniu sensu życia wywarł Lew Tołstoj. Rozpoczynam od ustalenia, które pisma Tołstoja Wittgenstein znał. Dalej przechodzę do trzech obszarów wpływu: (1) ujmowania pytania o sens życia jako centralnego problemu filozoficznego, (2) definiowania Etyki za pomocą kategorii sensu życia oraz (3) idei, zgodnie z którą rozwiązanie problemu sensu życia polega na zmianie praktycznej, a nie udzieleniu teoretycznej odpowiedzi. Zagadnienie to z kolei składa się z trzech części: (3a) tezy, że pytanie dotyczące sensu życia jest pseudopytaniem, (3b) tezy, że zniknięcie pytania o sens nie jest jeszcze rozwiązaniem problemu oraz (3c) tezy, że rozwiązanie problemu sensu życia polega na przyjęciu religijnego nastawienia względem świata. Staram się pokazać, że w punkcie 1 Wittgenstein przejął pomysł Tołstoja, lecz poddał go pewnej korekcie, co wyjaśnia zabieg definicyjny wymieniony w punkcie 2, natomiast w punkcie 3 Wittgenstein akceptuje idee Tołstoja, starając się jedynie nadać im swoje własne sformułowanie.

EN

In this paper, I try to show to what extent Wittgenstein’s thinking about the problem of the meaning of life was influenced by Tolstoy. I begin with the problem of what Tolstoy’s writings, especially philosophical, Wittgenstein knew. Then I proceed to three areas of impact: (1) treating the question of the meaning of life as the central problem for philosophy, (2) defining Ethics in terms of the meaning of life, and (3) the idea that the solution of the problem of the meaning of life lies in a practical change, not in giving a theoretical answer, which in turn is broken down into three more specific ideas, namely that (3a) the question concerning the meaning of life is a pseudo-question, that (3b) this vanishing of the question is not yet the solution, and that (3c) the solution of the problem of life consists in taking a religious attitude towards the world. I try to show that in point 1 Wittgenstein accepted Tolstoy’s general idea, but gave it his own version, which in turn makes the definition of Ethics in terms of the meaning of life in point 2 understandable; whereas in point 3 Wittgenstein accepts Tolstoy’s ideas and tries to formulate them in his own way.

17

Practical KnowledgeVersusKnowledge as Practice

70%

Danka I.

Human Affairs

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2009

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vol. 19

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issue 4

397-407

EN

The main thesis of this essay is that practice is superior to a "theoretical vs. practical" distinction. In this sense, every sort of knowledge is essentially "practical"; so-called "theoretical" knowledge is an historically overemphasised borderline example of the practical. Based mostly on Wittgenstein's view, I shall gradually refine an opposition between theoretical and practical knowledge by analysing some related dualisms on an active, processual, communicative and applicative concept of knowledge. Then I will provide some arguments as to why knowledge as a practical matter in this sense should be seen as, both logically and temporally, prior to the distinction.

18

Neskorý Wittgenstein a problém vonkajšieho sveta

70%

Greif A.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2016

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vol. 64

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issue 5

743-759

XX

The aim of this article is to determine how useful to us are the notes from the late work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, in dealing with one of the modern sceptical problems. By determining the usefulness I have in mind whether or not his thoughts and descriptions of everyday linguistic practice help solve the sceptical problem and, if so, in what way. The sceptical problem in question is the Cartesian argument about the external world – the argument of ignorance. We will endeavour to show that if we accept Wittgenstein’s remarks as adequate descriptions of epistemic practice, they will help to make it possible to block the argument in question. However, there arise questions of whether Wittgenstein’s descriptions of epistemic practice are adequate, on the one hand, and whether the sceptical claims about the external world really spring from this practice, on the other hand. I hold the view that these questions are basically empirical. This has the relatively unusual consequence that the worth of Wittgenstein’s thoughts, as well as the cogency of the problem of the external world, cannot be judged in a purely philosophical way.

19

Proč jsou elementární věty a stavy věcí v Traktátu vzájemně nezávislé?

70%

Daňková Z.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2014

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vol. 62

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issue 1

61-76

EN

In this article I attempt to reply to the question of whether, in the framework of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, reasons and arguments are given which might plausibly motivate the claim - made by Wittgenstein himself - that atomic propositions and their correlates (states of affairs) are mutually independent. My first step is to make clear that an answer to this question demands a detailed interpretation of Tractarian objects and, specifically, whether they are only particulars, or properties and relations too. After sketching the evidential support for both interpretations, I incline to a reading that takes properties and relations to be objects. In the context of the narrower and broader conceptions of objects, I then give a detailed analysis of the metaphor “the space of states of affairs” and “logical space”, which I consider to be the principal guide in our understanding the reasons for the independence of states of affairs and thus, more generally, of atomic propositions too.

20

Podstawy językoznawstwa kognitywnego w świetle myśli Kanta, Wittgensteina i Whorfa

70%

Kacprzak A.

Linguistische Treffen in Wrocław

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2021

|

issue 19

375-385

EN

In the recent thirty years, much of the research carried out in the field of linguistics has been based on the experientialist philosophy formulated by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, treating language as a key to uncover the cognitively unconscious in human thought and operating with notions such as conceptualization, conceptual metaphor, or image schema. Nevertheless, despite the great success of the cognitive linguistics enterprise, the basic philosophical assumptions that lie at the foundation of the paradigm may still raise controversies and trigger lively discussions. The present article aims to shed more light at some of the essential issues pertaining to the modern-day cognitive approach by tracing its roots to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Benjamin Lee Whorf. To start with, the article discusses the place that the philosophy of experiential realism takes in the basic division between realism and anti-realism, and attempts to demonstrate that the quest to uphold the basic realistic stance while still giving a chief role to human conceptualization is in many ways an elaboration of Kant’s “Copernican revolution”. Even more traces are found in the late works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who with his “Philosophical Investigations” laid foundations for the current cognitive theory of categorization, not only helping realize the blurry character of category borders but also questioning the hitherto dominating atomistic approach to meaning. Perhaps the most noteworthy inspirations, however, can be found in the writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf who, like the modern-day cognitive linguists, was deeply interested in the variety of the different models that humans impose on the real world, and who may have prefigured much of the currently popular theory of conceptual metaphor. Overall, a deeper insight into the philosophy of the three discussed thinkers allows us to better understand the roots of the modern-day cognitive linguistics and erase some of the controversies that have arisen around it over the years.

Refine search results

Nedorozumění

Idea, číslo, pravidlo

Philosophy without Psychology: a case of wishful thinking?

How Could Boltzmann Have Inspired the Early Wittgenstein?

O możliwych kierunkach nauczania filozofii

Istoty a skeptický problém

Czym są tak zwane tezy Traktatu? Drabina Wittgensteina

Wittgenstein’s and islamic concept of religious belief

Meaning under the threat of paradox on two fronts

Wittgenstein 1929–1930 – problem dwóch kolorów w tym samym miejscu

Aphantasia and the Language of Imagination: A Wittgensteinian Exploration

Wittgenstein and the Pseudo-Problem of Evil

Wittgenstein o rozjaśnianiu myśli. Wstęp do lektury „Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego"

Wittgenstein 1929-1930 – problem dwóch kolorów w tym samym miejscu

Wobec niewyrażalnego: Krystyna Miłobędzka, Julian Kornhauser, Marcin Świetlicki

Ethics, Religion, and the Problem of Life: Tolstoy’s Influence on Wittgenstein’s Thinking about the Meaning of Life

Practical KnowledgeVersusKnowledge as Practice

Neskorý Wittgenstein a problém vonkajšieho sveta

Proč jsou elementární věty a stavy věcí v Traktátu vzájemně nezávislé?

Podstawy językoznawstwa kognitywnego w świetle myśli Kanta, Wittgensteina i Whorfa