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Responding to Aesthetic Reasons

100%
EN
What makes a certain consideration an aesthetic reason rather than a reason of some other kind? Is it a solely a matter of the kind of attitude or activity that the reason supports? How fundamental or structural are such reasons? Do they contrast in a natural way with epistemic or practical reasons? Is skilled aesthetic achievement, whether interpretative or creative, a matter of recognizing the aesthetic reasons we have for a given response, and correctly according with such reasons? In this paper, I offer a preliminary discussion of these topics. I argue that our account of aesthetic reasons should respect the fact that they play an important regulative role, over and above directly supporting aesthetic response. Such a role allows aesthetic reasons to moderate a wide range of practical and epistemic activities, but not by adding or substituting distinctively aesthetic ends or purposes for such activities. I then go on to argue against the view that skilled aesthetic achievement consists in correct recognition of and accord with aesthetic reasons, adapting a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s.
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Aesthetic Supererogation

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EN
A number of moral philosophers have accepted the need to make room for acts of supererogation, those that go beyond the call of duty. In this paper, we argue that there is also good reason to make room for acts of aesthetic supererogation.
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Obligations to Artworks as Duties of Love

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EN
It is uncontroversial that our engagement with artworks is constrained by obligations; most commonly, these consist in obligations to other persons, such as artists, audiences, and owners of artworks. A more controversial claim is that we have genuine obligations to artworks themselves. I defend a qualified version of this claim. However, I argue that such obligations do not derive from the supposed moral rights of artworks – for no such rights exist. Rather, I argue that these obligations are instances of duties of love: obligations that one incurs in virtue of loving some object, be it a person or, in this case, an artwork.
EN
Damien Hirst is a “post-artist”; in other words, he is an artist who began his work after “the end of art.” He is a representative of the group called Young British Artists. In the article, his work becomes a pretext to take on the problem of “the end of art” and to discuss the difficulties with analysis related to it, thus defining the purpose and the aesthetic value of an art work. The author compares and critically considers the views of three art theorists: Donald Kuspit, Jean Baudrillard, and Arthur C. Danto. In the context of their theories, the author also analyses some chosen artworks of the so-called post-art.
EN
Stefan Morawski, one of the most prominent Polish esteticians, was exspecially interested in problems of axiology. He believed that proper axiology, based on empirical material and analysis, def ines the subject of estetic cognition. The article reconstructs the basic concepts of S. Morawski. In the f irst part of the text, presented in this current issue, the author discusses the concept of aestetic/artistic value, thee ontology of aestetic/artistic value, its objectivity, taste, aestetic experience and aestetic judgement. The author off ers a critical analysis of Morawski’s concept.
EN
The author, inspired by philosophical aesthetic reflection, presents one of the aesthetic qualities: ugliness. Based on the assumption that “Grimms’ Fairy Tales” directly reach the realm of the unconscious, utilising towards that end not only symbolic meaning, but also a wide range of operations through imagined sensory perception, she identifies in the texts such fragments of the stories which relate to specific sensations caused in the real world using physical stimuli. The analysis constitutes only a case-based introductory study of the issue of senses in literary texts. She does not focus on the tale as an independent existential creation, which carries a multitude of interpretative references and meanings, only the possibilities offered by the analysis of a work, which consists of a transfer of a literary description to the imagination of the sensory experience occurring (hypothetically) in the receiver’s imagination.
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EN
This paper investigates the way in which we adduce reasons in support of our aesthetic judgements. We examine the seemingly question-begging nature of that process, such that any aesthetic quality we adduce as a reason can be found compelling qua reason for a particular judgement if and only if that judgement is already assented to. We then analyse this phenomenon in the parallel contexts of gustatory taste and friendship, where the differences are understood to lie primarily with differences in the normative force of reasons held in support of gustatory judgements, aesthetic judgements, and personal friendships. While some question-begging obtains in all cases, in the latter we can begin to see that friendship can be justified with reference to its contribution to the good of ourselves. This is explored further in connection with the way in which examining our reasons for being friends with people is actually productive and generative of that friendship. Our conclusion is that while the giving of reasons for aesthetic judgements is still subject to a certain question-begging, those judgements acquire a powerful normative force in cultural contexts where it can be seen that assenting to them constitutes the realization of our good as individuals.
EN
In his article ‘Art and Time’ (1966) Patočka argues that Hegel rightly recognized a fundamental difference between classical and contemporary art. In developing Hegel’s insight he offers a conception of two eras of art, the ‘artistic’ era and the era of ‘aesthetic culture’. Patočka supposes that artworks of both the artistic era and the aesthetic era always open up a certain ‘meaning’ that gives human existence its fundamental points of reference. The status of this world, however, radically changed from one era to the next. The art of the artistic era offered objective and binding meaning, whereas aesthetic art offers personal or individual meaning. The current article points to an important discrepancy in Patočka’s treatment of the relation between the two eras, and presents Patočka’s later reading of Hegel’s notion of the past character of art. From the perspective of this interpretation, art reveals temporality as such, that is, as the ontological basis of the revelation of meaning. The article emphasizes that such an interpretation demonstrates the ontological relevance of the artwork in greater detail. Yet Patočka continued to use the concepts of the artistic era and the aesthetic era, without sufficiently clarifying the relationship between the two eras. Finally, the author argues that the discrepancy in the concept can be resolved with the help of Patočka’s later reflections on the ‘problematic nature’ of meaning. The article argues that in classical art such a nature is concealed, whereas in modern art it is revealed again. The article includes an English translation of Patočka´s ‘Art and Time’.
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Sociologická kritika filosofické estetiky

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EN
The aim of the text is to reconstruct and critically consider, on the basis of the findings of sociologists of culture (above all Pierre Bourdieu), the fundamental objections to philosophical aesthetics – aesthetic historicism and aesthetic scepticism. Aesthetic historicism confronts philosophical aesthetics at the methodological level by questioning the possibility of defining the concept of the aesthetic independently of a historically-conditioned aesthetic theory, or rather of normative decisions to be treated as a relevant part of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic scepticism calls into doubt the traditional conception of the autonomy of aesthetic values and of the objectivity of aesthetic evaluation. This position is elaborated in the text by reference to the example of the sociological critique of the opinions of the analytical aesthetician Frank Sibley on the logico-semantic status of aesthetic concepts. The concluding part of the text discusses the consequences that follow from the sociological critique for aesthe­tic axiology and for art criticism.
CS
Cílem textu je na základě poznatků a zjištění sociologů kultury (převážně Pierra Bourdieuho) rekonstruovat a kriticky promyslet základní výhrady vůči filosofické estetice: estetický historismus a estetický skepticismus. Estetický historismus konfrontuje filosofickou estetiku na metodologické rovině, protože zpochybňuje možnost vymezit pojem estetična nezávisle na historicky podmíněné estetické teorii, resp. normativních rozhodnutích, co budeme pokládat za relevantní součást estetické zkušenosti. Estetický skepticismus uvádí v pochybnost tradiční představu o autonomii estetické hodnoty a objektivitě estetického hodnocení. Tato pozice je v textu rozpracována na příkladu sociologické kritiky názorů analytického estetika Franka Sibleyho na logicko-sémantický status estetických pojmů. V závěrečné části textu jsou pojednány důsledky, jež ze sociologické kritiky vyplývají pro estetickou axiologii a uměleckou kritiku.
EN
In contrast to the generally accepted view that the value of a work of art lies entirely or primarily in its aesthetic value, I put forward the rather provocative assertion that the importance of aesthetic value has been overestimated and that it does not play the role that has been attributed to it up to this time. It should, however, be noted that my argument has nothing to do with programmatic attempts by advocates of so-called conceptual art to eliminate aesthetic value as a consideration, or with the effort to devalue it that has been made by followers of other postmodern tendencies. Rather, I am following up here on several of my previous articles in which I explained the need to recognize, in addition to the aesthetic value, the existence of another value – artistic value – that is no less important than aesthetic value. In this article, I want to take this argument a step further and show that artistic value is so fundamental in its importance that, in the valuation of works of art, it is the aesthetic value that plays second fiddle. I will put forward arguments that show that the huge differences in the prices of various works of art cannot be explained by the corresponding differences in their aesthetic value, but instead to the corresponding differences in their artistic value.
CS
Oproti všeobecně přijímanému názoru, podle kterého hodnota uměleckého díla spočívá výhradně či převážně v jeho hodnotě estetické, stavím poněkud provokativní tvrzení, že význam estetické hodnoty byl přeceněn a že při hodnocení výtvarných uměleckých děl zdaleka nehraje tu roli, která jí byla až dosud přisuzována. Toto mé tvrzení však nemá nic společného s programatickými pokusy o eliminaci estetické hodnoty ze strany propagátorů takzvaného konceptuálního umění ani se snahou o její devalvaci stoupenci jiných postmoderních směrů. Navazuji zde na několik předchozích publikací, ve kterých jsem vysvětloval nutnost uznat kromě hodnoty estetické i existenci další hodnoty – hodnoty umělecké, která je neméně důležitá než hodnota estetická. Zde chci tento argument posunout o krok dál a ukázat, že umělecká hodnota má zcela zásadní význam, takže při hodnocení uměleckých děl připadá estetické hodnotě role druhých houslí. Předložím argumenty, které ukazují, že obrovské rozdíly v cenách různých uměleckých děl nemohou být vysvětleny korespondujícími rozdíly v jejich hodnotě estetické, korespondují však s rozdíly v hodnotě umělecké.
EN
The article describes the transformations of the traditional category of beauty in the Croatian modernist discourse. Based on the analysis of works of Matoš, we offer a study of modernist concepts of beauty, manifested in the relations between beauty, art and life. The discourse in question simultaneously transforms and explains the sense of beauty, introduces into the world of aesthetic and artistic values central to the culture of modernism.
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Lze falzifikovat umělecké dílo?:

63%
EN
The author discusses Kulka’s study on aesthetics, especially in regards to the system he presents for the quantification of the value of a work of art; the article also deals in detail with certain “positivist” features of Kulka’s approach to art. From these the author then provides a detailed critique of selected examples. At the same time, however, he appreciates the readable and intellectually stimulating nature of Kulka’s book and of his texts in general.
CS
Autor diskutuje Kulkovu estetickou studii zejména ve vztahu k předkládanému schématu kvantifikace hodnoty uměleckého díla a zabývá se podrobně také jistými „pozitivistickými“ rysy Kulkova přístupu k tématu umění. Tyto pak na vybraných příkladech podrobně kritizuje. Současně však oceňuje zejména čtivou a myšlenkově stimulující povahu Kulkovy knihy a jeho textů obecně.
Amor Fati
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2015
|
issue 1
113-126
EN
The article relates to compounds of happiness with the literature, its purpose is to answer the question: what and why can literature talk about happiness? Different directions in literary studies occupy different positions to the values contained in the literary work. There is also no consensus as to whether it is the bearer of aesthetic func-tion. The author starts from the aesthetic function, which sees the only way to fulfill the value in the literary work to the reflection on the aesthetic value to propose a theoretical model of happiness in the literature. This model is based on the structural aesthetic by Jan Mukařovský, whose works are its theoretical foundations. In this connec-tion the two modes for its practice: evoking and showing, that explains an example of ‘Szczęśliwe drogi’ by K. K. Baczyński. Consideration sends attention to the impact on the valuation of happiness evoking literary work.
EN
The paper is a reflection about ways in which notions related to valuation function in literary criticism, focusing on processes of constructing, consolidating, and exchanging notions in socio-cultural circulation. Based on essays by, among others, Kacper Bartczak and Natalia Malek, who have different opinions about Louise Glück’s poetry, such notions as universality, honesty, female writing are considered.
PL
Celem artykułu Jak wytwarza się pojęcia wartościujące? Na przykładzie sporu o poezję Louise Glück jest refleksja nad sposobami funkcjonowania pojęć związanych z wartościowaniem w krytyce literackiej. Przedmiotem zainteresowania są procesy konstruowania, utrwalania oraz wymiany pojęć w społeczno-kulturowych obiegach. Na podstawie artykułów między innymi Kacpra Bartczaka oraz Natalii Malek, różnie oceniających wartość wierszy amerykańskiej noblistki, autorka tekstu bierze pod uwagę takie pojęcia, jak uniwersalność, szczerość, pisanie kobiece.
EN
In the following study, we perceive the literary text as a pretext for a decomposition analysis, while the new text modified by us (posttext) sheds an interpretive light on the examined verbal object in the ontological and axiological sense. Decomposition helps to analyze the way of construction and being of the original verbal artefact, as well as to highlight the functions it performs. In the first part we show the values of the poem Let (Flight) from the collection Pokosená hlina (Mowed Clay, 1999) by the contemporary Slovak writer Jozef Leikert on grounds of word-order decomposition strategies. In the second part we analyse the finished ”recomposition”, or rather a verbal adaptation of a canonized poetic text of Czech literature (a poem by Ondřej Koupil called Květen, 2020) and its interpretive possibilities with respect to the pretext, i.e. the poem Máj (May, 1836) by Karel Hynek Mácha.
CS
V následující studii vnímáme literární text jako pretext k dekompoziční analýze, přičemž nový, resp. námi upravený text (posttext) vrhá interpretační světlo na zkoumaný slovesný objekt ve smyslu ontologickém i axiologickém. Dekompozice pomáhá jednak analyzovat způsob výstavby a bytí původního slovesného artefaktu, rovněž zvýrazňuje funkce, které plní. V první části ukazujeme hodnoty básně Let ze sbírky Pokosená hlina (1999) současného slovenského spisovatele Jozefa Leikerta na pozadí slovosledných dekompozičních strategií, v druhé části pak analyzujeme už hotovou „rekompozici”, resp. slovesnou adaptaci kanonizovaného básnického textu české literatury (poéma Ondřeje Koupila nazvaná Květen, 2020) a její interpretační možnosti vzhledem k pretextu, tedy k poémě Máj (1836) Karla Hynka Máchy.
DE
In dem Artikel analysiere ich Ingardens Konzept des ästhetischen Wertes eines literarischen Werkes. Im Anschluss an Mitscherling versuche ich, Ingardens Ästhetik in sein phänomenologisch-ontologisches Gesamtprojekt einzuordnen. Ich behaupte, dass Ingardens Ästhetik nur dann richtig erkannt werden kann, wenn man seine ontologischen Überlegungen versteht, denn wie Ingarden selbst oft betont hat, sind alle seine philosophischen Untersuchungen eine realistische Antwort auf Husserls angebliche Hinwendung zum transzendentalen Idealismus. Zu diesem Zweck stelle ich Ansichten aus seiner Ästhetik und Ontologie nebeneinander und schaffe so einen kohärenten Werteansatz, in dem künstlerische und ästhetische Werte selbst auf die gleiche Weise analysiert werden, wie sie sich in einem literarischen Werk manifestieren. Ich behaupte, dass dank der ontologischen Analyse ästhetischer (und künstlerischer) Werte ein literarisches Werk in seiner Schichtstruktur transparenter wird.
PL
W artykule analizuję Ingardenowską koncepcję wartości estetycznej dzieła literackiego. Idąc tropem Mitscherlinga, próbuję umieścić estetykę Ingardena w ramach jego całościowego projektu fenomenologiczno-ontologicznego. Twierdzę, że estetykę Ingardena można właściwie poznać jedynie poprzez zrozumienie jego rozważań ontologicznych, ponieważ - jak często podkreślał sam Ingarden – wszystkie jego dociekania filozoficzne stanowią realistyczną odpowiedź na rzekomy zwrot Husserla w stronę idealizmu transcendentalnego. W tym celu zestawiam ze sobą poglądy z jego estetyki i ontologii, tworząc tym sposobem spójne ujęcie wartości, w którym same wartości artystyczne i estetyczne są analizowane w taki sposób, jak przejawiają się w dziele literackim. Twierdzę, że dzięki ontologicznej analizie wartości estetycznych (i artystycznych) dzieło literackie staje się bardziej przejrzyste w swej strukturze warstwowej.
EN
In this paper, I attempt to formulate an Ingardenian conception of the literary work’s aesthetic value. Following Mitscherling’s lead, I attempt to place Ingarden’s aesthetics within his overall phenomenological-ontological project. That is, I argue that Ingarden’s aesthetics can only be properly fathomed in the context of his ontological deliberations, since, as he himself often enunciated, all his philosophical investigations constitute a realist rejoinder to Husserl’s turn toward transcendental idealism. To this end, I bring together insights from his aesthetics and ontology to establish a coherent account of values, where artistic and aesthetic values are analyzed as they manifest themselves in the literary work of art. By attending to the ontology of its aesthetic (and artistic) values, I argue, the literary work’s stratified formation becomes more explicit.
EN
Celem artykułu są jest zaakcentowanie, iż w obliczu kryzysu werbalności obserwowalnego szczególnie w komunikacji masowej pojawia się pilna potrzeba reorientacji toczącej się zarówno w środowisku językoznawców, jak i literaturoznawców dyskusji na temat estetyki komunikacji werbalnej. Proponowana zmiana polega na oddaniu pierwszeństwa jakościom intelektualnym manifestującym się m.in. poprzez gradacyjną kategorię określoną na potrzeby prezentowanych rozważań jako kategoria wnikliwości. Nowością prezentowanych rozważań jest ujęcie tej kategorii w kontekście możliwości jej aplikacji do sprostania wyzwaniu, jakie stawia badaczom komunikacji XXI wieku problem wykrywania tekstów generowanych przez sztuczną inteligencję.
RU
Целью статьи является подчеркнуть, что обострение кризиса вербальности, проявляющееся особенно интенсивно в масскоммуникации, вызывает срочную необходимось переориентации дискуссии, которая идет в филологической общественности на тему эстетики словесного общения. Предлагаемое изменение заключается в том, чтобы в этой дисскусии дать первенство интеллектуальным ценностям, показателем которых среди остальных экспонентов можно принять градационную категорию глубины текста. Новизна рассуждений заключается в том, что вышеупомянутая категория рассматривается в контексте возможности ее применения для идентификации текстов, написанных искусстенным интеллектом, которая представляет собой настоящий вызов для исследователей коммуникации XXI века.  
PL
The aim of the paper is to stress that in the crisis of verbality observed specially in mass communication there is an urgent need for changing the direction of the discussion about the aesthetic value of verbal texts which is in progress in philological community. The change proposed is that the priority should be given to intellectual value manifested by the gradual category which could be named for the purposes of presented considerations as the thoroughness of the text. The novelty lies in the fact that the thoroughness of the verbal content is viewed in the context of a possible application  to detect AI-generated text which is the real challenge posed to the 21st century communication researchers.
XX
The aim of this study is to refute the frequent and repeated critical objections to Singer’s almost four-decades-old argument against speciesism. These objections are based, above all, on misunderstanding. There is misunderstanding not only of the argument itself, but also of Singer’s methodological starting point, which we have termed “Singer’s ethical razor”. In the text we show why it is not possible to reject Singer’s utilitarian argument only by rejecting utilitarianism en bloc. In the same way, we show why it is not appropriate to charge Singer with failing to extend his ethics to include plants and lifeless nature. In fact the opposite is true because Singer clearly demonstrates how environmental ethics relating to the protection of the wild can be based on the same principle of the equal consideration of interests which is the basis for the moral unacceptability of speciesism.
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