Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 9

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  civil proceeding
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The purpose of the article is to discuss the problem of the trademark protection in Polish law. This protection takes place in civil law proceedings. It may be impeded if the defendant begins to challenge the validity of the trademark. The court can- not decide on the validity of the trademark; the decision on the invalidation of the trademark may be taken only by the Patent Office. For this reason, the court should suspend the civil law proceedings which can last for long time. Therefore, in Polish law, following the example of EU law, consideration should be given to the possibility of determining the validity of a trademark also by a court, if such a need occurs during the civil law proceedings
EN
In the literature and jurisprudence there are distinguished two opposite principles ruling over revealing the truth: a material truth principle (objective) and a formal truth principle (procedural). In the proceedings based on the material truth principle, judicial decisions in the matter of the actual state should reflect the reality. The judge aims to clarify all circumstances essential to solve a case in order to reveal a really existing legal relation bounding both parties to litigation. On the other hand, in proceedings based on the formal truth principle, judicial decisions in the matter of the actual state should only reflect the factual material and evidence gathered by the parties. In the study there is presented an evolution of norms and doctrinal opinions in the matter of the endeavor to establish the truth in civil proceedings connected with amendments to the Civil Procedure Code in 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2012.
EN
Civil proceeding is a field in which the problem of abuse of rights is an issue of significant importance because it concerns many legal aspects and institutions i.e. the right to court access (the right to action and the right to defence), abuse of substantive rights, fictitious trial (disputes), procedural acts, other procedural conducts, the role of court, relations between the party and its litigation lawyer, etc. The main and general observations and conclusions drawn from analyses of all these aspects as well as many others are as follows: 1. APR intrinsically constructs a ban, under which any abusive conducts are forbidden. APR also provides an obligation under which every participant of civil proceeding is bound to act and behave properly, honestly and in accordance with good faith and principles of social coexistence. APR as a ban preventing any kind of abuse should be regarded as a binding civil procedure principle. Its existence is justified by: - the general provisions: art. 3 of the Polish civil procedure code – “pcpc” (which obliges participants of a proceeding to submit true facts without hiding anything and to conduct procedural acts in accordance with good customs), art. 45 para. 1 of the Polish Constitution and ratified international treaties (the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); - the specific provisions of pcpc which analytically deal with conducts that are directly forbidden or sanctioned; - the concept of procedural relationship – and more precisely by, derived from this concept, the duty of procedural fairness; - the aim and essence of civil procedure, the purpose of which is to provide the protection and enforcement of justified claims (in the private and public interest). This principle can also be derived from many other principles of law, e.g. principles of social coexistence, fairness, due process of law, justice, democratic legal state, good faith, cooperation, equality, safety of legal transactions, effectiveness of proceeding. Having existed in the spheres of these principles it binds them axiologically and praxeologically. The distinction of the principle banning any abuses in civil proceeding is an important factor in theory and practice of law. It helps to perform the proper interpretation and application of the specific pcpc provisions. Thanks to this principle it becomes obvious that legal institutions cannot be used in contradiction to aims for which they were constructed. 2. The discussed principle shall not be confused with the clause which bans the abuse of substantive rights (art. 5 Polish civil code – “pcc”), because the latter is a substantive law norm and cannot be applied to purely procedural situations. These two legal constructs should be clearly distinguished, as they are often confused, especially in practice of law. However, the substantive law clause of art. 5 pcc can also be applied to procedural acts but only to these of them which simultaneously constitute acts of material law (e.g. in case of judicial settlement) and only through specific procedural provisions (e.g. art. 203 of pcpc). 3. The principle itself, as every principle of law, does not provide any specific sanctions. Sanctions may be applied only if they are stipulated by the specific regulations (rules), which indicate given instances of abuse and their possible legal consequences. Therefore these rules exemplify the existence of the principle. Only the responsibility for the cost of proceeding can be regarded as a sanction of general nature, especially for the willful cost, because under art. 103 par. 1 and 2 of pcpc one who intentionally causes the costs should be held responsible regardless of the outcome of the trial. It must be pointed out that the best sanctions for procedural abuses are repressive measures, especially monetary fines, because their imposition well proportionate to the importance of the abuse is an effective means for the prevention of APR. Sanctions such as ineffectiveness, nullity, voidness, etc., shall not be considered due to two reasons. Firstly, because they are useless in case of abuses which do not constitute procedural acts. Secondly, they would cause the state of constant uncertainty on the validity and effectiveness of the parties’ procedural acts. 4. It must be observed that de lege lata no kind of legal consequences can be applied with regard to abuse of right to access to court. In Polish legal system the right to court is a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental, public substantive right of every human being. Therefore, it cannot be limited. Every claim or defence must be essentially, not only formally, tried, even if it is manifestly ill-founded and absurd. This state is not satisfactory. Thus, the implementation of some foreign solutions into Polish law is worth of consideration. One of them is the institution of vexatious litigant known in common law systems. Thanks to it, the persons who constantly and recklessly use their right to court can be officially declared as vexatious litigants and depicted in the special public register. That means that they cannot initiate or join any judicial proceeding without court’s consent. Also the scope of civil liability could be widened under Polish law. This kind of amendment would unable courts to find a party who litigates unfairly responsible for compensation of any damage sustained by her opponent. 5. APR concerns different kinds of acts and conducts which can be classified into three groups. The first includes punishable abuses of procedural entitlements performed with formally legitimate procedural acts. The second contains unfair conducts (acts and omissions carried on before or inside the proceedings) which affect the proper course or outcome of the trial and against which the specific consequences can be applied by the court. The third concerns unpunishable abuses which cannot cause any sanctions, however, they violate the general principle of APR. 6. The clause of APR cannot be referred to the activity of the court itself because abuse concerns only the use of right. The court does not exercise any rights but only fulfils public law obligations. Therefore, if the court makes mistakes, applies the substantive or procedural law incorrectly and uses its authority improperly, it means only that the obligations were not fulfilled but not that rights were abused. These mistakes may only constitute the grounds for appeals. 7. As far as the relationship between a party and its representative (mainly a professional litigation lawyer) is concerned, it must be underlined that generally it is the party who is responsible and charged with consequences of her lawyer’s improper conduct. However, notwithstanding the fact that in some cases he also can be the subject of punishment (art. 110 and art. 214 par 3 pcpc), under Polish law the range of sanctions should be widened. 8. Another important aspect of APR concerns so-called “fictitious trial”. In Polish doctrine of law this term is widely used for a proceeding in which parties are in conspiracy (collusion) in order to deceive the court and get its awarding adjudication. Because the plaintiff’s claim is imaginary, so in fact does not exist and the conspiring parties cooperate instead of litigate. Therefore the defendant does not arrange defense or simply confesses that the claim is true, and the court awards the plaintiff with the final decision. The real aim of this conspiracy is mostly to harm the real creditor of the defendant. The plaintiff in fact is a friend and a trustee of the defendant whose aim is to keep and safe assets with the use of the court’s decision issued in that trial. This kind of conduct is in contradiction to justice and a glaring example of abuse of litigation. The term “fictitious trial” is not proper although it has been commonly used for a long time. Whereas a claim and a dispute declared within the proceeding can in fact be fictitious, a judicial trial itself cannot be regarded as such. The court as the State authority is real, the parties are real, the proceeding is real. If we describe a trial as fictitious, we actually question the role and esteem of the court as an organ of State. Therefore, the new term should be suggested for this kind of abuse i.e. “fixed trial”. However, the old name can remain in use because of its long presence in legal literature but only with the awareness of its imperfection. Under pcpc there are some instruments which could prevent the conspiring parties from reaching their aim but they are insufficient. However, what is more important, there is no instrument which allow to challenge the essential decision issued in a fixed trial. When a decision is final even extraordinary procedural remedies like cassation or petition for resumption of proceeding cannot be used. Therefore, the provisions concerning the latter institution should be amended. Under this proposal the public prosecutor or the Human Rights Defender will be authorised to submit a petition with the justification that the final decision was issued in a fixed trial.
EN
Basic novelties in the civil proceeding in the Polish People’s Republic of a socialist nature appeared in the act from 20 July 1950 changing the code of the civil proceeding from 1932. Changes of the pre-war code of the civil proceeding (1932) concerned four areas of issues: the system of appeal means, the rule of the material truth and the rule of prosecutor’s availability and participation in the civil proceeding. In justification to the amendment of the regulations on the civil proceeding (1950) the Russian models were directly referred to. The works on a new code of the civil proceeding started at the end of 1951. Regulations of the future code of the civil proceeding were to be based on socialist rules while a direct model was to be a Czech-Slovak code of the civil proceeding from 1950. It was until September 1952, namely the time allotted to the submission of a new socialist code of the civil proceeding to the Presidium of the Government that just its general part was designed. The first project of a new code of the civil proceeding was finally prepared in 1955. In fact, it thwarted the achievements of the Polish science within the scope of the civil proceeding. The project solutions underwent criticism and codification of the civil procedure, above all, its assumptions, revived again after a political turn in 1956.
EN
The article discusses a prosecutor’s position in the Polish civil proceedings in relation to the form of its participation in civil cases. Prosecutor’s possibilities to participate in the civil procedure depend on whether or not he brought a court action or he joined proceedings already pending. The article focuses on the problem wheather prosecutor’s right to bring the action before the civil court should be considered as proper solution during the amendment processs of the Polish civil procedure code.
XX
The article describes the issue of the ban on judgements to the disadvantage of the claimant during the proceedings related to reservations about the post-audit statement (reformationis in peius). Once the arguments presented by the parties in the dispute have been analysed, two opposing views can be identified. According to the first view, the ban should be respected during the adjudicating committee proceedings, because the ban on judging to the disadvantage of the claimant is the basis for all fair proceedings. Whereas in accordance with the opposing view, the ban on reformationis in peius should not be applied in proceedings related to reservations, as it is not openly set forth in the Act on the Supreme Audit Office, and its application may lead to distorted audit results.
PL
Prawo do sądu jest jednym z podstawowych praw gwarantowanych jednostce w państwach demokratycznych. Jego istotnym elementem jest zwłaszcza dostęp do sądu, warunkujący możliwość uruchomienia postępowania przed wymiarem sprawiedliwości w celu dochodzenia obrony swoich praw. Celem niniejszego opracowania jest przedstawienie dostępu do sądu w sprawach cywilnych w świetle generalnej zasady odpłatności tej procedury. Autorka wskazuje na funkcje kosztów sądowych, przywołując poglądy doktryny oraz stanowisko judykatury oraz akcentując wytyczne Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w tym zakresie. Nadto, analizie poddane zostają występujące w polskim porządku prawnym instytucje zwolnienia od kosztów oraz pomocy prawnej udzielonej stronie z urzędu. Na podstawie poczynionych rozważań, autorka formuje wniosek, zgodnie z którym istnienie modelu odpłatnego procesu cywilnego nie stoi w sprzeczności z prawem dostępu do sądu, a za przyjętym rozwiązaniem zgodnym z ogólną klauzulą limitacyjną przemawiają funkcje jakie ma do odegrania instytucja kosztów postępowania w demokratycznym państwie prawnym.
EN
The right of recourse to court is one of the basic rights, which are guaranteed for an entity at the constitutional level in every democratical state. One of its parts is the access to court, which determinates the possibility of starting the proceedings before the court, in order to defend one’s rights. The aim of this elaboration is presenting the access to court in the civil proceedings in the light of costs of this proceeding. The author underlines the function of the legal costs by recalling the doctrine views, the position of the jurisdiction and by underscoring the guidelines of the Constitutional Tribunal in this area. Moreover, the institutions of the exemption from the costs and legal aid in polish law are analysed in the elaboration. Basing on the analisis, the author makes a conclusion, that the model of paid civil proceeding is not contrary to the right of recourse to court, that the current solution is compatibile with the general limitation clause and justified by the function and role of the institution of legal cost in the democratical state of law.
EN
The judiciary construed as the operation of courts is based on the principle known from its Latin expression as iura novit curia, which means that “the court knows the law”, which originated with the authors of mediaeval glosses. The rule means that courts should have the fullest possible, even if not complete, knowledge of the law that they are bound to apply in reference to the facts (events) determined in the basic court procedure, understood as events taking place in the external world. History of law is a field of legal sciences. A historian of law has certain specialist knowledge. In the article, the author discusses the court cases in which he was appointed as an expert witness historian of law. For example, he participated in trial before the Regional Court in Wieliczka by the Roman Catholic Parish in Niepołomice vs the District State Forest Authority. The task was to define the legal character of a benefit resulting from the charter of King Casimir the Great (Kazimierz Wielki) of 4th October 1358. Expert witnesses are summoned to ascertain facts. In the case of an expert witness historian of law, the question, however, looks differently. In this case, the opinion refers not to the realm of pure facts but rather to the legal assessment of these facts in the light of the law binding on the date of the event, construed not only through the letter of the law, but also with the acknowledgement of the contemporary adjudication and the legal doctrine of the time. An expert witness historian of law ascertains the facts against the background and in relation to law. Law, as a rule, defines the essence of a given fact in the light of law. The object of opinion of an expert witness historian of law is thus not only the contents of law that was binding in the past, but rather the practice of its application in a given time and space. Law of the past, especially distant, lies within the notional scope of foreign law, as mentioned in Art. 1143 § 3 of the Civil Procedure Code.
PL
Wymiar sprawiedliwości rozumiany jako działalność sądów opiera się na zasadzie znanej w swej łacińskiej formule iura novit curia, czyli „sąd zna prawo”, pochodzącej od średniowiecznych glosatorów. Reguła ta oznacza, że sądy winny posiadać jak najpełniejszą, jeśli nawet nie całkowitą znajomość prawa, które zobowiązane są stosować w odniesieniu do ustalonych w procesie sądowym faktów (zdarzeń), rozumianych jako zaszłości w świecie zewnętrznym. Historia prawa jest dziedziną nauki prawa. Historyk prawa posiada pewną specjalistyczną wiedzę. W artykule autor omawia sprawy sądowe, w których był powoływany jako biegły historyk prawa. W szczególności z jego udziałem toczył się proces wszczęty przed Sądem Rejonowym w Wieliczce przez Parafię Rzymsko-Katolicką w Niepołomicach przeciwko Okręgowej Dyrekcji Lasów Państwowych. Zadaniem miało być ustalenie charakteru prawnego świadczenia wynikającego z aktu erekcyjnego króla Kazimierza Wielkiego z dnia 4 października 1358 r. Biegli powoływani są do ustalenia faktów. W przypadku biegłego historyka prawa kwestia ta przedstawia się jednak inaczej. Przedmiotem opinii jest w tym przypadku nie tyle sfera czysto faktyczna, ile ocena prawna tych faktów w świetle obowiązującego w dacie zdarzenia prawa postrzeganego nie tylko przez literę tego prawa, ale także z uwzględnieniem judykatury tego czasu, a także doktryny prawnej. Biegły historyk prawa ustala fakty na tle i w związku z prawem. Prawo określa z reguły istotę danego faktu w świetle prawa. Przedmiotem opinii biegłego historyka prawa jest nie tylko treść obowiązującego w przeszłości prawa, co praktyka jego stosowania w danym miejscu i czasie. Prawo w przeszłości, zwłaszcza odległej mieści się w zakresie pojęciowym prawa obcego, o którym mowa jest w art. 1143 § 3 kodeksu postępowania cywilnego.
|
2022
|
vol. 16
|
issue 2
108-129
EN
The article constitutes a comparative legal study of mediation based on for proceduralregulations, i.e. Act of 6 June 1997: Code of Criminal Procedure, Act of 17 November 1964:Code of Civil Procedure, Act of 14 June 1960: Code of Administrative Procedure, and Actof 30 August 2002: Law on the Proceedings before Administrative Courts carried out withthe use of a dogmatic method. The author analyses the solutions that, in his opinion, makeit possible to propose a thesis on far-reaching convergence of the basic, and at the sametime of normative provenance, principles of mediation. The principles include amicability,voluntariness (optionality), commonness, loyalty to parties, confidentiality and non-opennessof mediation, as well as a mediator’s impartiality. The above-mentioned convergence doesnot mean complete homogeneity of particular solutions or their non-defectiveness, which isexemplified by Article 2591 CPC and Article 83 § 4 CAP. It is also shown that the domesticsolutions are in conformity with the solutions recommended by the Committee of Ministersof the Council of Europe.
PL
Tekst stanowi studium prawnoporównawcze instytucji mediacji występującej na gruncie czterech regulacji procesowych, tj. Ustawy z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. Kodeks postępowania karnego, Ustawy z dnia 17 listopada 1964 r. Kodeks postępowania cywilnego, Ustawy z dnia 14 czerwca 1960 r. Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego, a także Ustawy z dnia 30 sierpnia 2002 r. Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi przeprowadzonej na podstawie metody dogmatycznej. Analizie poddano te rozwiązania, które – zdaniem autora – pozwalają postawić tezę o daleko idącej zbieżności podstawowych, a zarazem mających normatywną proweniencję zasad rządzących tymi mediacjami. Do zasad tych zalicza się w tekście polubowność, dobrowolność (fakultatywność), powszechność, lojalność wobec stron, zasadę poufności i niejawności prowadzenia mediacji, a także bezstronności mediatora. Wspomniana zbieżność nie oznacza całkowitej homogeniczności poszczególnych rozwiązań, ani też ich niewadliwości, co wykazuje się m.in. na przykładzie art. 2591 k.p.c. oraz art. 83 § 4 k.p.a. Wskazano na zgodność krajowych rozwiązań z rozwiązaniami rekomendowanymi przez Komitet Ministrów Rady Europy.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.