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EN
Analogical reasoning constitutes one of the ways the blind get to know the world; it enriches information and influences thinking. The purpose of the article is the presentation of results of research on reasoning using geometric analogies in blind pupils aged 10, 12 and 14. The study encompassed a group of 63 blind pupils and 63 seeing pupils. The study used the twelve series B matrices from the Progressive Matrices of John C. Raven. A detailed analysis of the dependencies between the variables permitted the determination of differences between groups of pupils in terms of reasoning using geometric analogies.
PL
Analogical reasoning constitutes one of the ways the blind get to know the world; it enriches information and influences thinking. The purpose of the article is the presentation of results of research on reasoning using geometric analogies in blind pupils aged 10, 12 and 14. The study encompassed a group of 63 blind pupils and 63 seeing pupils. The study used the twelve series B matrices from the Progressive Matrices of John C. Raven. A detailed analysis of the dependencies between the variables permitted the determination of differences between groups of pupils in terms of reasoning using geometric analogies.
EN
The construct of the organization of information processing (OIP) has been adopted as a possible cognitive mechanism responsible for human intelligent functioning. Participants (N = 77) were asked to solve an analogical reasoning task, a test of divided attention, a working memory capacity test, and Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices as a standard test of general fl uid intelligence. On the basis of the chronometric analysis of their performance in the analogy task, participants were divided into those preferring to use parallel or sequential modes of organization of information processing. It appeared that intelligent people using the parallel mode of processing obtained the best results in the analogical reasoning test. Other subgroups did not differ substantially from one another. It also appeared that intelligent people using the parallel mode of processing performed equally well regardless of their attentional resources and working memory capacity, whereas people using the sequential mode of processing were much more dependent on these basic cognitive limitations. A compensatory mechanism is suggested in order to account for this data: the parallel mode of processing probably helps to compensate for defi cient attention or impaired working memory, whereas the sequential mode cannot act in a compensatory way.
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Model precedensu z analogii

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PL
Apart from the concise presentation of the rule-based model of binding judicial precedent, this article describes two basic accounts of analogical reasoning in precedential law. The first account has been named: the factual model and the second: the rational model. This terminology was adopted due to the fact that the judgment of similarity within the factual model is deemed to be a direct result of the very facts of the cases being compared, or of the unfathomed mystical workings of human intuition (emotions), or the outcome desired for the case at hand. The rational model, in turn, is based upon the notion of precedential reasons and casual facts, i.e. the facts that are relevant in the light of such reasons. Dependence upon these two notions makes the rational model more predictable and explicable. In certain circumstances, however, analogy to proceeds needs therein some additional factors which do not stem from the gist of that model. The factual model, unpredictable though it may seem to be, is faster and apt to generate just, or socially desirable, conclusions, especially when utilized by a person of a great legal knowledge and experience.
PL
Francis Bacon podzielił nauki przyrodnicze na fizykę i metafizykę. Twierdził, że z czterech przyczyn wskazanych przez Arystotelesa tylko przyczyny materialne i sprawcze należą do dziedziny fizyki, a przyczyny celowe, czy też twierdzenia teleologiczne, zaliczyć trzeba do dziedziny metafizyki. Bacon sprzeciwiał się włączaniu teleologii do fizyki, ponieważ doświadczenie podpowiadało mu, że twierdzenia teleologiczne zniechęcają do poszukiwania przyczyn sprawczych dla zjawisk przyrodniczych. Relegował on teleologię do metafizyki, a nauka w dużej mierze poszła jego śladem, wykształcając przez kolejne czterysta lat coraz większą awersję do uwzględniania czynników teleologicznych w wyjaśnieniach naukowych. Zdaniem Bacona człowiek, z racji swojej natury, „wymyśla […] paralele, odpowiedniości i stosunki, które w rzeczywistości nie istnieją”. Jednak wraz z rozwojem nauki w zakresie odkrywania przyczyn materialnych i sprawczych, jaki zachodził od czasów Bacona, zaczęły pojawiać się paralele, odpowiedniości i stosunki bardziej zasadne niż zapewne mógłby on sobie wyobrazić. Krótko mówiąc, poszukiwanie przyczyn materialnych i sprawczych w przyrodzie przyniosło imponujące uzasadnienie również dla wnioskowania o przyczynach celowych. Wnioskowania teleologiczne powinny być dopuszczone w nauce wówczas, gdy uprawomocniają je świadectwa empiryczne. Narzędzie pozwalające ustalić, czy wnioskowanie teleologiczne jest prawomocne, stanowi analogia. Bacon mógłby pomóc nauce uniknąć stopniowego, lecz i nieuchronnego przejścia w stronę naturalizmu metodologicznego, gdyby położył nacisk na to, jak analogia, zastosowana w roli narzędzia analitycznego w procesie indukcji, prowadzi do zasadnych wniosków o istnieniu teleologii w przyrodzie.
EN
Francis Bacon divided natural science into physics and metaphysics. He claimed that of Aristotle’s four causes, only material and efficient causes belong to the realm of physics, and that final causes, or teleological claims, belong to the realm of metaphysics. Bacon objected to including teleology in physics because in his experience teleological claims tended to discourage the search for efficient causes for natural phenomena. Because Bacon relegated teleology to metaphysics science largely followed his lead, evolving over the next four hundred years a growing distaste for including any teleological implications in scientific explanations. Bacon claimed that human nature, “will yet invent parallels and conjugates and relatives, where no such thing is”. Yet, as the material and efficient causal discoveries by science have progressed since Bacon’s time, they have in turn revealed more legitimate parallels and conjugates and relatives than perhaps he could have ever imagined. Stated succinctly, the process of exploring material and efficient causes in nature has also given breathtaking justification for also inferring final causes as well. As such, inferences to teleology in science should be allowed where they are warranted by the empirical evidence. The tool for determining whether a teleological inference is warranted is analogy. Bacon could have helped science avoid its gradual but inexorable drift into methodological naturalism if he had emphasized how analogy, used as an analytical tool in the process of induction, legitimately leads to reasonable inferences of teleology in nature.
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