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Rozum wobec żałoby: argumenty apologetyczne C.S. Lewisa w obliczu dotkliwej straty. Część I: Rozum

100%
Bylica P.
Przegląd Religioznawczy
|
2019
|
issue 1/271
EN
Clive S. Lewis is thought to be one of the most important contemporary Christian apologist. In his works, Lewis argued against naturalism and put forward arguments in support of theism. In doing so, he referred to experience and made use of laws of logic and probabilistic reasoning, hence meeting rationality criteria. Part I discusses Lewis’s arguments from the existence of morality, reason, desires and numinous experiences. It presents a basal criticism of these arguments. Except of the ptresentation of those arguments and their analysis the aim of the paper is to provide a basis for a comparison (in Part II) of the anti-naturalistic arguments with what Lewis wrote about God, faith and life after death in the period following the passing of his wife, a great loss for the thinker.
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Clive’a S. Lewisa argument z pragnień przeciwko naturalizmowi

89%
Bylica P.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2020
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vol. 56
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issue 4
179-202
EN
This article outlines a number of formulations of C.S. Lewis’s anti-naturalistic argument from desire. We tackle the problem of the logical validity of this argument and its weak points as characterized in the relevant literature, including objections concerning the deceptive character of irrational factors such as emotions and desires. It is shown that the formulations of Lewis’s argument in which the anti-naturalistic conclusion does not deductively follow from the premises can still be considered as adding to our knowledge, when viewed as instances of inductive reasoning. There are also formulations of this argument that can be shown invalid only at the great cost of accepting the premise of the Universe as absurd. Lastly, the objection that Lewis’s reference to irrational factors weakens his argument is also rejected.
PL
W artykule przedstawione zostaną różne sformułowania argumentu z pragnień, wysuniętego przeciwko naturalizmowi, autorstwa Clive’a S. Lewisa. Analizie zostaną poddane zarzuty o brak logicznej poprawności jego wywodu oraz dotyczące zwodniczego charakteru czynników irracjonalnych, do jakich zaliczają się uczucia i pragnienia. Wykazane zostanie, że sformułowania, w których mamy do czynienia z brakiem konkluzywności antynaturalistycznego wniosku Lewisa, można jednak traktować jako poznawczo wartościowe, gdyż są one oparte na indukcyjnym schemacie wnioskowania. Istnieją natomiast sformułowania, które jedynie wielkim kosztem, jakim jest uznanie Wszechświata za absurdalny, można uznać za niekonkluzywne. Podejrzenie, iż odwołanie do czynników irracjonalnych osłabia argumentację Lewisa, okazuje się błędne.
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