The author concentrates on the relation between person and body in phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Both of these traditions are, in their own way, critical towards the cartesian dualism. While phenomenology tries to overcome this dualism through the description of the experience of our corporeality from the first person point of view, analytic philosophy examines the metaphysical problem of the relation person and body from the third person perspective a usually proposes a materialist answer in the sense of an identity of person and body. The central part of the paper is a detailed analysis of Kripke’s challenge of contemporary materialism. The author argues that it is possible to accept Kripke’s modal and temporal arguments in favour of the dualism of person and body without being forced to accept the idea of dualism itself. It is the metaphysics of constitution that represents an alternative: the person is constituted by her body, but she is not identical with it. Surprisingly, it is the idea of the living body that is rediscovered in this solution – the idea which, in a sense, is a part of the phenomenological heritage, even though it is devoid of phenomenological anti-scientism and idealism.
The aim of this article is to uncover the relationships between philosophy and Massively Multiplayer Online Role-playing Games (hereinafter MMORPG) and their discussion fora; i.e. the relevance of existential and analytical philosophy to the virtual world of MMORPGs. Content analysis of writings by famous philosophers was employed as a reliable method for gathering relevant data, as it was for collecting useful information from MMORPG discussion fora. The author assumes that MMORPGs originated as a response to the super-technical and increasingly technocratic western world from which players want to escape in order to find a simpler and more challenging, yet virtual world.
It is often supposed that linguistic, conceptual and, perhaps, other kinds of intuitions are one of the most important tools used to test theories in analytical philosophy. On this view, intuitions thought to be rich enough to be applicable to all the data the philosopher has used in formulating and testing her theory; but specific enough to enable one to choose between competing theories; and transparent enough to be clearly relevant for the theory. In the light of certain examples from epistemology and philosophy of language, it is claimed here that these requirements are not met. Consequently, evaluation of philosophical theories on the basis of intuitions leads to unreliable and problematic results.
Hilary Putnam is widely considered as one of the most distinguished and important philosophers in the analytic tradition of the last fifty years. However, in his most recent publications he has started to emphasize various shortcomings and limitations of that powerful tradition, connected especially with its scientism and naturalism. He has also insisted that what we really need is a serious renewal and transformation of philosophy, drawing upon other philosophical traditions, including pragmatism. We should realize that although philosophy overlaps in some parts with science, it cannot be turned into a science. It is a humanistic enterprise having two dimensions, theoretical and moral, and it is unfortunate when we tend to forget about either of them.
Artykuł zawiera rozważania metafilozoficzne i metateoretyczne odnoszące się do uprawiania teorii prawa w nurcie klasycznego projektu analizy. Celem tych uwag jest ukazanie wyzwań, jakie klasycznemu projektowi analizy stawia pragmatyzm filozoficzny, a zwłaszcza pragmatyzm analityczny. Pierwsza część tekstu poświęcona jest przedstawieniu głównego nurtu powojennej polskiej teorii prawa jako realizacji programu analitycznego, za której przykład służą koncepcje Z. Ziembińskiego. W dalszej części charakteryzowany jest pragmatyzm analityczny w wersji R. Brandoma oraz wyzwania, jakie formułuje on pod adresem takich programów badawczych. Na koniec wskazane zostają korzyści filozoficzne, jakie klasyczna analiza odnieść może z przyswojenia sobie wyzwań analitycznego pragmatyzmu. Nalężą do nich możliwość przezwyciężenia dualizmu poznawczego, lepsze ugruntowania rozumności oraz poszerzenie o perspektywę antropologiczną.
EN
The article is a metaphilosophical and metatheoretical discussion relating to the theory of law pursued in the mainstream of the classical project of analysis. The purpose of these remarks is to show the challenges which philosophical pragmatism, and especially analytical pragmatism, poses to classical analysis. The first part of the text is devoted to the presentation of the mainstream of postwar Polish law theory as the implementation of the analysis program, with the conception of Z. Ziembinski serving as an example. The next part characterizes analytical pragmatism of R. Brandom and the challenges addressed to such research programs as classical analysis. The last part examines philosophical benefits that classical analysis could obtain by embracing the challenges of analytical pragmatism. These include the ability to overcome the cognitive dualism, better justification of rationality and extending the anthropological perspective.
Hilary Putnam is widely considered as one of the most distinguished and important philosophers in the analytic tradition of the last fifty years. However, in his most recent publications he has started to emphasize various shortcomings and limitations of that powerful tradition, connected especially with its scientism and naturalism. He has also insisted that what we really need is a serious renewal and transformation of philosophy, drawing upon other philosophical traditions, including pragmatism. We should realize that although philosophy overlaps in some parts with science, it cannot be turned into a science. It is a humanistic enterprise having two dimensions, theoretical and moral, and it is unfortunate when we tend to forget about either of them.
The aim of this article was the reconstruction and critical analysis of the concept of religion, faith and theology that can be extracted from selected works of Bochenski, coming mainly from an analytical period of his activity. Religion is a complex phenomenon for Bochenski. There are the pre-analytical (relation to the Absolute, the virtue of justice, or the form of answers to existential questions) and the analytical concept of religion (system of statements, analyzed for logical correctness, meaning and communication capabilities). The reference point is Christianity as a religion based on the dogmatic and ethical statements. Faith is primarily an act of reason, recognizing sentence as true under the pressure of the will. The object of faith is the system of sentences revealed by God and given by a religious institution. There is no evidence in faith, but only the respective reason. The main challenge becomes the justification of the basic dogma on the road of reductive inference (hypothesis religious). Faith, religious experience and reasoning are a way to know God. He revised his concept of faith, which has two levels: the base (minimum and consistent set of basic statements with the literal sense) and the superstructure (symbolic representation of basic sentences). The task of theology is axiomatization of sentences, which are the subject of faith. Theology must be linked to the logic, because it is possible then to avoid the errors of reasoning and precise its practice. Theology is therefore a rationalization of faith, studying the sources of revelation, fixing set of revealed sentences, clarification and explanation of the truths of faith. Bochenski rejected the so-called negative theology and stressed a critical role of philosophy in theology. He also advocated the creation of a national theology.
The article is a discussion text. In my response to the text dealing with semiotic problems (polysemy, vagueness, contextual dependence), I discuss the objections directed at semiotics as a tool for shaping appropriate language skills, in the context of the postulate of criticism. I accept the author’s opinions about limited possibilities in this regard. In my response to the texts on the philosophy of religion, I defend its status as a legitimate philosophical sub-discipline. Detailed issues in the field of philosophy of religion (including the problem of omnipotence) are also discussed. I defend the nature of the philosophy of religion as a discipline other than theology and not reducible to metaphysics.
PL
Artykuł jest tekstem dyskusyjnym. W dyskusji z tekstem poruszającym problemy semiotyczne (polisemia, nieostrość, zależność kontekstowa) omawiam i dyskutuję zarzuty kierowane pod adresem semiotyki jako narzędzia pozwalającego kształtować odpowiednie sprawności językowe, w kontekście postulatu krytycyzmu. Akceptuję opinie autorki tekstu o ograniczonych możliwościach w tym zakresie. W dyskusji z tekstami dotyczącymi filozofii religii bronię jej statusu jako uprawnionej subdyscypliny filozoficznej. Poddawane są także dyskusji szczegółowe kwestie z zakresu filozofii religii (m.in. problem wszechmocy). Bronię charakteru filozofii religii jako dyscypliny innej niż teologia i nie dającej się zredukować do metafizyki.
The subject of the paper is a critical analysis of Rorty’s idea of cultural politics, which has to substitute ontology. The author presents argumentation measured to analytical philosophy and suggested model of conversational philosophy (neologism for continental philosophy). He brings closer sketch of history from religion, through philosophy for literature appearing manner achievement so called beneficial truth. The author criticizes Rorty’s intention to pragmatism all in the world, rebuking him autodestructive performative contradiction.
RU
Предметом статьи является критический анализ предложенной Рорти идеи культурной политики, которая должна заменить онтологию. Аргументация автора нацелена на аналитическую философию и предложенную модель конверсационной философии (неологизм для континентальной философии). Он делает краткий обзор истории от религии через философию до литературы, указывая на способы достижения т. н. спасительной истины. Автор критикует намерение Рорти все прагматизировать, обвиняя его в автодеструктивном перформативном противоречии.
On the occasion of the hundredth birthday of an important proponent of critical rationalism, Hans Albert, this article maps the key moments of his intellectual development and above all outlines his relationship to selected philosophical currents of (not only) the twentieth century. Albert’s philosophical “breakthrough” occurred in the 1960s in an open dispute with the Frankfurt School. He then published his Traktat über kritische Vernunft (Treatise on Critical Reason), which stands out especially because of its surprising observations about the context of seemingly unconnected concepts in various problem areas. Albert thus finds, for example, a common property between scholastic and modern approaches to justifying knowledge (see the problem of justifying knowledge) and a similar inclination on the part of both neo-positivism and existentialism to create a conflict between objective knowledge and subjective decision (see the problem of value-neutrality), as well as finding an effort to create autonomous areas in analytical metaethics and philosophical hermeneutics (see the problem of the relativization of truth). The aim of this article is to explain these apparent incommensurabilities, especially through the prism of Albert’s Traktat über kritische Vernunft that will soon be published in the Czech translation.
CS
U příležitosti stých narozenin významného představitele kritického racionalismu, Hanse Alberta, mapuje tato stať klíčové momenty jeho intelektuálního vývoje, a především nastiňuje jeho vztah k vybraným filosofickým proudům (nejen) dvacátého století. Albertův filosofický „průlom“ nastal v šedesátých letech minulého století v otevřeném sporu s Frankfurtskou školou. Poté vydal svůj Traktat über kritische Vernunft, který vyniká zejména překvapivými postřehy ohledně souvislostí zdánlivě nespojitých koncepcí v různých problémových oblastech. Tak Albert například nachází společný rys mezi scholastickými a novověkými přístupy ke zdůvodnění poznání (viz problém zdůvodnění poznání) nebo podobný sklon novopozitivismu a existencialismu vytvářet rozpor mezi objektivním poznáním a subjektivním rozhodnutím (viz problém hodnotové neutrality) či snahu o vytvoření autonomních oblastí u analytické metaetiky či filosofické hermeneutiky (viz problém relativizace pravdy). Cílem této stati je vysvětlení těchto zdánlivých nesouměřitelností zejména prizmatem Albertova Traktat über kritische Vernunft, který se brzy dočká i českého vydání.
This article aims to present and analyze the stances of analytical philosophy as one of the most important schools of thought of the last century and their representatives on the ontological status of natural (moral) rights which has repeatedly become the target of criticism. The question of whether natural but also human rights exist is closely related to the existence of normative disciplines as such which for analytical philosophers represented one of their interests. The article presents a fundamental change in the perception of the ontology of abstract entities, natural rights included, and compares the Vienna Circle represented by Rudolf Carnap with post-war analytical philosophers such as Willard Van Orman Quine or Hilary Putnam. From Carnap’s internal and external questions, through Quine’s ontological commitment to Putnam’s abandonment of the last dogma of empiricism and Blackburn’s quasi-realism, the development of post-war analytical philosophy was accompanied by the change of perspective on classical ontology. This needs to be taken into consideration also in the case of natural and human rights. If the analytical philosophy urges us that classical ontology can no longer give us any answer, we need to find a new way to look at natural rights and their existence. This new perspective on the ontology of natural rights is analyzed in the article.
CS
Tento článek má za cíl představení a analyzování postojů analytické filosofie jakožto jednoho z nejvýznamnějších myšlenkových směrů minulého století a jejich představitelů k ontologickému statusu přirozených (morálních) práv, který se v historii opakovaně stal terčem kritiky. Otázka, zda přirozená, ale potažmo i lidská práva existují, úzce souvisí s existencí a povahou normativních disciplín jako takových, které pro analytické filosofy reprezentovaly jeden z jejich zájmů. Článek představuje zásadní změnu ve vnímání ontologie abstraktních entit, tedy i přirozených práv, u Vídeňského kroužku zastoupeného Rudolfem Carnapem ve srovnání s poválečnými analytickými filosofy jako Willard Van Orman Quine či Hilary Putnam. Od Carnapových interních a externích otázek přes Quinův ontologický závazek vůči abstraktním entitám až po Putnamovo zbavení se posledního dogmatu empiricismu a Blackburnův quasi-realismus, vývoj poválečné analytické filosofie s sebou přinesl změnu pohledu na klasickou ontologii, kterou je však potřeba zohlednit i u přirozených, ale potažmo též lidských práv. Pakliže nás analytická filosofie nabádá, že klasická ontologie nám odpověď na otázku po existenci přirozených práv dát nemůže, je třeba najít nový způsob, jak se dívat na přirozená práva a jejich ontologii. Právě tento nový pohled na ontologický status přirozených práv je v článku podroben rozboru.
The aim of this article is to present a characterization of Christian philosophy in terms of the notion of a research tradition. Since the work of Larry Laudan, it has been thought that the latter notion could prove useful for shedding light on the idea of Christian philosophy. To this end, the author first introduces the key concept of a ‘research tradition,’ and then proceeds to analyse the notion of an ‘image of the world,’ understood as something invariably associated with specific research traditions. The next step is the construction of a definition of Christian philosophy as a research tradition in project-based terms. The author sets out to demonstrate that Christian philosophy, as such a tradition, is both pluralistic and democratized. In conclusion, several higher-order proposals are formulated with respect to the right method for pursuing Christian philosophy. In particular, the approach adopted should be one oriented towards possibilities of discussion: i.e. a non-dictatorial game unfolding with the participation of representatives from various research traditions who endorse different images of the world.
PL
Celem artykułu jest charakterystyka filozofii chrześcijańskiej w kategoriach tradycji badawczej. Za Larrym Laudanem uznano, że tradycja badawcza nadaje się do eksplikacji pojęcia filozofii chrześcijańskiej. W tym celu autor przybliża najpierw kluczowe pojęcie tradycji badawczej, następnie analizuje pojęcie obrazu świata, które zawsze jest związane z określoną tradycją badawczą. Kolejnym krokiem jest konstrukcja projektującej definicji filozofii chrześcijańskiej jako tradycji badawczej. W artykule wykazano, że filozofia chrześcijańska jako tradycja badawcza jest tradycją pluralistyczną i zdemokratyzowaną. Na zakończenie sformułowano kilka deklaracji metaprzedmiotowych, odnoszących się do metody uprawiania filozofii chrześcijańskiej. Metodą tą powinna być dyskutowalność, czyli niedyktatorska gra zachodząca między przedstawicielami różnych tradycji badawczych wyznających odmienne obrazy świata.
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