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Searlovo pojetí problému svobodné vůle

100%
Janů V.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2017
|
vol. 65
|
issue 1
15-33
EN
The main aim of this article is to analyse Searle’s conception of free-will in view of the objections which have brought against it. First of all, the problem of free-will is defined as a controversy between determinism and libertarianism. Compatibilism is rejected as unenlightening. Next, biological naturalism is presented as the basis of the problem of free-will in Searle’s thought, and the psychological and neurobiological levels of the problem are delineated. In the light of this, several objections to Searle’s approach are discussed. Because Searle sees a possible solution to the problem being provided by quantum mechanics, the last part is devoted to Searle’s understanding of science, and his position is compared with quantum theory (as it is outlined by Harry Stapp). In the course of this comparison a new fundamental question emerges which can be defined in the spirit of the psycho-physical problem, and which must be answered before the problem of free will can be successfully tackled. It is demonstrated that, in the light of the current state of knowledge, none of the objections levelled at Searle’s conception of free-will is fatal to it. The solution of this question is, at this moment, dependent on the future development of science.
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Przeciw dualizmowi psycho-fizycznemu. Analiza i porównanie stanowisk Johna Searle'a i George'a Lakoffa

72%
Milewski D.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2014
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issue 56
57-92
PL
This paper discusses John Searle’s biological naturalism and George Lakoff’s embodied mind hypothesis. These theories are presented as examples of a certain part of the philosophy of mind that breaks with the tradition launched by Descartes. In both cases, the break from this tradition is indicated to be a radical one as the theories argue not only against Cartesian dualism - the basic philosophical categories utilized by Descartes are being questioned. This attempt of departure from distinctions that seem to form a great part of the contemporary philosophy of mind may stand for a chance to provide a new perspective for some old philosophical problems.
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