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PL
In 1952 Witold Czachórski posited as a general principle of Polish contract law that legal actions leading of a transfer of wealth require for their validity a proper cause; the rule was construed as a mandatory one and precluded the creation of abstract obligations unless expressly permitted by law. Czachórski’s theory was underpinned by an in-depth analysis of the entire body of civil law, as well as axiological considerations that emphasized the need to control contractual fairness (Section 1). After 40 years of largely uncontroverted acceptance the rule was abruptly abandoned by the Supreme Court on grounds of freedom of contract (Section 2). Despite its fundamental nature, this change was not accompanied by any in-depth discussion in legal doctrine (Section 3). While unsatisfactory on a theoretical level, it seems in retrospect that this was, at a time of systemic transformation to a liberal market economy, a pragmatic and perhaps inevitable approach that served to further the newly re-established principle of freedom of contract. Paradoxically, however, with the contemporary shift to a more control-oriented approach to freedom of contract it would not be entirely surprising to see a rebirth of the role of cause and of Czachórski’s theory some time in the future (Section 4).
EN
In 1952 Witold Czachórski posited as a general principle of Polish contract law that legal actions leading of a transfer of wealth require for their validity a proper cause; the rule was construed as a mandatory one and precluded the creation of abstract obligations unless expressly permitted by law. Czachórski’s theory was underpinned by an in-depth analysis of the entire body of civil law, as well as axiological considerations that emphasized the need to control contractual fairness (Section 1). After 40 years of largely uncontroverted acceptance the rule was abruptly abandoned by the Supreme Court on grounds of freedom of contract (Section 2). Despite its fundamental nature, this change was not accompanied by any in-depth discussion in legal doctrine (Section 3). While unsatisfactory on a theoretical level, it seems in retrospect that this was, at a time of systemic transformation to a liberal market economy, a pragmatic and perhaps inevitable approach that served to further the newly re-established principle of freedom of contract. Paradoxically, however, with the contemporary shift to a more control-oriented approach to freedom of contract it would not be entirely surprising to see a rebirth of the role of cause and of Czachórski’s theory some time in the future (Section 4).
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