This paper gives an overview of the potential integrative function of religion from the evolutionary standpoint. In order to fulfill those aims, the work first addresses the characterization of the use of an evolutionary paradigm for the study of religion. In this section, the most prominent evolutionary hypotheses of religion are discussed: the sociobiological view, memetic approach and cognitive perspective. Subsequently, the article also introduces several conceptual difficulties of the whole program of Darwinian religious study. In the final part of the paper, a couple of the most important religious mechanisms of social integration are shown.
We use the term “person” when we want to point out that human existence is unrepeatable and unique. The assumption that man is a person constitutes a basis for the belief in the dignity, efficacy, and responsibility of the human individual. Karol Wojtyla built his conception of the person in the context of theological and philosophical discussions. Even though Wojtyła’s conception has been given a great deal of scholarly attention, it is worthwhile to juxtapose it with contemporary anthropological theories that derive from cognitive sciences. Cognitivists usually base their theories on biological and sociological premises. Some conclusions arrived at in the area of the cognitive sciences lead to mind-brain reductionism, a theory in which the human being is regarded as a body endowed with the function of the brain and as an entity whose individual traits are shaped by its social and cultural environment. This position undermines the ideas of free will and the substantial singularity of the human person. However, debates with this position have worked out a non-reductionist alternative, a theory known as emergentism. This theory treats the human mind as a distinct faculty, one which emerges as a phase in the brain’s development. Emergentists base their reasoning on the assumptions that the body is a unity and that the mind is not identical with it. It is my belief that emergentism can be fruitfully applied to the dynamic understanding of the person put forward by Wojtyła in the middle of the 20th century.
The aim of this article is to discuss possible directions of interdisciplinary studies on obsessive-compulsive disorder. It is proposed that while examining the cognitive basis of the disorder one’s beliefs about the way cognitive processes work and the actual functioning of these processes should be taken into consideration, with executive functions in particular. Interdisciplinary studies combining psychiatry, clinical psychology and cognitive sciences may not only improve the understanding of the nature of cognitive processes, but also provide important data on how they are associated with specific symptoms of mental disorders. From a broader perspective such an approach may be potentially useful in developing new therapeutic techniques.
The review paper revisits the problem of subjectivity with particular focus on the latest research in this field presented in The Dispute about Subjectivity – an Interdisciplinary Perspective, edited by Adriana Warmbier (2016). I pay special attention to the interdisciplinary perspective of the analyzed issues of subjectivity as a research object in humanities (philosophy, psychology, anthropology) and cognitive sciences.
Podejmowanie przez psychologię kognitywną (cognitive sciences i nauki pokrewne: social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, social neuroscience itp.) problematyki związanej z takimi kategoriami, jak: świadomość, ,ja" czy podmiot stanowi - po latach nieobecności - swoiste novum. Na tym tle wyłania się specyficzny sposób widzenia osoby i natury jej działania. Jego istotną cechą staje się podważenie potocznych wyobrażeń na temat funkcjonowania człowieka jako świadomego podmiotu, kierującego własnymi działaniami zgodnie ze swoimi świadomymi planami, intencjami czy wolą: wzrastająca liczba badań wskazuje, że procesy odpowiedzialne za ludzkie zachowanie w znacznej mierze przebiegają w sposób subświadomy i automatyczny, a to, co sobie uświadamiamy, to jedynie efekty ich działania. W artykule przedstawione zostaną empiryczne argumenty (zwłaszcza z obszaru społecznej psychologii poznawczej oraz badań neurobiologicznych) przemawiające za tą właśnie tezą. Uzmysłowienie sobie roli tzw. poznawczej nieświadomości prowadzi zarazem badaczy do szeregu pytań. Ważniejsze z nich dotyczą tego: kto (jeśli nie podmiot utożsamiany ze świadomym ,ja") kieruje zachowaniem i sprawuje nad nim kontrolę?, a także tego: jaka jest rola świadomości, ,ja" i doświadczenia bycia podmiotem? Sytuacja ta skłania również do zadania pytania bardziej podstawowego: czy naukom szczegółowym dostępna jest kategoria ,podmiotu jako takiego"?
EN
Categories such as: "consciousness", "self, "agent" - after decades of absence - regain recognition as a specific novelty in the field of cognitive psychology (cognitive sciences and related disciplines: social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, social neuroscience, etc.). In this context, a particular approach towards the person and the nature of his/her actions emerges. The main mark of this approach seems to undermine our commonsense convictions on the man's functioning as a conscious agent who controls the course of his actions according to his conscious plans, intentions or will: an increasing amount of evidence indicates that complex processes responsible for human behavior do not require awareness; an important class of these unconscious processes is automatic: we are only aware of some of their effects. The text provides a number of empirically grounded arguments (advanced especially in the field of social cognition and neuroscience) in favor of the thesis mentioned above. Some evidence confirms a significant role of so called "cognitive unconsciousness" in various complex mental processes, although this raises some questions. Just to name some of the key difficulties: Who (if not the conscious "I") is the controller of one's own behavior and who guides it? What do we need consciousness for? What is the role of human sense of agency and a subjective experience of the will? And finally, to bring forward the fundamental one: can a scientific theory deal with the category of an 'agent as such'?
The paper focuses on the Argentine picture book for children by Amalia Boselli and Vero Gatti titled Los indomables pensamientos del Señor O from 2013. It is suggested to analyze the text with respect to Rousseau’s philosophical reflections on time and dreaming as seen by Poulet, and on the basis of the future orientation paradigm and the concept of daydreaming studied from the psychological perspective. The research revolves around the relationship between the main character’s mental imagery and his perception of the future, with regards to actions he undertakes. Over time, Mr. O’s thinking process becomes dominated by the anticipatory imagination which deprives him of boundless creativity experienced in childhood. Eventually the protagonist’s journey ends with the triumph of creative imagination. It is through numerous references to the emotionality and sensuality - present at both verbal and visual levels - that the text by Boselli and Gatti intensifies a singular reading experience. Thus, despite several simplifications and generalizations, it opens up to the individualized (child and adult) reader response.
PL
Praca poświęcona jest analizie argentyńskiej książki obrazkowej dla dzieci Amalii Boselli i Vero Gatti pt. „Los indomables pensamientos del Señor O„ („Nieposkromione myśli Pana O”) z 2013 roku. Proponuje się odczytanie historii tytułowego bohatera w odniesieniu do refleksji filozoficznych Rousseau na temat czasu i marzenia w interpretacji Pouleta, a także w oparciu o paradygmat orientacji temporalnej i wizję marzenia dziennego z perspektywy psychologicznej. Artykuł bada związek między obrazami mentalnymi głównego bohatera a jego postrzeganiem przyszłości i podejmowanymi działaniami. W miarę upływu czasu w procesie myślenia Pana O dominować zaczyna wyobraźnia antycypacyjna, przesłaniająca mu potencję nieograniczonej kreatywności z czasów dzieciństwa. Celem podróży postaci jest zwycięstwo wyobraźni twórczej. To poprzez liczne odwołania do emocjonalności i zmysłowości – zarówno w warstwie werbalnej jak i wizualnej – tekst Boselli i Gatti intensyfikuje towarzyszące każdej lekturze sensualne czytelniczego doświadczenie. Tym samym, pomimo obecnych w opowieści uproszczeń i generalizacji, otwiera się na zindywidualizowany odbiór, dziecięcy czy dorosły.
Przybysz Hanna, Artysta jako nieświadomy neurobiolog. Filmoznawczo-neurokognitywistyczna analiza myśli Hugo Münsterberga i Lwa Kuleszowa [An artist treated as an unconscious neurobiologist in the context of cognitive film studies: Hugo Münsterberg and Lev Kuleshov]. “Images” vol. XXV, no. 34. Poznań 2019. Adam Mickiewicz University Press. Pp. 137–147. ISSN 1731-450X. DOI 10.14746/i.2019.34.08. The history and theory of art have often shown, before the era of neurobiology, cognitive psychology and cognitive science, that great artists are unconscious neurobiologists, activating with their art the areas of the brain of recipients that cause aesthetic experience, and using in their works the principles of perception or optical illusions, unknown to ordinary mortals, and sometimes also to creators at the level of consciousness. The following considerations are intended to approximate and, to some extent, to rehabilitate and save film creators and theoreticians who are being forgotten, the ones who, long before the discoveries of the cognitive sciences, considered theoretically and carried out empirical experiments aimed at showing and explaining the mysteries of human perception and the influence of the film on the viewer. I will present the profiles of the two pioneers of pre-cognitive thought on the basis of film studies: Hugo Münsterberg and Lew Kuleszow. I will show that half a century before neuroscientific research, they dealt with the cognitive processes of human cognition. I will present the contemporary state of cognitive sciences to illustrate the pioneering and legitimacy of visions, intuitions and achievements of the above creators, who are underestimated and forgotten by time and the achievements of “cold” science, although neuroesthetics researchers who have been involved in the problem of perception of works of art and rehabilitation of the merits of the past in the area of neuroscience for some time cannot be denied their achievements. Ignoring their contribution and achievements in the science of cognition, especially as to this day they are continued in research laboratories, in my subjective opinion, equals the potential underestimation of Leonardo da Vinci’s contribution to medical science or Darwin’s to research emotions.
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