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Structure of the passive side of a bank’s balance sheet versus the pari passu and no-creditor-worse-off rules

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Kozińska M.
Nauki o Finansach
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2018
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issue vol. 23 no. 3
84-101
EN
The passive side of a bank’s balance sheet is characterized by considerable variety. Additionally, the intention of the supervisors is that the bank losses are covered according to a specific order, which foresees that the owners are the first to be exposed, followed by the creditors (but some of the bank’s liabilities are essential for the continuation of the operations and it is not recommended that they are redeemed or converted into shares). The sequence of covering losses expected in the supervisory regulations is often inconsistent with the order resulting from the hierarchy of claims established in the bankruptcy law. In such a situation, implementing actions involving the write-down or conversion into shares of subsequent categories of debt may entail breaking the basic principles of bankruptcy and resolution law: the pari passu and no-creditor-worse-off rules. The purpose of the article is to identify situations in which the indicated rules are breached, as well as to review and evaluate national solutions that have been implemented to ensure compliance with the above mentioned rules. To this end, the relationship between the structure of the passive side of the bank balance sheet, supervisory regulations in the area of capital adequacy and the resolution principles were analyzed. As a result, four situations have been identified where there is a risk of breaking the already mentioned rules. The review of national solutions implemented to address the problem suggests that they lead mainly to its shift to the next category in the claims’ hierarchy, but does not eliminate it. A similar effect is also provided by the amendment of the BRR Directive, which aims mainly to harmonize solutions introduced at national level.
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THE LEVEL OF OFFSHORIZATION OF BANK CAPITAL OF UKRAINE

86%
Shchehelska M.
Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem
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2015
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vol. 2(5)
75-86
EN
This research examines the offshorization level of the bank capital of Ukraine. We consider the offshorization level of the bank capital as the weight of the share capital, formed in/through states that are considered to be offshore centers according to the Ukrainian legislation or to the data of OECD. The results indicate that 12,10% of the bank capital of Ukraine is formed not transparently, but through offshores; the most popular places to form their capital by banks are BVI and Cyprus; some typical schemes of the ownership structure are described; the indicator of the offshorization level of the bank capital calculated according to the Ukrainian legislation is much lower than according to the OECD report and reaches only 3,00% that shows that substantial changes to the Ukrainian legislation that regulates the transparency standards are needed.
3
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18th century bill of exchange legislation : inspiration for or roots of Czech legal provisions on bills of exchange?

86%
Vyoralová T.
The Lawyer Quarterly
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2018
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vol. 8
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issue 1
51-63
EN
The bill of exchange code of 1850 was extended by some special provisions, especially ministerial decree of 1858, the Nurnberg Amendment of 1872, Jasinský’s Amendment and an act from 8 March 1876. Bill of exchange law has its history and also today it is an inseparable special part of the private law. It is therefore necessary to pay special attention to it, especially because there is very little professional literature covering its history, perhaps with the exception of V. Urfus. In the context of the Austrian bill of exchange codes I mentioned above a bill of exchange (cambium) was basically a written record of an exchange transaction. It was defined as a brief written promise that had to meet certain conditions defined by the law and whose content was otherwise identical to the contents of an exchange relationship. These conditions were either essential or non-essential. The authorized person in a bill of exchange could transfer his rights to another person. This was done in the form of an endorsement, also called “indosament” and “žiro”. A bill of exchange had to be accepted regardless of this endorsement. When paying the bill of exchange, the acceptor was to deposit the exchange amount to a court. The number of transfers by endorsement was not limited. However, each transfer had to meet various conditions defined by the bill of exchange code. If any of the required exchange requisites was missing the endorsement was, according to the bill of exchange code, treated as procuration. In this case endorsement did not transfer the rights from the endorser to the endorsee. For this reason, if the endorses was in bankruptcy proceeding, the bill of exchange was included in the bankruptcy assets. In the period of interest, a number of special exchange and mercantile courts were established with threelevel structure. These courts would make decisions on exchange relationships until they were reorganized by the Josephine reforms.
4
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Do Microprudential Regulations and Supervision Affect the Link Between Lending and Capital Ratio in Economic Downturns of Large Banks in the EU?

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Olszak M., Roszkowska S., Kowalska I.
Problemy Zarządzania
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2017
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issue 1/2017 (66), t.2
PL
Artykuł poszerza dotychczasowe badania nad związkiem między ograniczającym wpływem wskaźnika kapitałowego na podaż kredytu bankowego w okresie dekoniunktury poprzez analizy znaczenia polityki regulacyjnej państwa dla związku między aktywnością kredytową a wskaźnikiem kapitałowym dużych banków prowadzących działalność w Unii Europejskiej. W badaniu zastosowano estymator odporny dwuetapowy Blundella i Bonda (1998) i zidentyfikowano, że ograniczenie skali czynności wykonywa nych przez banki oraz bardziej restrykcyjne standardy kapitałowe osłabiają negatywny wpływ wskaźnika kapitałowego na podaż kredytu bankowego w okresie dekoniunktury, co jest spójne z koncepcją, że w krajach o restrykcyjnych regulacjach banki podejmują niższe ryzyko oraz cechują się wyższymi buforami kapitałowymi. Oficjalny nadzór bankowy również ogranicza wpływ wskaźnika kapitałowego, ale jego siła oddziaływania jest jedynie marginalnie istotna statystycznie w populacji banków, które prezentują dane nieskonsolidowane. Prywatny nadzór rynkowy wydaje się nieskuteczny w ograniczaniu negatywnego wpływu wskaźnika kapitałowego na podaż kredytu bankowego w okresie dekoniunktury. Przeprowadzone badania pokazują, że przynajmniej w pewnym zakresie restrykcyjne regulacje mikroostrożnościowe oraz nadzór mikroostrożnościowy są skuteczne w dążeniu do zapewnienia stabilności finansowej i ograniczenia procykliczności.
EN
This paper extends the literature on the capital crunch effect by examining the role of public policy for the link between lending and capital in a sample of large banks operating in the European Union during economic downturns. Applying Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step robust GMM estimator, we show that restrictions on bank activities and more stringent capital standards weaken the capital crunch effect, consistent with reduced risk-taking and boosted bank charter values. Official supervision also reduces the impact of capital ratio on lending in downturns; however, its effect is only marginally significant in the sample of unconsolidated banks. Private oversight seems to be related to thin capital buffers in expansions, and therefore the capital crunch effect is enhanced in countries with increased market discipline. We thus provide evidence that neither regulations nor supervision at the microprudential level is neutral from a financial stability perspective. Weak regulations and supervision seem to increase the pro-cyclical effect of capital on bank lending.
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