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1
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2016 Amendment of the Czech Significant Market Power Act of 2009

100%
Frischmann P., Šmejkal V.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2016
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vol. 9(14)
227-246
EN
The Significant Market Power Act (SMPA) adopted in 2009 regulates the assessment of, and the prevention of, the abuse of market power in the sale of agricultural and food products. The Act generated many controversies from the outset, survived legislative proposals for its abolition, to be finally amended in 2016. However, this kind of legislation failed to solve most of the problems and even managed to create additional controversies. The new amendment formally simplified the actual wording of the SMPA by transposing its numerous earlier appendixes, which contained an exemplary list of prohibited forms of SMP abuse, to the actual text of the Act. It also improved transparency and clarity with respect to its earlier vague and ambiguous terminology. At the same time, the amendment seriously modified the scope and principal philosophy of the SMPA by removing the previously required “substantial detriment to economic competition” as the pre-condition of the applicability of the Act. However, since the enforcement of the SMPA falls into the scope of the activities of the Czech Office for Protection of Economic Competition (in Czech Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže, UOHS), the concerns and doubts of the business community continue to grow whether this form of regulation is appropriate after the modification of the concept.
FR
La Loi sur les pouvoirs de marchés significatifs (« SMPA ») adoptée en 2009 réglemente l'évaluation et la prévention de l'abus de pouvoir de marché dans la vente de produits agricoles et alimentaires. Cette loi a provoqué de nombreuses controverses dès le début, a survécu les propositions législatives pour son abolition pour être finalement modifiée en 2016. Cependant, cette législation non seulement n'a pas réussi à résoudre la plupart des problèmes, mais a provoqué des controverses supplémentaires. Le nouvel amendement a simplifié le language du « SMPA » par la transposition de ses nombreuses annexes antérieures, qui ont contenu la liste exemplaire des abus interdites de « SMPA » au texte de la Loi. Il a également amélioré la transparence et la clarté par rapport à la terminologie vague et ambiguë antérieure du « SMPA ». En même temps, l'amendement a modifié sérieusement la portée et la philosophie principale du « SMPA » par la suppression de notion de « préjudice substantiel à la concurrence économique » qui a constitué précédemment une condition préalable de l’application de la Loi. Toutefois, vue que l'application du “SMPA” entre dans le cadre des compétences de l’Autorité de la concurrence tchèque (en tchèque : Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže, UOHS), les préoccupations et les doutes du business si cette réglementation est appropriée après la modification du concept continuent à monter.
2
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The Evolution of Classical Evaluation Standards in Competition Law: The Legal Assessment of Tying in View of Challenges Raised by Digital Markets

89%
Musielak M.
Studia Prawa Publicznego
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2021
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vol. 3
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issue 35
113-139
EN
This paper provides a detailed review of evaluation standards for the legal assessment of tying. This practice, which constitutes an abuse of a dominant position, is a significant breach of competition law. The mechanism of this type of abuse is based on taking advantage of market power in the supply of one product to create packed offerings capable of precluding competition from superior rival solutions. Tying occurs when one product, the “tying product”, is sold only with another product, the “tied product”. In the prevailing number of cases, tying serves to consolidate the company’s dominant position on the tied product market, which usually aims to share the tying product’s large customer group with the less-desired product. However, tying is not illegal per se. In many cases, it does not lead to any anti-competitive concerns, and might be beneficial for consumers. This is why each assessment of this conduct must be carefully evaluated with special attention given to the effects, in accordance with the generally applied effect-based approach, and also potential efficiencies. An analysis of the case-law and literature reveals the basic mechanisms for conducting a legal assessment of tying. However, the use of these mechanisms will not be possible without their adaptation to the ongoing changes caused by technological development. Digital markets not only generate incremental revenues, but are also the sources of new or unusual legal arrangements. It will more frequently be the case that existing provisions will not be able to address every new practice accurately without new acts. The Digital Markets Act aims to adapt the existing legal framework to contemporary market realities and to become a modern tool for enforcing competition law rules on digital markets. The European Commission is seeking to broaden its powers to intervene at the earliest possible stage, before an undertaking affects the competition on a market.
3
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The Principles of Article 102(c) TFEU in Cases of Non-exclusionary Secondary Line Discrimination on Grounds Other than Nationality Case Comment to the Judgment of EU Court of Justice of 19 April 2018 Meo-Serviços de Comunicações e Multimédia (C-525/16)

88%
Szczodrowski J.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2019
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vol. 12
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issue 20
269-278
FR
Bien que les cas d’application de l’article 102, point c), du TFUE puissant difficilement être considérés comme rares, ils ont été appliqués jusqu’à present à deux ensembles de situations essentiellement différentes: la discrimination fondée sur la nationalité, d’une part, et les autres formes de discrimination, d’autre part. Si le nombre de cas de la première catégorie de demandes est relativement élevé et si les critères d’application de l’article 102, point c), du TFUE à de tells situations semblent simples, il existe moins de cas où l’article 102, point c), du TFUE a été appliqué à une discrimination secondaire non exclusive fondée sur des motifs autres que la nationalité, et les critères d’application sont sans doute moins clairs. La décision rendue dans l’affaire C-525/16 MEO représente une étape importante, mais non révolutionnaire. Elle peut être considérée, à certains égards, comme apportant une certaine nouveauté (par exemple, la delimitation des champs d’application respectifs de l’article 102, point b), et de l’article 102, point c), du TFUE), mais elle confirme plutôt les principes qui ont été établis antérieurement (i.e., la notion de désavantage concurrentiel). L’enseignement de la Cour sur les éléments dont les autorités de concurrence et les juridictions de l’UE peuvent disposer pour établir l’existence d’un désavantage concurrentiel, au sens de l’article 102, point c), du TFUE, peut sans doute être interprété de diverses manières. Pourtant, elle détermine dans une certaine mesure les instruments don’t les autorités et les tribunaux peuvent disposer et laisse une certaine place à des arguments raisonnables liés au bien-être.
EN
Although the instances of application of Article 102(c) TFEU can hardly be described as rare, to date it has been applied to essentially two sets of diverging situations, namely to discrimination on grounds of nationality on the one hand, and other forms of discrimination on the other. While there is a relatively high number of instances of the former category of applications, and the criteria of the application of Article 102(c) TFEU to such situations seem straightforward, fewer cases exist in which Article 102(c) TFEU was applied to non-exclusionary secondary line discrimination on grounds other than nationality, and the criteria of application are arguably less clear. The judgment in case C-525/16 MEO represents a significant, yet not a revolutionary step in its interpretation. While in some respects, it may be seen as bringing some novelty (for example, the delineation of the respective scopes of application of Article 102(b) and Article 102(c) TFEU), in others (that is, the notion of competitive disadvantage), it rather confirms the principles which have been previously established. Arguably, the Court’s teaching on the elements which the competition authorities and courts across the EU may have at their disposal to establish the existence of competitive disadvantage, within the meaning of Article 102(c) TFEU, is open to various interpretations. Yet it does to a certain extent shape the toolkit that these authorities and courts may have at their disposal and leaves some room for reasonable welfare related arguments.
4
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Recent Developments in Slovak Competition Law - Legislation and Case Law Review

88%
Šabová Z., Fodorová K., Lukáčová D.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2013
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vol. 6(8)
223-243
5
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Particularities of Proving a Single and Continuous Infringement of EU Competition Rules

88%
Romić M. R.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2020
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vol. 13
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issue 22
FR
Une infraction unique et continue aux règles de concurrence de l’UE est une forme qualifiée d’infraction au droit de la concurrence de l’UE caractérisée par l’existence d’un projet commun aux entreprises ayant un objectif unique. Compte tenu de la spécificité de cette forme d’infraction, la preuve est différente de la procedure de preuve standard pour prouver les infractions aux règles de concurrence devant les tribunaux de l’UE. Cet article vise à donner un aperçu des règles de prevue à travers la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’UE et à en analyser l’application dans la pratique.
EN
A single and continuous infringement of EU competition rules is a qualified form of infringement of EU Competition Law characterized by the existence of a global plan having a single objective between undertakings. Given the specificity of this form of infringement, proving it is somewhat different from the standard evidentiary process for proving infringements of competition rules before EU courts. This article aims to give an overview of the evidentiary rules through the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and analyze their application in practice.
6
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Antitrust and Copyright Collectives – an Economic Analysis

88%
Zabłocka A.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2008
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vol. 1(1)
152-165
EN
The activity of the copyright collecting societies had been scrutinized by many antitrust authorities. The paper presents the decision taken by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), which deals with abusing practices of Polish copyright collective society – ZAiKS. The paper concentrates on the economic aspects of the decision from the President of UOKiK.
7
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Antitrust liability in the context of online platforms. Case comment to the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of 21 January 2016 ‘Eturas’ UAB v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba (Case C-74/14)

88%
Targański B.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2016
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vol. 9(14)
293-298
8
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Gateways to the Internet Ecosystem – Enabling and Discovery Tools in the Age of Global Online Platforms

75%
Firniksz J., Dömötörfy B. T., Mezei P.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2022
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vol. 15
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issue 26
131-156
FR
L’affaire Google Shopping a fourni des leçons importantes qui vont au-delà de l’application du droit de la concurrence. Les «outils d’activation et de découverte» créent une couche qui sert de passerelle vers l’écosystème d’Internet. Par conséquent, d’une part, ils jouent un rôle clé pour assurer l’ouverture de l’écosystème d’Internet et, d’autre part, ils exercent une influence primordiale sur les expériences des consommateurs et leurs processus cognitifs, qui à leur tour déterminent les transactions des consommateurs en ligne. Les outils d’activation et de découverte, tells que l’adoption de méthodes de conception basées sur les sciences comportementales appliquées (par exemple: la conception de l’expérience utilisateur (EU) et la conception de l’interface utilisateur (UI)), créent des défis mondiaux au carrefour du droit de la concurrence, du droit de la consommation et de la réglementation des plateformes. Dans le même temps, compte tenu de la complexité de l’économie des plateformes, certains phénomènes de marché pourraient être particulièrement difficiles à identifier et à traiter, alors qu’une adaptation rapide et efficace est un facteur essentiel pour les acteurs du marché. Cela place le plaidoyer pour la promotion d’un environnement concurrentiel au centre de l’attention également au niveau national, en particulier là où un double régime d’application du droit rend possible une approche multifocale.
EN
The Google Shopping case has provided significant lessons that reach beyond antitrust enforcement. ‘Enabling and discovery tools’ create a layer that serves as a gateway to the Internet ecosystem. Therefore, on the one hand, they play a key role in ensuring the openness of the Internet ecosystem, and on the other hand, they exercise a primary influence on consumer experiences and their cognitive processes, which in turn determine online consumer transactions. Enabling and discovery tools, such as adopting design methods based on applied behavioural sciences (for example: user experience design (UX) and user interface design (UI)), create global challenges at the crossroads of antitrust, consumer law and platform regulation. At the same time, in light of the complexity of the platform economy, some market phenomena might be particularly difficult to identify and address, while fast and efficient adaptation is an essential factor for market players. This brings advocacy – the promotion of a competitive environment – into the focus also at the national level, particularly where a dual enforcement regime makes a multifocal approach possible.
9
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What Role for EU Competition Law in Regulated Industries? Reflections on the judgment of the General Court of 17 December 2015 Orange Polska v European Commission (Case T-486/11)

75%
Marco Colino S.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2016
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vol. 9(14)
265-278
10
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Arbitraż a prawo konkurencji – głos w dyskusji (artykuł polemiczny)

75%
Bagdziński T.
internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny
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2015
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vol. 4
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issue 4
69-74
PL
Artykuł jest głosem w dyskusji dotyczącej możliwości rozstrzygania sporów z zakresu prawa konkurencji za pomocą arbitrażu. Stanowi polemikę z artykułem autorstwa Piotra Nowaczyka i Szymona Sypa, którzy opowiedzieli się za możliwością rozstrzygania sporów z zakresu prawa konkurencji w drodze arbitrażu. Autor przedstawia argumenty dotyczące publicznoprawnego charakteru regulacji, jaką jest prawo konkurencji i skutków z tego wynikających, w szczególności w zakresie celów realizowanych regulacjami oraz kontroli nad orzecznictwem z tego zakresu, a także trudności z potencjalną egzekucją rozstrzygnięć zapadłych w arbitrażu.
EN
This article is a voice in the discussion whether a competition law dispute may be resolved by way of arbitration. It constitutes a polemic response to an earlier article written by Piotr Nowaczyk and Szymon Syp who argue in favour of such a solution. By contrast, the author of this paper stresses the public-law character of competition law and the resulting repercussions, especially with respect to the goals of competition law and judicial control over its enforcement. The author notes also the potential difficulties with the execution of verdicts reached in arbitration.
11
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Arbitration Agreements and Actions for Antitrust Damages After the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide Judgment

75%
Sadrak K.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2017
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vol. 10(16)
77-106
EN
On May 21st 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union in CDC Hydrogen Peroxide decided whether the application of jurisdiction clauses in actions for damages impedes the effective enforcement of EU competition law. The CJ stayed silent, however, on how to treat arbitration clauses, which similarly to jurisdiction clauses, exclude a default court jurisdiction. The question of how to interpret arbitration agreements in the event of an antitrust violation and subsequent actions for damages remains thus unanswered. In light of the foreseen increase in private enforcement of EU competition law, this problem gains significance. This is because arbitration agreements may be frequently used to govern commercial relationships between antitrust infringers and their injured direct contractors. Against this background, the paper aims to analyse the consequences brought about by the existence of arbitration clauses in the event of actions for antitrust damages. It seeks to answer two questions: whether the claims for antitrust damages can be per se arbitrated, and whether the general arbitration clauses used by the parties to regulate their commercial relations cover the actions for antitrust damages. In order to address these problems, the papers draws attention to the CJ’s interpretation of jurisdiction clauses and the Polish experience of interpreting the scope of arbitration agreements in the field of unfair competition law. The paper reaches the conclusion that neither the arbitration nor EU law prevent arbitrating actions for antitrust damages. Whether a specific arbitration agreement covers actions for antitrust damages or not can be analyzed only with reference to the will of the parties interpreted under applicable national law. It is believed, however, that there are many reasons to adopt an arbitration-friendly interpretation of vague arbitration agreements.
12
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La limitación de la producción de los aceites de oliva por parte del estado español

71%
Latorre Ruiz J.
Przegląd Prawa Rolnego
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2021
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issue 2(29)
265-275
IT
Il settore agroalimentare presenta, in generale, una situazione piuttosto complicata per quanto riguarda l’instabilità dei prezzi alla fonte. Tuttavia, con l’ultimo anello della catena, ovvero il marketing, la situazione è completamente diversa: questo settore, di solito, trae profitto dalla vendita dei prodotti agricoli. In Spagna, il settore dell’olio d’oliva soffre ripetutamente di questo tipo di squilibrio. Per cui, viste le circostanze, il legislatore ha scelto di approvare, con Regio Decreto, delle regole di base che consentano il ritiro ordinato della produzione dal mercato, al fine di alleviare la situazione precaria, soprattutto in termini di prezzi, e lo ha fatto sulla base di un regolamento dell’UE. Nell’articolo ci poniamo la domanda se il regolamento in questione possa portare a creare una instabilità concorrenziale sul mercato oppure se possa, forse, aiutare a stabilizzare i prezzi “alla fonte” del settore olivicolo, e quindi di tutelare i consumatori.
EN
The instability of prices of produce at the source of its production in the agri-food sector presents a rather complicated situation. However, regarding the last link in the chain, namely marketing, the situation is quite different and this sector usually makes a profit on the sale of agricultural products. In Spain, the olive oil sector repeatedly suffers from this type of imbalance. Given these circumstances, the legislator has chosen to adopt, by means of a Royal Decree, some basic regulations that allow withdrawal of a certain production from the market in an orderly manner to alleviate the precarious situation, especially in terms of prices. This was done based on the European Union Regulation. In this article, the question that is asked is whether the operation of this regulation might lead to the distortion of the free market competition, or whether, perhaps, it may help to stabilise the prices at the source (original) production in the olive sector and thus protect the consumers.
PL
Sytuacja w sektorze rolno-spożywczym jest dość skomplikowana z uwagi na niestabilność cen produktów na początku procesu ich wytwarzania. Inaczej jest na ostatnim jego etapie, jakim jest marketing, który zapewnia zysk ze sprzedaży tych produktów. W sektorze oliwy z oliwek w Hiszpanii ten brak równowagi istnieje już od dłuższego czasu. W tej sytuacji hiszpański ustawodawca zdecydował się przyjąć, w drodze dekretu królewskiego, podstawowe zasady wycofania danej produkcji z rynku, aby złagodzić niepewną sytuację, zwłaszcza w zakresie cen, i uczynił to, bazując na rozporządzeniu Unii Europejskiej. W artykule postawiono pytanie, czy może to spowodować zakłócenia na wolnym rynku, czy raczej prowadzić do ustabilizowania cen na pierwszym etapie produkcji oliwek, a tym samym chronić konsumentów.
ES
El sector agroalimentario presenta con carácter general una situación bastante complicada en lo que se refiere a la inestabilidad de los precios en origen. No sucede lo mismo con el último eslabón de la cadena, el de la comercialización, que normalmente obtiene beneficios por la venta de dichos productos. El sector del aceite de oliva en España sufre este tipo de desequilibrios y, además, lo hace de forma recurrente. Ante estas circunstancias el legislador español  ha optado por aprobar mediante Real Decreto, el establecimiento de las normas básicas que permitan de forma ordenada retirar la producción del mercado al objeto de paliar la situación precaria sobre todo en los precios y lo ha hecho basándose en la aplicación de un Reglamento europeo. En este artículo nos planteamos si esta norma puede provocar la falta de competencia en el mercado o, si bien, consigue estabilizar los precios en origen del sector oleícola y, a su vez, no genera un perjuicio al consumidor.
13
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EU competition law and artificial intelligence : reflection on antitrust and consumer protection issues

63%
Krausová A.
The Lawyer Quarterly
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2019
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vol. 9
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issue 1
79-84
EN
The paper provides a brief overview of problems identified with use of artificial intelligence in the area of EU competition law. The paper extends the prevalent focus on pricing algorithms and price discrimination and shows how else artificial intelligence could be used to inhibit competition or harm a consumer. Potential possibilities related to agreements between undertakings, abuse of a dominant position and consumer protection including advertising and unfair commercial practices are described.
14
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Gun Jumping in Selected SEE Countries – an Obvious Risk in M&A Transactions

63%
Zrno Prošić M., Radovanović R., Kordić R.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2020
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vol. 13
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issue 22
211-232
FR
« Gun jumping » est un terme qui décrit la réalisation prématurée d’une fusion avant d’obtenir l’autorisation des autorités de la concurrence compétentes. Au cours des dernières années, la Commission européenne et les autorités nationales de la concurrence ont montré un intérêt accru pour les affaires de « gun jumping ». Reconnaissant cet intérêt et le nécessité d’une guidance pratique, l’article donne d’abord un aperçu de l’évolution du « gun-jumping » à travers la jurisprudence. Il souligne ensuite les différents seuils de notification des fusions dans la région, et les implications qu’ils pourraient avoir pour les questions de « gun jumping », pour montrer que malgré les points de convergence dans la région, les seuils de notification des fusions diffèrent sensiblement d’un pays à l’autre, d’une manière qui exige une organisation prudente et parfois difficile des activités de fusion et d’acquisition à portée régionale. Sur la base d’une vue d’ensemble des cas particuliers de « gun jumping » dans la région et en tenant compte des précédents de l’UE, l’article fournit des recommandations sur la manière d’éviter les risques de « gun jumping ».
EN
Gun jumping is a term which describes the premature realization of a merger before obtaining a merger clearance from the relevant competition authorities. In the last years, the European Commission and national competition authorities have demonstrated an increased interest in investigating and punishing gun jumping cases. Recognizing this interest and the need for practical guidance, the article first gives an overview of gun-jumping evolution through case law. It then points to different merger filing thresholds in the region, and implications they could have for gun-jumping issues, to show that despite the commercial and historical common ground in the region, merger filing thresholds do differ significantly between the countries, in a way which requires a cautious and sometimes challenging structuring of M&A activities with regional reach. Based upon an overview of individual gunjumping cases in the region, but taking into account the EU precedents, the article provides recommendations how to avoid gun-jumping risks.
15
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Institutional Design, Efficiency and Due Process in Competition Enforcement: Lessons from Slovenia and Serbia

63%
Smiljanić V., Rihtar K.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2020
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vol. 13
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issue 22
67-88
FR
L’article compare les conceptions institutionnelles et l’héritage historique du cadre slovène et serbe d’application des règles de concurrence, et examine les avantages et les inconvénients de chaque modèle. La Slovénie a mis en oeuvre un modèle mixte, dans lequel la procédure d’application des règles de concurrence est répartie entre des procédures administratives d’enquête et de sanction fonctionnellement distinctes. Le modèle slovène a été généralement perçu comme peu efficace, avec des difficultés spécifiques dues au manque de clarté des relations entre les procédures administratives et les procédures pénales. D’autre part, la Serbie a considérablement modifié sa conception institutionnelle en 2009, passant de ses traditions d’inspiration autrichienne à une procédure administrative unique. Le nouveau système semble avoir été plus efficace, mais de solides sauvegardes juridictionnelles sont nécessaires. Les auteurs examinent la question d’un point de vue national et international, en tenant compte de la directive ECN+ et de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne et de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme.
EN
The article compares the institutional designs and historic legacy of the Slovenian and Serbian competition enforcement framework, and discusses the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Slovenia implemented a mixed model, where the competition enforcement procedure is divided into functionally separate investigation and misdemeanour administrative procedures for the imposition of sanctions. The Slovenian model has generally been perceived as inefficient, with specific difficulties arising from the unclear relationship between the administrative and the misdemeanour procedures. On the other hand, Serbia significantly changed its institutional design in 2009 from its Austrian-inspired roots to a single administrative procedure. The new system appears to have been more effective, but strong judicial safeguards are necessary. The Authors further review the matter from a national and international point of view, considering the ECN+ Directive and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and European Court of Human Rights.
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What’s New in Western Balkans?

63%
Gajin D.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2018
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vol. 11(18)
285-296
EN
Western Balkan jurisdictions (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia (FYROM)) are often outside the focus of the competition community in the EU. This paper aims to rectify that, by providing an overview of the most interesting competition law developments in these jurisdictions during 2017. The overview will show that, despite similarities in their competition legislation, the observed jurisdictions differ when it comes to their priorities in competition law enforcement: while for some the accent is on merger control, for others it is on antitrust. The paper also highlights certain peculiarities of the observed jurisdictions, even though they are all based on the EU model. These include the existence of a notification system with respect to individual exemptions of restrictive agreements in three out of the four observed jurisdictions.
FR
Les juridictions des Balkans occidentaux (Serbie, Monténégro, Bosnie-et-Herzégovine et Macédoine (ARYM)) souvent ne sont pas au centre du débat sur la concurrence d l’UE. Cet article vise à remédier à cela, en donnant un aperçu des plus intéressants développements du droit de la concurrence dans ces pays au cours de 2017. La vue d’ensemble indique que, en dépit des similitudes dans leur législation sur la concurrence, les juridictions observées diffèrent en ce qui concerne leurs priorités en matière d’application du droit de la concurrence: alors que pour certains l’accent est mis sur le contrôle des concentrations, pour d’autres il est sur la concurrence. L’article met également en évidence certaines particularités des juridictions observées, même si elles sont toutes basées sur le modèle de l’UE. Ceux-ci comprennent l’existence d’un système de notification en ce qui concerne les exemptions individuelles des accords restrictifs dans trois des quatre juridictions observées.
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The Effects of Antitrust Enforcement Decisions in the EU

63%
Dinev A.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2014
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vol. 7(10)
59-84
EN
In the complex procedural aftermath of Regulation 1/2003, a more systemic approach to antitrust enforcement by various authorities – EU and national, judicial and administrative – could supplement existing cooperation mechanisms with a truly integrated system of rules and decisions. This is the core argument of this article, as it examines the effects of antitrust enforcement decisions in the EU from three different but related angles
FR
Vu la complexité procédurale qui caractérise, depuis l’entrée en vigueur du règlement n° 1/2003, la mise en œuvre du droit antitrust européen par une multitude d’autorités – européennes et nationales, judiciaires et administratives –, une approche dite systémique pourrait compléter les mécanismes de coopération actuels avec un système plus cohérent de règles et de décisions. Tel est l’argument principal de cet article, qui examine successivement, sous trois angles différents, les effets que peuvent avoir les décisions antitrust dans l’UE.
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Provisions of the Damages Directive on Limitation Periods and their Implementation in CEE Countries

51%
Vlahek A., Podobnik K.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2017
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vol. 10(15)
147-176
EN
The article analyses the provisions on limitation of antitrust damages actions set out in Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. It presents (draft) implementing legislation of CEE countries from the perspective of their general rules on limitation, and the problems the Member States have faced in the process of transposing the Directive into their national legal systems. Within that, focus is placed upon the analysis of the types of limitation periods, their length and their suspension or interruption. In addition, the authors present the effects of the new limitation regime on the balance between the interests of the claimants and of the defendants, as well as on the relation between public and private antitrust enforcement.
19
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Effectiveness of Judicial Review in the Polish Competition Law System and the Place for Judicial Deference

51%
Bernatt M.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
|
2016
|
vol. 9(14)
97-124
EN
The article discusses the effectiveness and the intensity of judicial review in the Polish competition law system. First, it studies whether the judicial review offered by the 1st instance Court of Competition and Consumer Protection in Warsaw (SOKiK) is effective in practice. Next, the article analyzes whether Polish courts tend to defer to the findings of the Polish competition authority, UOKiK. Judgments of the Supreme Court concerning relevant market definition serve as case studies. Finally, the article discusses whether proceedings before the Polish competition authority ensure sufficient due process guarantees, the impartiality of decision-makers, and the overall expert character of UOKiK’s decision-making process. On this basis the article examines whether there are grounds for the reviewing courts to defer to UOKiK’s findings. The article concludes that currently the review undertaken by SOKiK happens to be superficial and thus ineffective. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s review of the determination of the relevant market is not deferential towards UOKiK’s findings. The Supreme Court substitutes its own definition of the relevant market for that of UOKiK and that of the lower courts. However, the article shows that there are no grounds at the moment for arguing for greater judicial deference. Proceedings held before UOKiK, despite recently introduced improvements, still do not offer sufficient due process guarantees or a division between investigatory and decision-making functions. In addition, UOKiK’s expertise is not sufficient for both institutional and practical reasons.
FR
L'article analyse l'efficacité et de l'intensité du contrôle juridique dans le droit de la concurrence en Pologne. Premièrement, il examine si le contrôle juridique mené par la cour de première instance, la Cour de la concurrence et de la protection des consommateurs à Varsovie (SOKiK), est efficace. Ensuite, l'article analyse si les tribunaux polonais ont tendance à se référer aux décisions de l'Autorité polonaise de la concurrence (UOKiK). Les arrêts de la Cour suprême concernant la définition du marché pertinent font l'objet d'études de cas. Enfin, l'article examine si les procédures devant l'Autorité polonaise de la concurrence assurent des garanties du procès équitable, l'impartialité des décideurs et le caractère expert du processus décisionnel de l'UOKiK. Par cette analyse, l'article tente à déterminer s'il existe des motifs que les tribunaux font preuve de déférence à l'égard des décisions de l'UOKiK. L'article conclut que la révision par le SOKiK est actuellement superficielle et inefficace. En même temps, la révision judiciaire de la détermination du marché pertinent par la Cour suprême ne fait pas preuve de déférence à l'égard des décisions de l'UOKiK. La Cour suprême change sa propre définition du marché pertinent par celle de l'UOKiK et des tribunaux inférieurs. Toutefois, l'article montre qu'il n'existe actuellement aucun motif de plaider pour une déférence judiciaire plus importante. Les procédures devant l'UOKiK, malgré les améliorations récemment introduites, n'offrent pas encore suffisamment de garanties du procès équitable, ainsi que la répartition des fonctions d'enquête et des fonctions décisionnelles. De plus, l'expertise de l'UOKiK n'est pas suffisamment présente autant que pour des raisons institutionnelles tant que pour des raisons pratiques.
20
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Umowa agencyjna w świetle artykułu 101 TFUE. Jak gonić króliczka, aby go nie złapać

51%
Kozak M.
internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny
|
2012
|
vol. 1
|
issue 4
28-43
PL
Systemy dystrybucji stają się coraz bardziej złożone. Jednocześnie, aby zrealizować założone cele producenta w ich ramach wykorzystywane są różne rozwiązania prawne. Jednym z takich instrumentów może być agencja. Jednakże, z punktu widzenia prawa konkurencji, agencja posiada specjalny status, wynikający z faktu, że agent jest obecny na dwóch odrębnych rynkach właściwych. W pierwszym obszarze, reprezentuje dającego zlecenie, a w drugim oferuje swoje usługi jako agent. Dualizm ten powoduje pewne trudności praktyczne jak i teoretyczne. Jednocześnie, błędna kwalifikacja dystrybutora jako agenta (i uznanie, że art. 101 ust. 1 TFUE nie ma zastosowania) może skutkować nawet karą finansową nałożoną przez organy ochrony konkurencji, w przypadku kiedy jednak dochodzi do zawarcia porozumienia ograniczającego konkurencję. Według wykładni art 101 ust. 1 TFUE, aby mogło dojść do zawarcia porozumienia ograniczającego konkurencję, konieczne jest występowanie dwóch, różnych stron takiego porozumienia. Prowadzi to do swoistego immunitetu umów agencyjnych spod zakazu porozumień ograniczających konkurencję na pierwszym z opisywanych rynków, kiedy agent zawiera umowę w imieniu zleceniodawcy. Kryteria zastosowania art 101 TFUE do umów agencyjnych zostały wskazane przez Komisję Europejską już w 1962 r. Również orzecznictwo Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej odnosi się do tego problemu. Niemniej jednak zagadka jest daleka od rozwiązania, ponieważ proponowane rozwiązania wydają się być niespójne. Jedno z nich skupia się na pojęciu jednolitego organizmu gospodarczego. Inne rozwiązania odnoszą się do teorii organów pomocniczych (ang. auxiliary). Najnowsze propozycje rozwiązania skupiają się na kwestii ryzyka podejmowanego przez agenta w związku z umowami, przy zawarciu których pośredniczy.
EN
Distribution systems have become more and more complex and tend to use different legal solutions to fulfill the aims of the producer. One of them can be agency. From the perspective of competition law, agency holds a special status, resulting from the fact that an agent is present in two distinct relevant markets. In one market an agent represents the principal in the conclusion of a contract, in the second market it offers its own services as an agent. This specific causes some practical difficulties and is interesting from a theoretical point of view. The erroneous qualification of a distributor as an agent could result in fines being imposed by competition authorities. However, as to the first of the aforementioned markets, according to an interpretation of Article 101 TFEU, an anticompetitive agreement cannot be concluded between the same person. This could lead to agency agreements being immune from competition law requirements. It is imperative to recognize the difference. The criteria for the application of Article 101 TFEU to agency agreements were set out by the European Commission in 1962 and repeatedly considered by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Nevertheless, the enigma is far from being resolved since the proposed solutions tend to be incoherent. One of them concentrates on the single economic entity doctrine. Another refers to auxiliary theory. The most recent approach focuses on risks undertaken by an agent in relation to the contracts that it negotiated.
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