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Ekonomia i Zarzadzanie
|
2016
|
vol. 8
|
issue 3
89-97
EN
The article investigates the state of bank lending in Ukraine, identifies the source of the severe banking crisis, that broke out in Ukraine in 2014-2015. Additionally, it suggests recommendations for the enhancement of the role of bank lending in the process of expanded incentives for investments in order to facilitate the exit from the economy crisis towards the economic growth. Using the general scientific methods of empirical and theoretical research, the dynamics of bank lending in Ukraine in 2003- 2014 was analysed and the following periods were distinguished: 2003-2007, which is the period of the rise of a strong banking system and the increase of bank lending; 2008-2009, when the crisis and post-crisis recovery processes have been attempted, and 2014-2015, which is the period of an unprecedented crisis and a wave of bank failures. The analysis revealed the following main factors constraining the lending to the economy of Ukraine in today’s conditions: a slowdown in the economic growth, increasing economic and political risks of inflation and devaluation expectations, rapid fluctuations of exchange rate, a high cost and the lack of credit because of insufficient domestic resources and the mismatch of terms and conditions of bank loans with the aim to attract resources, a significant credit risk and imperfect methods of management, the lack of clear mechanisms for loan repayment applicable to insolvent borrowers, and inadequate protection of the rights of lenders and borrowers. The article substantiates that the stimulation of the lending process should be based on the following: the improvement of the investment climate in Ukraine, using stricter lending criteria, ensuring effective mechanisms for provisioning for credit risks, and the improvement of measures for the protection of rights of lenders and borrowers. The state should focus on new projects stimulating - international investments by introducing the European standards on domestic enterprises, including joint investment projects in strategic sectors; the promotion of investment projects in support of small and medium enterprises; and intensified efforts to stimulate foreign banks to open credit lines for small and medium-sized businesses to implement energy efficiency projects under the state guarantee.
EN
In this paper we investigate the evidence of credit rationing in Italy during the period 2010-2016 characterized by evere distress in the banking system. The role of banks in the Italian economic system is crucial, since the Italian financial system can be classified as a bank oriented one. In addition, Italian economy is characterized by a very large share of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). This aspect adds value to our analysis given that literature usually assumes that the smaller the firms size the larger they suffer from credit rationing. By using a unique data set, provided by Bank of Italy, we get a twofold result. First, in Italy, the last economic and financial crisis has reduced the access to banking loans for SMEs, since there is a clear hump-shaped pattern in the time series of our measures of credit rationing. Differently, for large firms, it seems to have caused a larger volatility rather than a veritable credit rationing. Second, and this is our main result, matching micro and macro data, we do find support to the intuition that different banking crises exert different effects on firms’ financing conditions.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza reakcji Danii, Finlandii i Szwecji na kryzysy nordyckie, które wystąpiły w latach 80. i 90. XX wieku. Interpretacji poddano przyczyny wystąpienia kryzysów nordyckich. Porównano reakcję duńskiego, fińskiego i szwedzkiego sektora bankowego oraz rynku walutowego na kryzys. Na podstawie przeprowadzonej analizy można sformułować uogólniający wniosek, iż reakcja Danii, Finlandii i Szwecji była odmienna w poszczególnych krajach.
EN
The aim of the article is to analyze the reaction of Denmark, Finland and Sweden for the Nordic crises in the 80s and 90s. Interpretations were the cause of the Nordic crises. The paper compares the reaction of the Danish, Finnish and Swedish banking sector and currency market to crisis. Based on the analysis, can be formulated a generalized conclusion that the response of Denmark, Finland and Sweden was different in different countries.
EN
The main aim of the article is to analyse the safety of bank deposits both from the theoretical and practical perspective. Deposit guarantee schemes constitute an important part of the banking regulation. Deposit insurance is one of the instruments of crisis management. The starting point of the analysis is a brief description of the main regulatory themes relating to deposit insurance. The central part of this article focuses on anti-crisis measures undertaken by Iceland and Cyprus – two countries where the banking crisis reached an exceptional scale becoming the direct cause of a gross violation of the rights of depositors. A significant emphasis has been placed on the legalissues arising from the decisions of the competent authorities, which were subsequently reviewed by appropriate courts of justice. The key issues relating to the deposit guarantee schemes have been raised in the analysis of legislative reforms undertaken at the EU level.
PL
Celem artykuł jest przedstawienie bezpieczeństwa depozytów zarówno w aspekcie teoretycznym, jako jednego z założeń regulacji działalności bankowej, jak i w wymiarze praktycznym, jako jednego z elementów działań antykryzysowych w sektorze bankowym. Punktem wyjścia analizy są zagadnienia regulacyjne powstałe na gruncie problematyki gwarantowania depozytów. Natomiast główną część artykułu stanowi opis doświadczeń Cypru oraz Islandii ‒ krajów, w których kryzys bankowy osiągnął nadzwyczajną skalę, stając się powodem wyjątkowej ingerencji w uprawnienie deponentów. Istotny akcent został położony na zagadnienia prawne powstałe na gruncie władczych rozstrzygnięć organów państwa, które następnie stały się przedmiotem orzecznictwa właściwych sądów. Węzłowe zagadnienia dotyczące gwarantowania depozytów zostały również poruszone w ramach analizy zmian prawnych na szczeblu UE.
EN
Since the wide spreading of the European Union (EU) crisis begun, the research papers have been providing different definitions such as currency crisis, competitiveness crisis, banking crisis, balance of payment crisis, but the most frequent notion of EU crises is the sovereign debt crisis. In this paper, the researchers agree that the current European crisis can be identified as sovereign debt crises at its surface, but in order to search for solutions of EU problems, we must look deeper into the sources of this crisis. Through this paper, the multiplication of crisis is explained, whereby it is being concluded that one type of crisis led to another, while staying on the point that the Eurozone current crisis is basically a combination of two core crisis: balance of payment crisis and banking crisis. In order to support the hypothesis that sovereign debt crisis is deeply connected with balance of payment crisis, we have analysed the trade and capital flows of European countries. It was discovered that periphery countries mostly financed their current account deficit, trade deficits and public deficit through external borrowing from creditor countries. Further, the periphery countries have been cumulating not only trade deficit in trade activity with other European partners, but also in trade with the rest of the world. The key source of imbalances between the European countries seems to be a different level of competitiveness caused by different level of productivity. As the second face of EU crises, we recognised a banking crisis. We found that sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis are interconnected but banking crisis usually precedes the debt crisis. With the fast growth of international capital flows, financial integration was strongly regionally concentrated and became especially important within the EU. Through the analysis of the international investment position of creditor countries, it was concluded that these countries are more integrated within the euro area through financial flows than through real economic flows. Additionally, it was discovered that creditor countries’ banks were among the biggest investors in bonds of periphery countries such as Greece. In other periphery countries such as Ireland, banking crisis and subsequent measures for the rescuing of banking system led to the increase of public debt. In the other countries, banks were faced with solvency problems due to bad debt holdings. Having in mind that we found interconnection of the debt crisis with balance of payment crisis on the one side, and with the banking crisis on the other side, the conclusion is that sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone is a result of two-core crisis: balance of payment crisis and bank crisis. Reckoning on the European Union history where each crisis usually led to the stronger integration, maybe the current crisis is a step further towards better and deeper integration.
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