Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  armed attack
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
This article is referenced to the thirtieth anniversary of the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgement on the merits of 1986. It acknowledges the significance of this much-debated judgement for the modern international law on the use of force (jus ad bellum). However the text focuses on one aspect of the judgement only, i.e. the definition of the notion of “armed attack” as the most grave form of the use of force. The impact of the judgement in this respect is critically analysed. It is argued that the introduction to the UN Charter text of undefined notions of the use of force, aggression, and armed attack may be labelled as the “original sin” of contemporary jus ad bellum, as it results in conceptual obscurity. It is also claimed that the ICJ reaffirmed this original sin in its Nicaragua judgement because it explicitly argued for the notion of “armed attack” as the most grave form of the use of armed force and, in consequence, distinguished it from the other, lesser forms of the use of force, while failing to introduce any sort of clarity in the conceptual ambiguity of jus ad bellum. The article also offers some remarks de lege ferenda and suggests abandoning the gravity criterion, which would require abandoning the well-established judicial and doctrinal interpretation approaches to jus ad bellum.
EN
Cyberspaces can be significantly influenced by simple tools and tactics, and offer cost-effective solutions for states to achieve their objectives. However, it can also be used for conducting cyberwarfare, and its effects remain in gray areas. The spectrum of cyberwarfare activities ranges from minor web disruptions to crippling attacks on critical national infrastructures. Nevertheless, cyberattacks present a unique challenge in applying well-established humanitarian legal principles, particularly regarding the distinction between civilian and military targets. This is because of the interconnectedness and shared infrastructure of cyberspace between civilian and military entities, which blurs the lines between combatants and civilian populations. This article seeks to shift the general perception of the problems associated with this manner of conducting hostilities by building on the learning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Furthermore, the authors examine the cyber activities that occurred during the conflict and the legal and ethical challenges that arise from classifying these activities and applying international law. They try to distinguish cyber activities as an act of force or armed attack, with a focus on determining the criteria that played a role in this classification, in light of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter. With reference to the United Nations (UN) Charter and the principles of self-defence, the concept of attack is scrutinised. Furthermore, the article addresses the principles of distinction and proportionality in relation to qualified cyber activities as an armed attack in the same conflict, emphasising the importance of the principle of proportionality in assessing cyber warfare.
EN
In light of contemporary circumstances, on the 30th anniversary of the Nicaragua judgement it is worth revisiting and considering again certain legal problems decided by – and raised by – the ICJ judgement. This article addresses the importance of the judgement in terms of international legal regulations on the use of force. First and foremost, the article examines the concept of armed attack based on the “gravity” criterion elaborated by the Court and the exercise of the right of self-defence. Moreover, the relationship between customary international law and treaty law, as well as forcible counter-measures and military actions against non-State actors are also discussed in the article. It is argued that the “gravity” criterion used by the ICJ seems controversial and, consequently, may limit the right of self-defence. On the other hand, however, the judgement established a strong barrier to the realization of individual political interests by militarily powerful States. This is the Nicaragua judgement’s long-lasting legacy. In this sense the judgement has stood the test of time.
PL
Zagrożenia wynikające z dokonywania cyberataków stanowią wyzwanie dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Takie ataki mogą być wymierzone w każde państwo, aby zakłócić jego codzienne funkcjonowanie. W obliczu złożonych i różnorodnych kryzysów Unia Europejska w ostatnich dekadach zwiększyła swoje możliwości reagowania, wprowadzając do art. 42 ust. 7 Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej (TUE) tzw. klauzulę pomocy i wsparcia, mającą zastosowanie w przypadku zbrojnej agresji przeciwko państwu członkowskiemu UE na jego terytorium. Głównym celem niniejszej publikacji jest analiza potencjalnych warunków zastosowania art. 42 ust. 7 TUE w odpowiedzi na operacje cybernetyczne. Autor argumentuje, że w określonych sytuacjach klauzula pomocy i wsparcia z art. 42 ust. 7 TUE może być stosowana w odpowiedzi na niektóre operacje cybernetyczne przeciwko państwu członkowskiemu UE na jego terytorium.
EN
The threat posed by the occurrence of cyber-attacks constitutes a challenge to national security. Such attacks may target and disturb the daily functioning of any state. Faced with complex and diverse crises, the European Union (EU) has improved its response capacities over the last decades, introducing a so-called ‘aid and assistance clause’ into Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) applicable in the case of armed aggression against an EU member state on its territory. The main objective of this publication is to examine potential conditions for the application of Article 42(7) TEU in response to cyber operations. The author argues that under certain conditions, the aid and assistance clause in Article 42(7) TEU may be invoked in response to certain cyber operations against an EU member state on its territory.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.