Warszawa wydostała się spod nazistowskiej okupacji jako zniszczone miasto, a następnie przez cztery dekady była pod sowiecką okupacją. Ludzie, którzy przetrwali, odbudowali Stare Miasto. Warszawa szybko się rozwija i nadrabia zaległości do reszty Europy. Jednakże Warszawa doświadcza też problemów infrastrukturalnych związanych z bezładną zabudową miejską, transportem publicznym, zanieczyszczeniem środowiska i komunikacją metropolitarną bez planowania regionalnego i innych metod zarządzania przestrzennego, znanych gdzie indziej. Wynika to z historycznej awersji do centralnego planowania. Historia tego miasta zapewnia unikalną możliwość studiowania gospodarki przestrzennej na przykładzie zdewastowanych obszarów.
The paper provides an empirical analysis of the causes of corruption in postcommunist countries. Researchers vary in their evaluation of how economic policy instruments and structural factors influence the level of corruption in these countries, Goczek says. He looks at the two main hypotheses about the sources of corruption in the region. The first hypothesis holds that the current level of corruption in postcommunist countries is largely due to what happened under communism, including the institutional standards of the time. The other hypothesis is that these countries’ transition from central planning to a market economy is largely responsible for the current level of corruption in the region. Both models discussed in the article proved to be useful in explaining the level of perceived corruption in postcommunist countries, the author says. In the first model, Goczek checked if the current scope of corruption has its roots in these countries’ communist past. The empirical study showed that the more economically developed a particular country was in 1989, the more successful it was in dealing with the problem of corruption. Generally, the extent of central planning in the economy proved to be the most significant factor, Goczek says. He argues that the level of perceived corruption in a given country depended on the scope of central planning and the resulting market disturbance. In the second model discussed in the paper, the author tries to check if market reforms contributed to an increase in corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. According to some researchers, wide-ranging redistribution processes linked with privatization and liberalization in the economy frequently encouraged corruption after the fall of communism. Goczek’s analysis of economic policy choices reveals that the level of corruption in Central and Eastern Europe is lower than in the former Soviet Union. While most Central and Eastern European countries as well as the Baltic states introduced far-reaching economic reforms at the start of transition, Goczek says, former Soviet republics dragged their feet on such reforms. As a result, the levels of corruption in these two regions differ considerably. Generally, those countries that quickly carried out economic reforms managed to arrest and even reverse the progress of corruption after the fall of communism, Goczek concludes.
International economists are divided over whether income inequalities can be explained with the use of an approach known as the Kuznets hypothesis. Some researchers criticize the Kuznets hypothesis while others support it in their reports. According to Kumor, the Kuznets curve (which is the graphical representation of Russian American economist Simon Kuznets’ hypothesis that economic inequality increases over time while a country is developing, and then begins to decrease after a certain average income is attained) accurately reflects income inequalities only when there are distinct processes of change in the economy. The author sets out to check if the Kuznets hypothesis holds true for Poland. The research covered the period of 1974-2007 with two different economic systems: central planning in 1975-1988 and the market economy in 1990-2007. The processes of economic change in both systems were represented by GDP per employee. The author modified Gini coefficients (measures of the inequality of a distribution developed by Italian statistician Corrado Gini) characterizing wage inequalities. He also applied the method of least squares, a standard approach to the approximate solution of sets of equations in which there are more equations than unknowns. The results of the research seem to confirm a modified version of the Kuznets hypothesis, separately for both economic systems, according to Kumor. In the last analyzed year, 2007, the Gini coefficient was close to its maximum value, the author says.
The demise of central planning in the former East bloc is a frequent topic of economic and political analyses. Kaliński’s article describes changes in the centrally planned economies of former Soviet satellite states in the context of market trends in capitalist economies. The analysis covers a period from the emergence of the Soviet Union until its breakup. The statistical analysis is accompanied by a discussion of the political and social environment of the time. The author notes that, in the initial period, there was no link between global business cycles and economic growth in the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc countries. This was due to major political and economic differences and the far-reaching isolation of the region’s centrally planned economies, especially during the Cold War period. The partial opening of Central and Eastern Europe to commercial and financial cooperation with the West in the 1970s led a convergence between the capitalist and centrally planned systems. Negative trends in the global economy, including energy crises and growing indebtedness, had a strong impact on what happened in the Soviet bloc. This situation, coupled with the inefficiency and poor competitiveness of the centrally planned economy and its inability to meet consumer demand, became a significant factor behind the collapse of the system across Central and Eastern Europe, the author concludes.
The aim of this article is the reconstruction of the views of Michael Kalecki and his followers on rational calculation and allocation of resources in a socialist economy, and also to try to compare their statements with the views of both supporters of capitalism, as well as alternative models of socialism. In this matter the piece examines articles of Polish economists on the pattern formation of prices in capitalism and socialism, the role of the working class and the system of incentives and economic governance. In this paper, we have also discussed the views of the authors who, based on the work of Kalecki, took up a controversy with a circulation narrative explaining the failure of socialism. The conclusion that flows from the preceding analysis is as follows: Real capitalism and real socialism struggle with problems of imperfect information, and soft budgets; a particular model of economic management in this regard is not the direct cause of the failure of the socialist project. In addition to the problem of innovation and optimal investment, from the Kaleckian perspective, a fundamental problem of socialism appears to be the appropriate relations of production in the Marxist sense, understood as democratization of the relationship between the working class and the production management layer.
PL
Celem artykułu jest rekonstrukcja poglądów Michała Kaleckiego i jego zwolenników na temat racjonalnej kalkulacji i alokacji zasobów w gospodarce socjalistycznej, a także próba zestawienia tych poglądów z poglądami zwolenników zarówno kapitalizmu, jak i alternatywnych modeli socjalizmu. Pod tym kątem przeanalizowano artykuły polskiego ekonomisty dotyczące schematu tworzenia się cen w kapitalizmie i socjalizmie, roli klasy robotniczej oraz systemu bodźców i sposobu zarządzania gospodarką. W artykule omówiono też poglądy autorów, którzy bazując na pracach Kaleckiego, podjęli się polemiki z obiegową narracją wyjaśniającą porażkę realnego socjalizmu. Zarówno realny kapitalizm, jak i realny socjalizm zmagają się z problemami niedoskonałej informacji i miękkich budżetów, nie istnieje również doskonały model zarządzania gospodarką, w związku z tym nie są to bezpośrednie przyczyny niepowodzenia projektu socjalistycznego. Oprócz problemu innowacji i optymalnych nakładów inwestycyjnych z perspektywy kaleckiańskiej zasadniczym problemem socjalizmu wydaje się ustanowienie właściwych stosunków produkcji w marksistowskim sensie, rozumianych jako zdemokratyzowanie relacji pomiędzy klasą robotniczą a warstwą zarządzającą produkcją.
Rada Wzajemnej Pomocy Gospodarczej została powołana 8 stycznia 1949 r. z woli Józefa Stalina i była ważnym elementem umacniania dominacji ZSRR w Europie Środkowowschodniej. Początkowo ugrupowanie miało przede wszystkim utrwalać i podtrzymywać radziecki model ekonomiczny w państwach zależnych, oparty na odrzuceniu praw rynkowych, centralnym planowaniu i forsownej industrializacji. Służąc ogólnie interesom Kremla, RWPG przez cały okres swojego istnienia ułatwiała mu kontrolę i wpływ na kształt oraz kierunki rozwoju gospodarek krajów „demokracji ludowej”. U podstaw tego systemu leżała ścisła współpraca polityczna, ekonomiczna i militarna poszczególnych państw socjalistycznych z moskiewskim centrum, przy równoczesnym znacznym ograniczeniu handlu z krajami kapitalistycznymi (zwłaszcza do 1956 r.). RWPG, zrzeszająca państwa z gospodarkami centralnie sterowanymi, pozbawionymi mechanizmów wolnorynkowych, a do tego bez wcześniejszych, szerszych tradycji wzajemnej współpracy nie stała się ani strefą wolnego handlu, ani unią celną, ani też wspólnym rynkiem. Nie było więc żadnych możliwości racjonalnej integracji w ramach ugrupowania, rozumianej jako podstawy do zapewnienia członkom harmonijnego i trwałego wzrostu gospodarczego. Upadek realnego socjalizmu i rozpad bloku wschodniego na przełomie lat 80. i 90. oznaczał również rychłe rozwiązanie ich podstawowych struktur, w tym RWPG, co nastąpiło ostatecznie w 1991 r.
EN
RWPG (translator’s note: the Polish abbreviation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; the English abbreviation: COMECON) was founded on January 8th, 1949 at the will of Joseph Stalin and was an important element in strengthening domination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Central and Eastern Europe. In the beginning, the organization was supposed first of all to solidify and support the Russian economic model in the subordinate countries that was based on rejecting market principles and on focusing on central planning and extensive industrialisation. Serving the interests of the Kremlin generally, COMECON throughout the whole period of its existence, facilitated the Kremlin’s control and influence on the shape of economic development of the countries within the so called “people’s democracy”. The core of this system was a close political, economic and military cooperation of socialist countries with the Moscow centre along with significant limitations imposed on trading with capitalist countries (especially after 1956). RWPG bringing together centrally controlled countries, lacking free market mechanisms, and furthermore with no earlier, broader traditions in mutual help, did not become either a free market zone, or a customs union, nor did it form a common market. Thus, a rational integration within the organization, viewed as the basis for ensuring for its members a harmonious and continuous economic growth, was not possible. On the contrary – RWPG strengthened all negative features developed in economic systems of socialist countries (autarchy, bureaucracy, technological delay, etc.) and maintained its dependency on the Soviet Union. The fall of real socialism and dissolution of the Eastern Block at the end of the eighties and in the beginning of the nineties last century meant an immediate dissolution of its basic structures, namely the Warsaw Pact and then the COMECON. As far as the latter is concerned, there were still ideas about transforming the organization and maintaining its existence, but, obviously, in another form. In 1990 it was intended to elaborate new By-laws of the organization and then in the beginning of the following year it was discussed to change the integration model to be based on partnership principle. At the same time Russians put forward an idea to transform RWPG into the International Organization of Mutual Assistance that would only serve as a consulting and not a decision making body and which would incorporate principles of a free market into its activities. However, the break up of RWPG was inevitable, and the process accelerated after January 1st, 1991 that marked the end of transactions in transfer rubles among the members of the group, which since then were not able to pay in dollars. In this way on June 28th, 1991, at the last session of the Council in Budapest, 9 RWPG members decided to end its activities, which was sealed by signing a special report.
Warsaw emerged from the Nazi occupation as a physically destroyed city, followed by surviving the Soviet occupation for four decades. The people persevered, recreating a magnificent Old Town. The city is growing rapidly and catching up to the rest of Europe. It is also facing the infrastructure, urban sprawl, mass transit, pollution, and transportation issues of growing metropolis, without the regional planning and other land use planning tools available elsewhere as a result of its aversion to central planning. Its history provides a unique dynamism to study post-disaster planning.
PL
Warszawa wydostała się spod nazistowskiej okupacji jako zniszczone miasto, a następnie przez cztery dekady była pod sowiecką okupacją. Ludzie, którzy przetrwali, odbudowali Stare Miasto. Warszawa szybko się rozwija i nadrabia zaległości do reszty Europy. Jednakże Warszawa doświadcza też problemów infrastrukturalnych związanych z bezładną zabudową miejską, transportem publicznym, zanieczyszczeniem środowiska i komunikacją metropolitarną bez planowania regionalnego i innych metod zarządzania przestrzennego, znanych gdzie indziej. Wynika to z historycznej awersji do centralnego planowania. Historia tego miasta zapewnia unikalną możliwość studiowania gospodarki przestrzennej na przykładzie zdewastowanych obszarów.
The countries that gained independence after the collapse of the socialist bloc were directed from the central planning management system towards the free market economy and were called as the countries with transition economy until they completed this process. Though these countries started nearly at the same time and had the same targets, they achieved different results within the last twenty-five years. The reason is having different historical past, geographical location, human and natural resources, social and demographic features. The above-mentioned differences affected the quality of reforms in different degrees and consequently, though the transition process was completed for some countries, it was revealed that the road to be overcome was long. Generally, the transition process was very difficult for every country and the set tasks were achieved after a long period. Therefore, while explaining the mentioned process the same chronological sequence is followed without taking into consideration different features of the countries. The mentioned process was investigated in details in the present article.
PL
Kraje, które uzyskały niepodległość po rozpadzie bloku socjalistycznego, przechodzące z centralnego systemu planowania gospodarki do gospodarki wolnorynkowej, aż do momentu ukończenia tego procesu, nazywa się krajami z gospodarką przejściową. Kraje te, mimo że rozpoczęły reformy w tym samym czasie i miały podobne cele, w ostatnich 25 latach uzyskały zupełnie inne wyniki. Powodem tego jest fakt, że były to kraje, które mają bardzo różną przeszłość historyczną, położenie geograficzne, zasoby ludzkie i naturalne oraz społeczno-demograficzne. Wyżej wymienione różnice w odmienny sposób wpłynęły na jakość procesu transformacji. Podczas gdy niektórym krajom udało się skutecznie zakończyć proces transformacji, inne nadal znajdują się w procesie przebudowy. Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, proces transformacji jest procesem bardzo trudnym dla każdego kraju i postawione cele zostają osiągnięte dopiero po długich latach zmagań. W artykule szczegółowo omówiono proces powyższych przemian.
The article examines the economic practice of individual service providing in communist Czechoslovakia from 1965 to 1989. It analyses changes in its legal regulation which occurred in years 1965, 1983 and 1988, and examines one unimplemented reform draft from 1989 which sought to establish a different form of state economic governance over individual businesses. It gives a quantitative account of individual service providing in the 1980s, as well as an insight into the spectrum of business areas individual providers operated in. The quantitative analysis draws on public statistical evidence and scattered archival sources, mainly from the East Bohemian region in the 1980s.
Artykuł poświęcony został procesom kształtowania się systemu ochrony zdrowia w Polsce w pierwszych latach po zakończeniu II wojny światowej. Jego celem jest ukazanie ewolucji, jaka się w tym czasie w tej dziedzinie polityki społecznej dokonywała. Polegała ona na przejściu od reguł ustanowionych jeszcze przed wojną i będących podstawą funkcjonowania ochrony zdrowia tuż po wyzwoleniu do systemu opartego na centralizacji, upaństwowieniu i planowaniu, wzorowanego na rozwiązaniach sowieckich i będącego w zamierzeniu jednym z nieodłącznych elementów systemu stalinowskiego w Polsce. Ramy czasowe artykułu obejmują okres od wyzwolenia części ziem polskich i przejęcia władzy przez Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego do roku 1950, gdy zakończone zostały zasadnicze przemiany w organizacji systemu ochrony zdrowia w Polsce. From the Second Polish Republic to the People’s Poland. The evolution of the health care system in Poland in the years 1944–1950First years after the Second World War were very difficult for the health care in Poland. The end of German occupation brought a wide range of challenges. They resulted from war damage, a significant loss of medical staff and a large scale of health risks. One of important goals of the health policy was to create the public health service available to all citizens. Initially, the restoration of the health care system was based on the model created in the interwar period. With time, along with political changes taking place in Poland, the transformation of the system began to adapt it to the centrally planned economy. The main part of this process ended in 1950. The new system was compatible with the Soviet model and was based on central and directive management which included all elements of the so-called “social health service”. The private medical practice was pushed to the margin and insurance health service was taken over by the state. The system built after the war, however, was still not widespread. Most of the rural population, which represented nearly half of the country`s population, were deprived of equal access to health care.
Article describes concept of political reproduction of the capital, which is a new method of the reproduction of the capitalist society, based on the means of political assets and free of the early capitalist belief in a permanent economic growth. The idea of political reproduction of the capital helps to understand the transformation of the global capitalist system and also helps the marxist theory to overcome the problems concerning the methods practiced by the modern, financial capitalism – including its public debt policies. Modern capitalism doesn’t need constant growth and makes use of the central planning institutions, allowing the global capital to avoid disastrous effects of new system’s crisis. The modern reproduction of the capital is therefore based on the objective of maintaining capitalist power regardless of the level of capitalist profit.
Artykuł zajmuje się polską polityką przemysłową i rozwojem przemysłu w Polsce w trakcie ostatniego stulecia. W okresie międzywojennym zwrot w kierunku aktywnej polityki państwa nastąpił w latach pełnienia funkcji wicepremiera przez Eugeniusza Kwiatkowskiego. Jednak najbardziej intensywna industrializacja finansowana przez państwo miała miejsce w okresie rządów komunistycznych, szczególnie w trzech dekadach między 1948 i 1978 r. Radykalną zmianę przyniosła transformacja systemowa. Porzuceniu starych dogmatów związanych z systemem gospodarki centralnie kierowanej towarzyszyła tendencja do restrukturyzacji przemysłu, powszechna w krajach rozwiniętych już od lat 70. XX w. Pomimo silnego spadku zatrudnienia w przemyśle, restrukturyzację można uznać za udaną, szczególnie jeżeli spojrzy się przez pryzmat konkurencyjności międzynarodowej.
EN
The paper deals with the Polish industrial policies and the development of Polish industry during the last hundred years. In the interwar period, the turn towards the state’s active policy in the industry took place under Deputy Prime Minister Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski. The most intensive state-sponsored industrialization took place. However, under the communist rule, especially the three decades between 1948 and 1978 the situation changed radically along with the systemic transformation. The end of communist-era dogmas associated with central planning was accompanied by a universal tendency towards industrial restructuring, lasting in developed countries since the 1970s. Despite heavy losses in industrial employment, the restructuring process can be viewed as successful, especially in terms of international competitiveness.
Financial outcome is calculated in the accounting system of enterprises and institutions. We can say the need for achieving and division of financial outcome was the reason for establishing accounting. The whole accounting and financial outcome play different roles in a capitalist economy as well as in the central planning.
The subject of the article is the relationship between civilian secret service officers and personnel managing economic entities in the first three decades of the Polish People’s Republic. By discussing the tasks of the security apparatus carried out in enterprises and various institutions providing services to the economy, the author shows the context of this relationship which took place amidst Poland’s systemic transformations in Poland after World War II, namely: the formation of a totalitarian system and the fiasco of this project, followed by the construction of the foundations of an authoritarian system with all its consequences for the functioning of the people involved in both the economy and the special services.
PL
Tematem artykułu są relacje między funkcjonariuszami cywilnych służb specjalnych a kadrami zarządzającymi podmiotami gospodarczymi w trzech pierwszych dekadach PRL. Omawiając zadania aparatu bezpieczeństwa realizowane w przedsiębiorstwach i różnych instytucjach zajmujących się obsługą gospodarki, autor ukazuje kontekst tytułowych relacji – przekształcenia systemowe w Polsce po II wojnie światowej: kształtowanie się ustroju totalitarnego i fiasko tego projektu, a następnie budowanie zrębów systemu autorytarnego ze wszelkimi tego konsekwencjami dla funkcjonowania osób związanych zarówno z gospodarką, jak i służbami specjalnymi.
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