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Studia Gilsoniana
|
2017
|
vol. 6
|
issue 3
331-364
EN
Étienne Gilson juxtaposes what he calls Aquinas’s “existentialism” to what he calls Scotus’s “essentialism.” For Gilson, “existentialism” is philosophical truth, the only view compatible with an authentically Christian metaphysic, while “essentialism” is a Hellenic mistake that seduces Christian philosophers by appealing to the idolatrous desire to reduce reality to what is intelligible. In this paper, the author attempts to describe the difference between “essentialism” and “existentialism” as understood by Gilson. Then, he assesses the case for attributing “essentialism” to Scotus, based on an assessment of Scotus texts and secondary scholarship.
PL
It is generally considered that the principle of individuation is matter and that this doctrine comes from Aristotle. This paper will examine how medieval philosophers approached this problem and we will show that they offered various theories by which the principle of individuation could be matter, form, combination of matter and form, accidents or some special principle such as haecceitas, which we find in the school of J. Duns Scotus. We will assess how all these theories resolve the problem only partially, and thus indicate the need of a single principle of individuation. This becomes particularly relevant in the context of the metaphysical study of a human person. Our research will show that it is actus essendi, which is not only the act of all acts, but also the principle of all principles.
EN
Gilson came across Báñez’s commentary on the Summa Theologiae in 1952, and since then he saw in Báñez the confirmation of his own understanding of the act of being against the background of deviant interpretations made by other Thomists, especially Cajetan. In this paper, Gilson’s claims about the metaphysics of Báñez, including the actus essendi, the immortality of the soul, the relation between philosophy and theology, etc., are discussed. Although Gilson rectifies Báñez’s interpretations of Thomas’ ways and the act of being of the accidents, Gilson’s ultimate assessment of Báñez is positive to such an extent that for the French medievalist the Dominican of Salamanca will remain “the most Thomistic of all the Thomists that I have had the privilege of knowing.”
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2020
|
vol. 9
|
issue 1
33-62
EN
The author compares the views of Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Thomas Aquinas on the order in our knowledge of being. While Gilson and Maritain maintain that esse and the actus essendi are what are first known, Aquinas maintains consistently that it is the existent thing or the ens itself that is first known. The paper proceeds by first laying out the positions of Gilson and Maritain as evidenced in their respective works Being and Some Philosophers and Existence and the Existent. Then, it manifests what in their positions is correct and in what they err. And finally, it argues that ens is the first thing known by appealing to the proper object of the intellect, the order between the acts of the intellect, and the intellect’s mode of procedure. In the course of these arguments, the primary authoritative sources used are the works of Aquinas.
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