The aim of the survey was to find out what attitudes young people aged twelve to seventeen maintain towards adult civic qualities and virtues as compared with their demands for changes in civic behaviour. The objective of the study was to find out whether, based on their perception of adult behaviour, the critical youth wish for changes in civic behaviour and which aspects of citizen life they should be linked to. The survey tool used was a questionnaire investigating attitudes and behaviour in various situations of citizens’ everyday life. There were 33 Likert-type question items in the questionnaire (e.g. They are proud of their country.). The questionnaire showed a high level of reliability. The survey sample consisted of 533 adolescent respondents (aged 12–17). There were four factors generated through factor analysis from the collected results: 1. Respect for traditional social norms and roles; 2. Tolerance and respect for other people’s rights; 3. Patriotism and trust in public institutions; 4. Application of constitutional civic rights. The adolescent respondents were asked to mark the statements which should be changed. The outcome confirmed the hypothesis of high criticality in the respondents, which we consider a significant social challenge: adolescents demand a major change in civic behaviour described by the total of 14 items (42.7%) in all four factors. The highest number of proposed changes falls into the factor of “Respect for traditional social norms and roles”, while the fewest proposed changes concern the factor of “Patriotism and trust in public institutions”. According to the respondents, traditional social norms and roles and tolerance and respect for other people´s rights should be strengthened as well. The attitude towards active civic virtues implies a need for better and more sophisticated civic virtues education, both within the family and in schools. The results obtained from this survey will be used in generating civic education programmes for primary and secondary schools.
Project titled ‘Polonia Restituta. The Decalogue for Poland on the 100th Anniversary of Independence’ is intended by its authors – the Ministry of Science and Higher Education and the Council for Social Affairs of the Polish Episcopal Conference – as a thought about the future of our Homeland and State, about ‘how Poland should look like’. It should be a thought from a clearly defined perspective of Catholic social science, that is a theo-logic perspective. The Minister explains: we need ‘an in-depth reflection on where we are going to and what for, what values should accompany our collective life, what values we should use as the basis to restructure our state’. And later: since ‘the role of the Catholic church is unique and incomparable with any other institution in our history’, consequently, ‘here and now, we will examine Poland through the prism of its teaching, which directed the generations of our ancestors.’ ‘Thinking Homeland … Civic virtues and patriotism on the 100th anniversary of regaining independence by Poland’ is one of the ‘commandments’ of the ‘Decalogue for Poland’ under elaboration, i.e. one out of ten segments of theo-logic thinking (the thought guided by the logics of social science derived from the science of God) and understanding of the phenomenon of Poland itself. The sub-title clearly specifies further that the subject of the said thought shall be a conjunction of civic virtues (= a set of attitudes resulting from the bonds joining a person and a state) and patriotism (= according to John Paul II: ‘love for everything relating to homeland’, a moral virtue of love to Homeland). And the questions like: how do they relate to each other, whether they are directly or inversely proportional to each other, what ethical/social spaces do they share and which ones are separate for them? etc. Whereas, the two-word title (being the title of Karol Wojtyła’s poem) enables, and – what is more: suggests, inclines – to provide the thought in the light of teaching of our great fellow citizen and compatriot, the saint Pope. Thus: what John Paul II tries to tell us about what is patriotic and what is civic and about the interrelationship, threats and perspectives between these two aspects? And what – this is the most important question – from his theo-logic thought in this subject could become ‘deca-logic’ (in the perspective of liability and morality) for Poland, for its conversion, good and future? Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II does not differentiate clearly (he does not formulate strict definitions, does not make differences) between patriotism and civic virtues. The fundamental string of his thought and teaching in this respect is directed towards in-depth understanding and description of patriotism, which leads to civic ethos (the so-called civic virtues, arete politike, that is, a set of attitudes which show concern about the common good, namely, the state). He presents these in several genealogical layers of his works and teaching: within the poetic layer (here, in particular, in his poem titled Thinking Homeland… of 1974), within the essayistic layer (here, in particular, in Memory and Identity, written in 1993 and 2005) and within the preacher’s and lecturer’s layer (here, for instance, in homilies and speeches made during pilgrimages to Poland, but not only in these cases, also in some speeches concerning the issue in question, among others, during his famous speech in the Paris-based seat of UNESCO in 1980). The poem Thinking Homeland…, a text exceptionally dense in terms of language and content, published five years after its creation, already during the pontificate, under a nick name, contains several splendid and well-known phrases of Wojtyła: ‘When I think: Homeland, then I express myself and put down my roots’; ‘Is it possible for history to flow against the current of consciences?’’ ‘the liturgy of history’. Fragments of Memory and Identity constitute its essayistic development and interpretation. It is in this work where John Paul II explains fundamental content of his theology of patriotism/civic virtues, homeland and nation, their history and culture. In short: Homeland is a heritage, a resource of goods (strictly interrelated spiritual and material values, culture and land) received ‘after ancestors’. The teaching of Christ includes the most in-depth elements of theological vision of the homeland – it ‘opens the notion of homeland towards eschatology and eternity, but by no means deprives it of its earthly content (!). Patriotism means the ‘love for homeland’, an internal attitude (pietas) and a moral virtue, falling within the scope of the 4th commandment of the Decalogue. Both homeland and nation have got their own theological roots and existential reference to the mystery of creation and – similarly as in case of a family – they constitute ‘natural communities’ (nature of a man is of social character; a nation ‘is not a fruit of an ordinary agreement’) and ‘remain realities that cannot be replaced’ (!). What is more to say and describe in more detail in this subject: ‘You cannot […] replace a nation with a state’, ‘the more you cannot convert the nation into the so-called democratic society’. The Pope reaches for Christology also in this case: ‘The mystery of personification, the foundation of the Church, belongs to the theology of nation’ and gives it proper justification and inalienability, direction and depth. Theology and theo-logics of homeland and nation, as well as a theological reflection over relationships between ‘man – nation– homeland – state – civic virtues’, protects the whole difficult, complicated conglomeration, exposed to vagueness and distortions against mistakes and their existential consequences (sometimes with terrible results), such as, on the one side eradication and orphanage, and on the other side, a nationalism (‘so as the inalienable function of the nation will not degenerate into nationalism’). Calling for the ‘”Jagiellonian” dimension of Polish identity’, the Pope writes that ‘Polish identity is, in fact, a multiplicity and pluralism, not parochialism and confinement’. At the same time, he defends the – nowadays attacked – strive for protection and development of the ‘nation’s identity’ against its dispersion in transnational and cosmopolitan structures. He does so through the category of culture, crediting it with fundamental significance in his theological thought concerning the nation and state (thus, also the patriotism and civic virtues). During his speech in the seat of UNESCO, he mentioned: ‘The nation is such a great community of people who are joined together with various bonds, but, above all, with culture. The nation exists ‘because of its culture’ and ‘for its culture’. […] There is a basic sovereignty of the society, expressed in the culture of nation. Simultaneously, it is the sovereignty through which a man becomes parallelly the most sovereign.’ He said a terrific thing about his experience of papal service: ‘with my experience of the history of my homeland, with my increasing experience of the value of nation, I was not a stranger for the people I met. On the contrary, my experience of homeland facilitated, to great extent, my contacts with people and nations on all the continents.’ Consequently, the basic conclusion from ‘thinking: Homeland’: when, in the Christian, ecclesiastically moderated space, ‘I express myself and put down my roots’ into what is native and national, then the process (and attitudes co-creating it) serves what is universal for all humans, transnational, universal, eternal. Strengthening of (arousing, developing and cleansing) patriotism constitutes the best way to strengthening of (arousing, developing and cleansing) virtues and civic attitudes. Let us emphasise it: both require protection – patriotism need protection against demons of nationalisms, civic virtues – against emptiness of a liberal state, where the nomo-, bureau-, and technocracy cannot defend the panegoism and atrophy of virtues. ‘When I think: Homeland, I’m looking for the way’ – wrote Wojtyła forty-four years ago. The way runs through the Baptism of Poland, teaches. The one dating back to more than a thousand years and the one, in which all subsequent generations should cleanse themselves. The Baptism will save Independent Poland and its citizens, it will bring the future to both the Homeland and State. The Baptism will put down its and their roots in the redemptive God’s mysteries of creation, personification and love.
Przedmiotem artykułu jest krytyka Arystotelesowskiego republikanizmu, którą przeprowadza Kymlicka, oraz jego alternatywna propozycja tzw. republikanizmu instrumentalnego. Podejmę dyskusję ze stanowiskiem Kymlicki, która skoncentruje się wokół dwóch kwestii. Po pierwsze, czy celem życia ludzkiego jest uczestnictwo w polityce? Po drugie, czy cnoty powinny być traktowane przez państwo jako coś więcej niż środki konieczne do utrzymania i dobrego funkcjonowania jego instytucji, to znaczy jako konieczny (autoteliczny) element dobrego życia, który winien stać się przedmiotem zabiegów państwa?
EN
In considering Will Kymlicka’s critique of Aristotelian republicanism and his own version of instrumental republicanism, I pay special attention to two questions that divide the liberal and republican perspectives. First of all, should we take political participation as an essential form of human life? Secondly, can we admit that virtues should be treated by the state as autotelic elements of the good life? I reach the following conclusions: First, accepting a broad understanding of the political, we need to recognize the necessity of political engagement. Paradoxically, both liberals and republicans agree on this matter. The differences between them are to a large extent a result of different definitions of the terms political, social and private. Secondly, the state’s treating some virtues as intrinsic goods may be desirable and does not have to be in conflict with liberal justice.
Artykuł przedstawia współczesne społeczeństwo niemieckie jako „społeczeństwo resentymentu”. Termin ten podkreśla, że normatywny porządek społeczny republiki Niemiec bynajmniej nie wynika ze zbiorowo zaakceptowanego pojęcia „wspólnego dobra”, lecz niemal wyłącznie dyktowany jest przez te części społeczeństwa, które twierdzą, że są wykluczone lub dyskryminowane. Konsens zbiorowy opiera się raczej na ciągłym rozszerzaniu społecznej wrażliwości i społecznego uznania dla wszelkiej formy indywidualnej lub kulturowej „inności” oraz cechuje się niechęcią do akceptacji wszelkich wartości moralnych o uniwersalnie obowiązującym charakterze. W oparciu o wyniki badawcze badań empirycznych artykuł stawia tezę, że to „rewolucja kulturowa” z lat sześćdziesiątych i siedemdziesiątych w Niemczech doprowadziła do całkowitej eksternalizacji dawnych „cnót obywatelskich”. Analitycznym punktem wyjścia jest ciesząca się poparciem dużej części niemieckiej opinii publicznej książka Thilo Sarrazina Niemcy się likwidują, w której autor krytykuje deformację ogólnych zasad socjalizacji w Niemczech. Metodologicznej dyrektywy artykułu dostarcza reinterpretacja Nietzscheańskiego pojęcia resentymentu dokonana przez Maxa Schelera oraz wykład Georga Simmla pt. Konflikt nowoczesnej kultury. Deformacja niemieckiego życia społecznego w Niemczech jest przedstawiona jako efekt buntu skierowanego przeciw kulturze w imię wyzwolenia życia spod władzy porządku instytucjonalnego. Łącząc obie koncepcje Schelera i Simmla, artykuł wykazuje, że „Nowej Lewicy” w Niemczech – zogniskowanej wokół „teorii krytycznej” Szkoły Frankfurckiej – w ostatnich czterdziestu latach udało się stworzyć republikę, w której wszelka próba konstytuowania jakichkolwiek ogólnospołecznie obowiązujących norm i wartości uchodzi za nieuprawomocnioną represję względem „życia” – za nietolerancję.
EN
The paper describes the German society as a “society of resentment”. The term expresses that the normative order of the German Republic is not in the least based on an collectively accepted idea of the “common good”, but is almost entirely dictated by those parts of society, which claim to be excluded or discriminated against. The social consensus is predominantly based on the constant widening of social sensibility and social recognition of every form of individual or cultural “difference” and also is characterized by an unwillingness to accept universal moral values. According to the results of scientific research the article presents the thesis that it was the “cultural revolution” of the sixties and seventies which externalized all former “civic virtues”. The starting point of the analysis is Thilo Sarrazin’s book Germany Does Away With Itself, which addresses the issue of the deformation of general principles of socialization and has recently received major support form the German public opinion. The methodological directive will be the reinterpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of resentment accomplished by Max Scheler and the lecture by Georg Simmel entitled The Conflict Of Modern Culture. The deformation of social life in Germany will be described as an effect of a revolt turned against culture itself conducted in the name of the liberation of “life” from all kinds of institutionalized order. By connecting both concept of Scheler and Simmel, the article will prove, that in the past forty years the New Left in Germany – focused on the Critical theory of the Frankfurt School – constituted a republic, in which any attempt of creating generally applicable norms and values for society in general passes for being an illegitimate repression of “life” – for being intolerant.
DE
Der Artikel stellt die gegenwärtige deutsche Gesellschaft als „Gesellschaft des Ressentiments“ dar. Dieser Terminus soll darauf hinweisen, dass die normative Ordnung der deutschen Republik sich keineswegs an der Idee des „Gemeinwohls“ orientiert, sondern fast ausschließlich durch diejenigen Gesellschaftsmitglieder aufgezwungen wird, die angeben diskriminiert oder ausgegrenzt zu sein. Der soziale Konsens beruht daher auf einer ständigen Ausweitung der gesellschaftlichen Sensibilität und der Anerkennung jeglicher Form individueller oder kultureller „Andersheit“. Darüber hinaus kennzeichnet diesen sozialen Konsensus eine Abneigung gegenüber universal geltenden moralischen Werten. In Anlehnung an empirische Forschungsergebnisse stellt der Artikel die These, dass es durch die Kulturrevolution der sechziger und siebziger Jahre zu einer vollkommenen Externalisierung der „bürgerlichen“ Tugenden gekommen ist. Der analytische Ausgangspunkt des Artikels wird das unter der deutschen Bevölkerung sehr populäre Buch von Thilo Sarrazin Deutschland schafft sich ab sein, in welcher der Autor die Deformation der allgemeinen Regeln der Sozialisierung in Deutschland kritisiert. Die methodologische Direktive wird Max Schelers Reinterpretierung des nietzscheanischen Begriffs des Ressentiments und die Vorlesung von Georg Simmel unter dem Titel Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur sein. Die Deformation des Gesellschaftslebens in Deutschland wird als Aufstand gegen die Kultur als solcher dargestellt, indem sich das Leben im Namen der Befreiung das Recht nimmt sich aus allen Schranken der institutionellen Ordnung zu lösen. Indem ich beide Konzeptionen von Simmel und Scheler verbinde, wird der Artikel zeigen, dass es der „Neuen Linken“ in Deutschland, die sich um die „Kritische Theorie“ der Frankfurter Schule konzentriert, in den letzten vierzig Jahren gelungen ist eine Republik zu konstituieren, in welcher jeder Versuch der Konstitution von allgemeingültigen Normen und Werten als nicht gerechtfertigte Repression an dem „Leben“ angesehen wird – als Intoleranz.
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