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1

L'expedition Polonaise de 1450 en Moldavie et la bataille de la petite riviere de Crasna (Izvorul Crasnei, 6 Septembre 1450)

100%
Antoche E. C.
Rocznik Przemyski
|
2013
|
vol. 49
|
issue 1: Historia Wojskowości
3-24
2
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Relacje o bitwie konotopskiej z 1659 roku w zbiorach polskich archiwów

75%
Kroll P.
Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica
|
2008-2009
|
vol. 15-16
|
issue 15-16
127-144
EN
The Battle of Konotop took place in early July 1659 and was a very important episode in the history of fighting for the independence of Ukraine in seventeenth-century. It became an important part of The Union of Hadiach [Гадяч] history, since this wasted victory contributed to the collapse of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky [Іван Виговський] as well as the idea of union, and as a result “pushed” Cossacs toward Moscow. There are numerous doubts around this battle of Cossack troops supported by the Tatars against the army of Moscow and faithful to Tsar Zaporozhian Cossacks; beginning with the number of troops taking part in the battle, ending with its course. This is because of the contradictory information contained in the sources used by historians. Documents presented in this article are of great importance for understanding the course of battle of Konotop. They are preserved in the Central Archive of Historical Records (AGAD) and the Jagiellonian Library in Kraków. Three of the four presented documents emerged just days after the battle, and were written by Ivan Vyhovsky, Cossack hetman. This in turn makes them very valuable source of information.
PL
Stoczona na początku lipca 1659 r. bitwa konotopska stanowi bardzo ważny epizod w historii XVII-wiecznej, walczącej o niezależność, Ukrainy. Jest istotną częścią dziejów unii hadziackiej, gdyż to niewykorzystane zwycięstwo przyczyniło się do upadku hetmana Iwana Wyhowskiego i idei unii, popychając Kozaczyznę w stronę Moskwy. Wokół tego starcia wojsk kozackich, wspieranych przez Tatarów, z armią moskiewską i wiernymi carowi Koza-kami zaporoskimi narosło wiele sprzeczności, począwszy od ilości wojsk biorących w nich udział, aż po jego przebieg. Wynikało to z faktu rozbieżności informacji zawartych w wykorzystywanych przez historyków źródłach. Dokumenty prezentowane w artykule mają wielkie znaczenie dla poznania przebiegu walk pod Konotopem. Przechowywane są w AGAD i w Bibliotece Jagiellońskiej w Krakowie. Trzy spośród czterech prezentowanych powstały zaledwie kilka dni po bitwie, a ich autorem jest sam hetman kozacki, Iwan Wyhowski. To zaś czyni z nich bardzo cenne źródła informacji.
3
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Bitwa pod Poznaniem z 19 VIII 1704 r.

63%
Kościelniak K.
Historia Slavorum Occidentis
|
2022
|
issue 4(35)
113-136
EN
The Battle of Poznań was fought on 19 August 191704 between the Saxon and the Swedish armies. It was an exceptional battle which took place at night, and its result was inconclusive – at least as indicated by the commanders-in-chief of both armies and the historiography of the last two hundred years. This article is intended to identify the winner.
4
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13 pułk piechoty w bitwie o Grudusk 3 września 1939 roku

51%
Świdwa M.
Studia Mazowieckie
|
2022
|
vol. 17
|
issue 2
101-112
EN
The article concerns the activities of the 13th Infantry Regiment, part of the 8th Infantry Regiment in the “Modlin” Army under the command of General Emil Krukowicz-Przedrzymirski. After being mobilized in the last days of August 1939, the regiment set off towards the northern border. Together with the 21st and 32nd Infantry Regiment, it constituted a reserve unit for the 20th Infantry Regiment, which included positions on the fortifi ed line of Mława. The fi rst battle of the regiment, which took place on September 3, 1939, led to a breakthrough of the front line by German troops, dispersal, and rejection of the 8th Infantry Regiment, including the 13th Infantry Regiment, toward Modlin. The Battle of Grudusk bears traces of a defeat for the 13th Infantry Regiment, however, it did not completely destroy this unit, which, regrouped in Modlin, continued to take action until the death of their commander. The main objective of the article is an attempt to answer the question of what led to the disastrous result of the actions of the 13th Infantry Regiment near Grudusk on the night of September 3–4, 1939.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy działań 13 pułku piechoty, wchodzącego w skład 8 DP w Armii „Modlin” pod dowództwem gen. Emila Krukowicz-Przedrzymirskiego. Pułk po zmoblizowaniu w ostatnich dniach sierpnia 1939 r. wyruszył w kierunku granicy północnej. Wraz z 21 i 32 pp stanowił jednostkę odwodową dla 20 DP obejmującej stanowiska na ufortyfi kowanej linii Mławy. Pierwsza bitwa pułku, do której doszło 3 września 1939 r., doprowadziła do przełamania linii frontu przez oddziały niemieckie, rozproszenia i odrzucenia 8 DP, w tym13 pp, w kierunku Modlina. Bitwa pod Gruduskiem nosi ślady porażki dla 13 pp, jednakże nie doprowadziła do całkowitego rozbicia tej jednostki, która przegrupowana w Modlinie prawadziła działania aż do śmierci swojego dowódcy. Głównym założeniem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie o to, co doprowadziło do katastrofalnego rezultatu działań 13 pp pod Gruduskiem w nocy z 3 na 4 września 1939 r.
5
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Wojny napoleońskie na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1806-1807 oraz 1813-1814

51%
Szalkiewicz M.
Ogrody Nauk i Sztuk
|
2014
|
issue 4
448-454
PL
W artykule zaprezentowano działania armii francuskiej na obszarze Dolnego Śląska, które wydarzyły się w latach 1806-1814. Omówiono poszczególne wydarzenia, łącznie z najważniejszymi bitwami i oblężeniami. Przedstawiono także skutki zawarcia traktatu pokojowego w Tylży oraz sytuację w rejonie, w okresie pomiędzy kampaniami. Na końcu tekstu opisano skutki wojen oraz postanowienia Kongresu Wiedeńskiego dotyczące Dolnego Śląska.
EN
This article presents the operations of the French army in Lower Silesia, which happened from 1806 to 1814. Discussed the various events, including the most important battles and sieges. It Introduces also the consequences of the peace treaty in Tylża, and the situation in the region in the period between campaigns. Finally it includes the contents of the effects of war and the resolutions of the Congress of Vienna , which involved Lower Silesia.
6

Arginuzy, Sokrates, Nietzsche, metafizyczny paralelizm i dzienniczek gimnazjalisty

51%
Staniszewski M.
Roczniki Humanistyczne
|
2019
|
vol. 67
|
issue 3: Filologia klasyczna
91-106
PL
Artykuł to krótka analiza rozpoczynającej Dziennik filozofa notatki młodego Aleksandra Kożewnikowa (Kojève’a) poświęconej bitwie pod Arginuzami i procesowi ateńskich dowódców, które to fakty zostały przez Kożewnikowa przedstawione w sposób niezgodny ze źródłami starożytnymi (głównie Ksenofont) i współczesnymi mu badaniami historycznymi; to również próba odnalezienia źródeł tego tekstu, porównanie ze źródłami i badaniami historycznymi, omówienie wcześniejszych interpretacji tej notatki oraz próba zarysowania własnej.
EN
This articles is a short analysis of the first entry in Aleksander Kozhevnikov’s (Kojève) Diary of a Philosopher, dedicated to the battle of Arginusae and subsequent trial of Athenian generals. A great discrepancy between facts – as presented by young Kozhevnikov – and ancient sources and their interpretation in modern scholarship leads to an attempt to find out the contemporary inspiration of this short text, followed by some remarks on previous interpretations of this very first ‘philosophical’ essay of young Kojève.
7
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Kompania pospolitego ruszenia Jana Piotra Opalińskiego – rejestr popisowy pod Beresteczkiem z 1651 roku

51%
Staręgowski B.
Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica
|
2021
|
vol. 28
165-173
EN
Levèe en masse muster rolls are one of the most valuable sources for historians dealing with military and social history as well as prosopography and genealogy. These sources provide knowledge about organization of expeditions of the levèe en masse. In 1651 one of the largest expeditions of this kind was organized for the war with Zaporozhian Cossacks. It also included troops from voivodships that were not directly threatened by military action. These included Poznań and Kalisz voivodships from Wielkopolska. The Kalisz voivodship expedition was organized by the castellan of Kalisz, Jakub Rozdrażewski. One of the groups that reached Beresteczko the earliest (26th June 1651) was the company of the Crown Cupbearer Jan Piotr Opaliński. The published muster roll proves that a small part of Wielkopolska's forces reached the place of assembly on time and took part in the Battle of Beresteczko.
PL
Rejestry popisowe pospolitego ruszenia są jednym z najcenniejszych źródeł dla historyków zajmujących się historią wojskową i społeczną oraz prozopografią i genealogią. Źródła te dostarczają wiedzy o organizacji wypraw pospolitego ruszenia. W 1651 r. na wojnę z Kozakami zaporoskimi zorganizowano jedną z największych tego typu ekspedycji. Brały w niej udział również wojska z województw bezpośrednio niezagrożonych działaniami zbrojnymi. Z Wielkopolski były to województwa poznańskie i kaliskie. Wyprawę z województwa kaliskiego przygotowywał kasztelan kaliski Jakub Rozdrażewski. Jedną z grup, która najwcześniej dotarła pod Beresteczko (26 VI 1651 r.) była kompania podczaszego koronnego Jana Piotra Opalińskiego. Publikowany rejestr jest dowodem na to, że niewielka część wielkopolskich sił pospolitego ruszenia dotarła na miejsce koncentracji wojsk w terminie i wzięła udział w bitwie pod Beresteczkiem.
8
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Zygmunt Gloger i rok 1863. Przyczynek do biografii słynnego Podlasianina

51%
Kalinowski E.
Studia Podlaskie
|
2017
|
vol. 25
PL
Artykuł jest próbą nowego spojrzenia na stosunek Zygmunta Glogera do powstania styczniowego 1863 r., do czego asumptem stało się pytanie o autorstwo korespondencji nadsyłanych w tym roku do krakowskiego „Czasu” z Warszawy oraz „znad Narwi”. Teksty zdradzają zainteresowania ich autora tożsame z ówczesnymi badaniami młodego Glogera oraz dobrą znajomość przebiegu potyczek powstańców na terenie łomżyńskiego i tykocińskiego, w jego rodzinnych stronach (okolice Tykocina, Jeżewa, Dobroch).
EN
The article attempts to reconsider the perception of Zygmund Gloger’s attitude to January Uprising of 1863, which has been incited by a question about the author of correspondence sent that year to the Cracovian “Time” from Warsaw and “from the Narew River”. These texts confirm that the author’s interests were identical with the research pursued at that time by young Gloger, and prove a good insight into skirmishes fought by insurgents near Łomża and Tykocin, i.e. Gloger’s homeland (the surroundings of Tykocin, Jeżewo and Dobrochy).
9

Norwid jako strateg w kontekście rozważań o walce i wojnie

26%
Kasperski E.
Studia Norwidiana
|
2015
|
vol. 33
51-76
EN
Norwid’s deliberations about strategy were not a very well known but important and inventive current in his thought and literary work. In his concise essay La philosophie de la guerre, in the rhapsody Fulminant and in numerous poems, poetical digressions, remarks, notes and memorials the writer defined strategy as a domain of knowledge, a kind of art and a practical skill, necessary to reach long-range historical aims, and especially – in the particular situation of the partitions of Poland and in the face of the lost uprisings – to conduct an efficient struggle for independence, ending in a success. Opposing the long-term planning and strategic actions to a war, a battle, a skirmish and short-term plots – or in one word: to “bloody episodes, “convulsive straining”, futile martyrdom and fatalities, Norwid advocated a peaceful struggle carried on incessantly and consistently, a struggle that aimed at realizing positive human values, and not selfish goals. He thought that this kind of “struggle is a normal task of Humanity” and a universal law of history; whereas bloody war – is a license and an exception, acceptable only in the situation of a “just war”, in defense of universal values that were vio¬lated. According to this conception the writer contrasted the “soldier’s” attitude capable of he-roism first of all in everyday life and everyday work, with the “marauding soldier’s” one, taking one’s anger out on other people in aggression, violence; one greedy for blood and revenge. Hence in Norwid’s understanding it was the ability to predict and forestall events and to take precautionary measures in time that was the essence of strategy. He also connected successful strategy with working out and keeping to “a perfectly well conceived plan” that, owing to earlier preparations, concentrating the means in the right place and time, as well as to well thought out maneuvers, eliminated or reduced to a necessary minimum the use of physical force and violence towards the opponent. The basis of strategy was then formed by a long-range intellectual conception, and also by the ability to carry on struggle with various means, including also struggle “on the field of the idea” and “on the field of the word”.
10
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Norwid jako strateg w kontekście rozważań o walce i wojnie

26%
Kasperski E.
Studia Norwidiana
|
2015
|
vol. 33
51-76
EN
Norwid’s deliberations about strategy were not a very well known but important and inventive current in his thought and literary work. In his concise essay La philosophie de la guerre, in the rhapsody Fulminant and in numerous poems, poetical digressions, remarks, notes and memorials the writer defined strategy as a domain of knowledge, a kind of art and a practical skill, necessary to reach long-range historical aims, and especially – in the particular situation of the partitions of Poland and in the face of the lost uprisings – to conduct an efficient struggle for independence, ending in a success. Opposing the long-term planning and strategic actions to a war, a battle, a skirmish and short-term plots – or in one word: to “bloody episodes, “convulsive straining”, futile martyrdom and fatalities, Norwid advocated a peaceful struggle carried on incessantly and consistently, a struggle that aimed at realizing positive human values, and not selfish goals. He thought that this kind of “struggle is a normal task of Humanity” and a universal law of history; whereas bloody war – is a license and an exception, acceptable only in the situation of a “just war”, in defense of universal values that were violated.  According to this conception the writer contrasted the “soldier’s” attitude capable of he-roism first of all in everyday life and everyday work, with the “marauding soldier’s” one, taking one’s anger out on other people in aggression, violence; one greedy for blood and revenge. Hence in Norwid’s understanding it was the ability to predict and forestall events and to take precautionary measures in time that was the essence of strategy. He also connected successful strategy with working out and keeping to “a perfectly well conceived plan” that, owing to earlier preparations, concentrating the means in the right place and time, as well as to well thought out maneuvers, eliminated or reduced to a necessary minimum the use of physical force and violence towards the opponent. The basis of strategy was then formed by a long-range intellectual conception, and also by the ability to carry on struggle with various means, including also struggle “on the field of the idea” and “on the field of the word”.
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