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1

Bezpośrednio, telefonicznie czy internetowo? Efekt techniki w badaniach wiktymizacyjnych

100%

Ostaszewski P.

Biuletyn Polskiego Towarzystwa Kryminologicznego im. prof. Stanisława Batawii

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2015

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issue 22

91-101

PL

Badania wiktymizacyjne stanowią w kryminologii jedno z głównych źródeł rzetelnych danych ilościowych o rozmiarach wiktymizacji, poziomie lęku przed przestępczością i społecznych ocenach organów ścigania i wymiaru sprawiedliwości. Badania te realizowane mogą być przy wykorzystaniu różnych technik badawczych, które z kolei mogą być obarczone różnego rodzaju błędami. W artykule omówiono podstawowe rodzaje technik prowadzenia badań wiktymizacyjnych oraz rodzaje błędów związanych z realizacją badań sondażowych. Opisano szczególne problemy, jakie może nieść za sobą wykorzystanie dwóch, alternatywnych do wywiadu bezpośredniego (PAPI lub CAPI), sposobów prowadzenia badań wiktymizacyjnych, czyli sondaży telefonicznych (CATI) i kwestionariuszy internetowych (CAWI).

2

Polskie Badanie Przestępczości (PBP) 2007-2009: analiza wybranych rezultatów

71%

Siemaszko A.

Archiwum Kryminologii

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2009

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issue XXXI

223-264

EN

Polish Crime Study (PBP) carried out between 2007 and 2009 was a joint project of the Police Headquarters and the Institute for Justice. The particular aim of the project, which was carried out in all 16 voivodships of Poland and in the police area of the of the Capital District, was to estimate the level of crime increase and its dark figures, evaluation of police work, and measure of fear of crime - both across the country and in each province. The research was carried out each year in the first half of January of on a random sample of 17 thousand respondents (3 thousands in each province and 3 thousand in the the Warsaw Police Headquarters area) by traditional face to face interview method. Analyzed results include 51 thousand respondents who were surveyed in 2007 - 2009. For the entire sample constructed in this way the measurement error is minimal and is in fact only 0.4% in general and 1.8% for the particular local area tests. It should be emphasised that PBP is the largest victimological study in Poland (surveys of the Institute of Justice in the previous rounds of the ICVS did not usually exceed 5 thousand respondents) and, at the same time, one of the major social surveys in our country.. The questionnaire of Polskie Badanie Przestępczości included questions related to the victimization with the following acts: robbery, assault, burglary, car theft, other theft (pickpocket, mobile phone theft, bicycle theft). The study also included a question concerning the reporting level of abovementioned acts. Much attention was paid to the perception of the police and fear of the crime in the measurement tool (such items were generally modeled on the Polish version of the ICVS questionnaire). The study included a total of 12 positions and 10 measurable questions. Positions related to offenses and their applications were relatively complex and de facto consisted of several questions. PBP results indicate that the intensification of a crime in Poland is still quite considerable. Nearly every fifth inhabitant of our country was a victim of one of the offenses taken into consideration during the analyzed period, almost every eighteenth was a victim of a burglary. Also other thefts (nearly 1,900 cases per 51 thousand respondents), and robberies (nearly 1,500 cases per 51 thousand resondents) happen quite often. The largest (tenfold) diversity in regional reviev concerns the risk of a car theft, white the smallest (2,5 fold) diversity concerns robberies and other theft. Relatively large, (fivefold) differences have also been reported in case of battery. It should be noted that differences in the frequency of the offences taken into consideration voivodship-wise is comparable or even greater than in the individual EU countries taking part in the final round of the ICVS, which is certainly quite a surprise.

3

Przestępczość i polityka karna w krajach postkomunistycznych: spojrzenie laika

36%

Siemaszko A.

Archiwum Kryminologii

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2006

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issue XXVIII

67-94

EN

Can we seriously analyse penal policy trends in the post-communist states if we have no idea on the penal legislation in these countries, on trends in crime combat and prevention or the current shape of the penal policy, including in particular penal code reforms that are being developed or implemented? We would naturally say no. The author, however, attempts to prove that such an analysis is possible provided one has access to relevant statistical data. The data are contained mainly in three publications: European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics, Penological Information Bulletin and Atlas przestępczości w Polsce [Overview of Crime in Poland]. For the purposes of this paper, the data were significantly modified not to include some of the post-communist states. For various reasons, mainly due to the data credibility and completeness, the author focussed only on ten such states, i.e. Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary. Some comparisons also include Bulgaria. Firstly, an analysis of the data shows that the common characteristics of the post-communist states under discussion are their high crime levels, both in terms of dynamics and prevalence. An exceptionally high level of crime risk is also displayed in the victimological research results. Secondly, a comparison of crime reporting levels clearly shows that the crime level in our region is actually much higher than police statistics might suggest. This is also confirmed by the results of nationwide Polish research held every four years within the International Crime Survey. We usually are one of the last countries in terms of crime reporting levels. It seems that people in our region are generally quite reluctant to report crime (due to our mistrust in police effectiveness), which makes our official crime statistics extremely unreliable. Therefore, while victimological research in the Western European countries may be treated as an interesting alternative to police statistics (and we actually could do without the latter), in our region, such research is a must. Thirdly, due to the extremely unreliable police statistics, it is essential to initiate victimological research in the countries of our region, and ideally to include them in the International Crime Survey. Without reliable victimological studies, we will have to rely on the police data that sometimes seem to be a tactless joke. The author's analysis, although not aimed at establishing any general rules, but rather at clearly describing the facts, naturally brings some obvious conclusions. The first conclusion is that all the former Soviet bloc countries were characterised by high crime levels at the turn of the 21st century. And the times are not conducive to softening penal repressions, which makes it obvious that most states under discussion continued their rather harsh penal policy compared to the Western countries. Poland was an interesting exception with its new and extremely liberal penal legislation having been introduced in the period of an extremely sharp crime growth. However, the author underlines that these developments had fortunately little influence on the judicial practice, all the more so since the main legislative and judicial changes to ease penal repressions had been introduced earlier. In other words, already before 1997 when the new penal codification was adopted, we had reached a dead end in crime policy liberalisation and there was no space left for more such changes for fear of mass protests and riots. The fact that the new and much more liberal penal code did not bring significant changes in the judicial practice proves the advantage of the judicial opinion over penal code solutions. This means and is clearly confirmed in the Polish experience that the form of penal legislation is much less important (though not unimportant) than specific judicial practice. All the states under analysis still show a disastrous structure of the length of unsuspended prison sentences. On the one hand, the shortest terms (up to one year, or even six months) are used too rarely, and on the other, too seldom are also the relatively long terms of ten and more years of prison. That makes sentence diversification seem insufficient. In all the states under discussion, the dominating group of imprisonment sentences are those from one to three years, which is inefficient from the criminology perspective, quite costly, and leads to the overpopulation of prisons. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that all these countries have such high imprisonment rates per 100,000 inhabitants.

4

Równość płci i przemoc wobec kobiet. Próba wyjaśnienia tzw. paradoksu nordyckiego

36%

Grzyb M.

Archiwum Kryminologii

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2018

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issue XL

221-261

EN

According to the prevailing assumption, the main cause of violence against women isa structural inequality between men and women. That idea is common in internationalhuman rights discourse, widely accepted on political level and enforced by severalscientific studies. The structural nature of violence against women means that it isgender-based violence and one of the crucial social mechanisms by which womenare forced into a subordinate position compared with men. It is a manifestationof historically unequal power relations between men and women which have led todomination over, and discrimination against, women by men, and have prevented fulladvancement of women.Logically thinking, achieving gender equality would lead to the elimination ofviolence against women. Respectively, in societies with greater gender equality, wherewomen enjoy better rights, have a better footing towards men, greater legal protectionand access to power, they also should be less vulnerable to violence based on theirgender. The most gender-equal countries in the world are Scandinavian countries –Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Denmark and Finland.Yet, the recent EU-wide victimisation survey on violence against women (FundamentalRights Agency 2014) produced startling results. It turned out that the highestrates of violence against women (in almost every single aspect, intimate partner violenceand non-partner violence) were reported in the Nordic countries, particularly in Sweden,whereas countries considered traditional and conservative, e.g. the Mediterraneancountries or Poland, revealed a lower prevalence of violence against women. The FRAresults on Scandinavian countries were coined the “Nordic paradox”.The main problem is this: is really gender equality a factor reducing or increasingthe likelihood of violence against women’s victimisation? Is the subordinate positionof women typical of more conservative societies a protective factor against violenceagainst women? And are actually the FRA study results sufficiently reliable to drawsuch conclusions?The first section of the paper discusses the FRA results regarding the Scandinaviancountries and presents it against a larger picture of gender equality indicators. Thenext section examines the possible explanations for differences between countriesoffered by the authors, which are mainly methodological and contextual ones, such as:cultural acceptability to talk with other people about experiences of violence againstwomen, higher levels of disclosure about violence against women in more gender-equalsocieties, patterns of employment or lifestyle or levels of urbanisation, differencesbetween countries in the overall levels of violent crime and drinking habits in particularsocieties.The third section reviews the previous research findings, looking at the relationshipbetween gender equality or women’s status and violence against women. There are twochief hypotheses tested in the studies: the ameliorative hypothesis (violence againstwomen will fall along with greater gender equality) and the backlash hypothesis (ifwomen remain in their subordinate position, men are less threatened and less likely toresort to violence against them). Overall, the studies showed mixed results, dependingon the used measures. Furthermore, most of the them were conducted on the US data,and their application to the European context is doubtful.The final section presents some theoretical explanations from the critical sociologyfield. The three most relevant theories suitable to explain the “Nordic paradox” andthe relationship between gender equality and relatively high rates of violence againstwomen include the variety of patriarchy theory of G. Hunnicutt, the hegemonic masculinities of R.W. Connell and J. Messerschmidt and the symbolic violence ofP. Bourdieu. All of these theories critically frame the use of violence by men as a meansof upholding their superior position towards women.

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3 Archiwum Kryminologii

1 Biuletyn Polskiego Towarzystwa Kryminologicznego im. prof. Stanisława Batawii

2 Siemaszko A.

1 Grzyb M.

1 Ostaszewski P.

1 2018

1 2015

1 2009

1 2006

Bezpośrednio, telefonicznie czy internetowo? Efekt techniki w badaniach wiktymizacyjnych

Polskie Badanie Przestępczości (PBP) 2007-2009: analiza wybranych rezultatów

Przestępczość i polityka karna w krajach postkomunistycznych: spojrzenie laika

Równość płci i przemoc wobec kobiet. Próba wyjaśnienia tzw. paradoksu nordyckiego