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Are Zeno’s Arguments Unsound Paradoxes?

100%
Calenda G.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2013
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vol. 4
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issue 1
125-140
EN
Zeno’s arguments are generally regarded as ingenious but downright unsound paradoxes, worth of attention mainly to disclose why they go wrong or, alternatively, to recognise them as clever, even if crude, anticipations of modern views on the space, the infinite or the quantum view of matter. In either case, the arguments lose any connection with the scientific and philosophical problems of Zeno’s own time and environment. In the present paper, I argue that it is possible to make sense of Zeno’s arguments if we recognise that Zeno was indeed a close follower of Parmenides, who wanted to show that, if the plurality of beings existed, then various absurd consequences would follow. He intended to highlight the compact and inarticulate nature of the being, and the human character of the system of world partitions producing the entities and the objects on which our knowledge is based.
2
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What about Plurality? Aristotle’s Discussion of Zeno’s Paradoxes

86%
Sattler B. M.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2021
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vol. 12
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issue 1
87-105
EN
While Aristotle provides the crucial testimonies for the paradoxes of motion, topos, and the falling millet seed, surprisingly he shows almost no interest in the paradoxes of plurality. For Plato, by contrast, the plurality paradoxes seem to be the central paradoxes of Zeno and Simplicius is our primary source for those. This paper investigates why the plurality paradoxes are not examined by Aristotle and argues that a close look at the context in which Aristotle discusses Zeno holds the answer to this question.
3
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Trilemmas: Gorgias’ PTMO Between Zeno and Melissus

86%
Rossetti L.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2017
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vol. 8
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issue 1
155-172
EN
The present paper makes the following points. (1) The summary given in Sextus Emp. Math. VII is of much greater value than usually acknowledged, since it preserves several key elements of Gorgias’ communicational strategy. (2) A sketchy trilemma is available in the opening sentence of Philolaos (DK 44B2) as well as in a passage of Plato’s Parmenides. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the very first known trilemma was devised by Gorgias and not by Sextus himself or Aenesidemus. (3) Not unlike Zeno, Gorgias enjoyed to be neither serious nor joking, but remained somewhat halfway. This point is seldom acknowledged, though it is crucial in order to understand that he pretends to claim (e.g. that p), but his claims do not amount to any points of doctrine. (4) That he remains halfway should not prevent us from appreciating some of his ideas, but, at the same time, we should not expect full intellectual adhesion to what he tells us. Besides, something similar occurs in most of Plato’s dialogues. (5). Gorgias owes a lot to Melissus.
4
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Aristotle, Eleaticism, and Zeno’s Grains of Millet

86%
Boeri M. D.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2021
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vol. 12
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issue 1
107-121
EN
This paper explores how Aristotle rejects some Eleatic tenets in general and some of Zeno’s views in particular that apparently threaten the Aristotelian “science of nature.” According to Zeno, it is impossible for a thing to traverse what is infinite or to come in contact with infinite things in a finite time. Aristotle takes the Zenonian view to be wrong by resorting to his distinction between potentiality and actuality and to his theory of mathematical proportions as applied to the motive power and the moved object (Ph. VII.5). He states that some minimal parts of certain magnitudes (i.e., continuous quantities) are perceived, but only in potentiality, not in actuality. This being so, Zeno’s view that a single grain of millet makes no sound on falling, but a thousand grains make a sound must be rejected. If Zeno’s paradoxes were true, there would be no motion, but if there is no motion, there is no nature, and hence, there cannot be a science of nature. What Aristotle noted in the millet seed paradox, I hold, is that it apparently casts doubt on his theory of mathematical proportions, i.e., the theory of proportions that holds between the moving power and the object moved, and the extent of the change and the time taken. This approach explains why Aristotle establishes an analogy between the millet seed paradox, on the one hand, and the argument of the stone being worn away by the drop of water (Ph. 253b15–16) and the hauled ship, on the other.
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Recenzja książki W.K. Gródka OFM "Jedno, wiele, nic u Zenona i Gorgiasza. Analiza terminów ἕν, πολλά, οὐδέν w kontekście teorii Parmenidesa:, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jana Pawła II, 2018

86%
Pacewicz A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2021
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vol. 53
113-117
EN
Review of W.K. Gródek's book "Jedno, wiele, nic..."
PL
Recenzja książki W.K. Gródka "Jedno, wiele, nic..."
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