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A priori a matematika u Berkeleyho

100%
Tomeček M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2014
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vol. 62
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issue 3
369-385
EN
According to the Oxford English Dictonary George Berkeley introduced the term a priori into English. His inspiration for this was, it seems, to be found partly in the writings of his immediate predecessors, particularly Pierre Bayle, and partly in his pedagogical work where he adjudicated disputations between his pupils. Some of his arguments against the existence of matter Berkeley tells us are a priori, others a posteriori. Even the a priori arguments are underpinned by prior semantic principles of an anti-abstractionist character, which are shown to be important particularly in the immaterialist philosophy of mathematics. Berkeley's courageously unorthodox, and generally unpublished, thoughts about mathematics thus grow from the same soil as his celebrated denial of matter.
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The Is-Ought Problem, the Open Question Argument, and the new science of morality

88%
Bělohrad R.
Human Affairs
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2011
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vol. 21
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issue 3
262-271
EN
The article deals with a recent attack by Sam Harris on two famous arguments that purport to establish a gap between factual and evaluative statements-Hume’s Is-Ought Problem and Moore’s Open Question Argument. I present the arguments, analyze the relationship between them and critically assess Harris’ attempt to refute them. I conclude that Harris’ attempt fails.
3

On the Synthetic Content of Implicit Definitions

63%
Christopoulou D.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
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2013
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vol. 22
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issue 1
75-88
EN
This paper addresses the issue of stipulation in three cases of implicit definitions (postulates of scientific terms, systems of axioms and abstraction principles). It argues that the alleged implicit definitions do not have a purely stipulative status. Stipulation of the vehicles of the implicit definitions in question should end up with true postulates. However, those postulates should not be taken to be true only in virtue of stipulation since they have extra commitments. Horwich’s worry emerges in all three kinds of implicit definitions under consideration, since the existence of meanings so that the alleged postulates are true depends on extra requirements that should be fulfilled. Moreover, if Ramseyfication method is applied to the three kinds of implicit definition, they are split up into two components from which the first one is broadly factual while the second one is purely stipulative. The paper argues that their definitional task in each case should be assigned to their second component i.e. their Carnap-conditional.
4
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Ontologiczny dowód na istnienie Boga Immanuel Kant i Anzelm z Canterbury

63%
Surzyn J.
Folia Philosophica
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2014
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vol. 32
PL
The paper concerns Immanuel Kant’s view on ontological argument for the existence of God by Anselm of Canterbury. Arguing from his critical philosophy, Kant remains sceptical about the possibility of proving the very existence of God, which he takes as only the idea (ideal) of pure reason. Seen along such lines the concept of God cannot be verified in the matter of experience. Kant’s critique was based on refutation of speculative character of theological speculation related to the tradition of natural (rational) theology. From this point of view he takes it as impossible to derive a priori the real existence of subject merely on the basis of taking it as the greatest thing that can be conceived, that is the best thing that might exist. The idea of the highest being has in Kant merely intellectual status, that is, it has it source in (pure) reason only and in this sense its real existence cannot be subject of analysis (scrutiny). Interestingly, what Kant has in mind in his critique of ontological argument (besides other arguments) is Descartes’ argument which is to an important degree different from the one by Anselm. In this paper similarities and differences between Kant’s refutation and Anselm’s support of the ontological argument are discussed.
5
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Theunissenův Hegel, Henrichův Husserl

62%
Janoušek H.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2020
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vol. 68
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issue 1
83-97
EN
The text focuses on two works that compare Hegel’s philosophy with Husserl’s. In both it is possible to find interesting impetuses towards further elaboration. In Michael Theunissen’s work, this can especially be found in the relating of the reflection of the object from Hegel’s introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit to Husserl’s reflection on the ways in which the object is given. Dieter Henrich, in turn, points to the relational structure of the principal determinations in which objects are thought and which, in Husserl, appear to be distorted by the orientation to the relations of the performances of objective intentionality, in which these determinations reach a demonstrative giveness. It is, however, possible to find significant shortcomings in the approaches of both authors. While Theunissen’s effort remains at the level of an unfinished idea, Henrich glosses over the fundamental differences between Husserl and Kant’s conceptions of the a priori justification of knowledge. Yet even these texts clearly show the untapped potential that comparing the philosophies of Husserl and Hegel can offer, which could contribute to a better understanding of these thinkers and the distinctive features of their approaches.
CS
Text se zaměřuje na dva pokusy srovnat Hegelovu a Husserlovu filosofii. V obou lze nalézt zajímavé podněty vybízející k dalšímu rozpracování. V pokusu Michaela Theunissena jde zejména o vztažení reflexe předmětu pro nás z Hegelova úvodu k Fenomenologii ducha k Husserlově reflexi způsobů danosti předmětu. Dieter Henrich zase poukazuje na relační strukturu hlavních určení, v nichž jsou předmětnosti myšleny a která se zdá být u Husserla zkreslena orientací na relace výkonů objektivující intencionality, v nichž tato určení dospívají k názorné danosti. V přístupech obou zmíněných autorů lze ovšem shledat nepominutelné nedostatky. Zatímco Theunissenův pokus zůstává jen na úrovni nerozpracovaného nápadu, Henrich přehlíží zásadní rozdíly v Husserlově a Kantově koncepci apriorního odůvodnění poznání. Přesto se i v těchto textech jasně ukazuje nevytěžený potenciál srovnání Husserlovy a Hegelovy filosofie, který může přispět k lepšímu pochopení těchto myslitelů a svérázu jejich koncepcí.
DE
Der vorliegende Text befasst sich mit zwei Versuchen eines Vergleichs der Philosophien von Hegel und Husserl. In beiden finden sich interessante Gedanken, die zu einer eingehenderen Betrachtung einladen. Bei Michael Theunissen geht es insbesondere um die In-Beziehung-Setzung des Gegenstands für uns aus Hegels Einleitung zur Phänomenologie des Geistes mit Husserls Reflexion von Arten der Gegebenheit des Gegenstandes. Dieter Henrich wiederum verweist auf die Relationsstruktur der Hauptbestimmungen, in denen die Gegenständlichkeiten gedacht werden und die bei Husserl durch die Orientierung auf die Relation von die Intentionalität objektivierenden Leistungen, in denen diese Bestimmungen zu einer anschaulichen Gegebenheit gelangen, verzerrt erscheinen. In den Ansätzen der beiden genannten Autoren lassen sich jedoch auch unübersehbare Unzulänglichkeiten finden. Während Theunissens Versuch auf der Ebene einer nicht weitergeführten Idee bleibt, übersieht Henrich die grundlegenden Unterschiede von Husserls und Kants Konzept der A-Priori-Begründung der Erkenntnis. Dennoch zeigt sich auch in diesen Texten das nicht ausgeschöpfte Potential, den das Vergleichen der Philosophien Husserls und Hegels bietet. Ein solcher Vergleich könnte zu einem besseren Verständnis dieser Denker und der Eigenarten ihrer Konzeptionen führen.
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Socjologiczne a priori w ujęciu Georga Simmla

62%
Cieśla S.
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
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2002
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vol. 30
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issue 1
47-70
EN
The paper sought to present the assumptions of Georg Simmel's sociology. Founding sociology, Simmel relies on the results of his epistemological research. In reference to sociology, he calls his research „theory of knowledge of the social science” or „theory of the knowledge about society.” These theories are supposed to answer the questions about the character of social reality, and about individuals as participants and co-creators of this reality. Epistemological research in sociology is that important because the subject matter of sociology is very complex, and is a result the working of an infinite number of social processes. The paper is also an attempt at an a priori sociological interpretation, that is the understanding and individual character of social harmony.
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On Accelerations in Science Driven by Daring Ideas: Good Messages from Fallibilistic Rationalism

51%
Marciszewski W.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2015
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vol. 40
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issue 1
19-41
EN
The first good message is to the effect that people possess reason as a source of intellectual insights, not available to the senses, as e.g. axioms of arithmetic. The awareness of this fact is called rationalism. Another good message is that reason can daringly quest for and gain new plausible insights. Those, if suitably checked and confirmed, can entail a revision of former results, also in mathematics, and - due to the greater efficiency of new ideas - accelerate science’s progress. The awareness that no insight is secured against revision, is called fallibilism. This modern fallibilistic rationalism (Peirce, Popper, Gödel, etc. oppose the fundamentalism of the classical version (Plato, Descartes etc.), i.e. the belief in the attainability of inviolable truths of reason which would forever constitute the foundations of knowledge. Fallibilistic rationalism is based on the idea that any problem-solving consists in processing information. Its results vary with respect to informativeness and its reverse - certainty. It is up to science to look for highly informative solutions, in spite of their uncertainty, and then to make them more certain through testing against suitable evidence. To account for such cognitive processes, one resorts to the conceptual apparatus of logic, informatics, and cognitive science.
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Geltungsnoematische Struktur als Formalismus: Werner Flachs Negation und Andersheit heute

45%
Krijnen C.
Folia Philosophica
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2022
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vol. 47
1-53
EN
Hegel criticizes the mode of reflection that is typical of the transcendental philosophy of his age. The present article explores the relevance of Hegel’s criticism with regard to contemporary transcendental philosophy, in particular that of Werner Flach. Christian Krijnen shows that, despite substantial modifications of Kant’s conception of transcendental philosophy, not least inspired by Hegel, contemporary transcendental philosophy absolutizes the logic of essence. More precisely, from the perspective of its mode of reflection, contemporary transcendental philosophy basically is an absolutized form of external reflection.
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