Search results

1

Ohledání Kantova zdravého rozumu

100%

Glombíček P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2009

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vol. 57

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issue 6

893-913

EN

The aim of the paper is to forestall certain one-sided interpretations of Kant’s notion of common sense. First, the very occurrence of the term in Kant’s work is widely underestimated, with attention being limited to his negative strictures towards the Scottish school. Second, common sense tends to be instrumentally over-interpreted for particular purposes in aesthetics or political philosophy. The interpretation proposed here, in contrast, begins by pointing out the positive use of the notion already in the first Critique. Furthermore a close reading reveals the epistemological justification of sensus communis in the third Critique, a justification that bases the Kantian notion on the Aristotelian idea of koiné aisthésis what makes the communal aspect of it an effect rather than a foundation. In effect, Kant turns out to be transforming previous uses of the notion of common sense into its current form.

2

Джеймс. Привлекательность разумности и защита „common sense”

80%

Михина Ф.

Społeczeństwo i Edukacja. Międzynarodowe Studia Humanistyczne

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2012

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issue 2

51-68

EN

The author of the article presents the analysis of the pragmatic position or the classic pragmatists’ position concerning rationality and rationalism. Such position is explained with reference to substantialistical thinking interpreted by rationalism which manifests itself not only in the contemporary philosophical thought though. Most attention has been focused on the philosophical conception of W. James.

3

Obecný smysl u Arendtové a Kantův zdravý rozum

80%

Glombíček P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2011

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vol. 59

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issue 3

351-376

EN

The article is concerned with the epistemological background of Hannah Arendt’s philosophy. It focuses on the notion of common sense that plays a central role in Arendt’s work. The origin of Arendt’s notion of common sense lies in her interpretation of Kant, and the author tries to state the inadequacies of Arendt’s interpretation of Kant with respect to the notion of common sense. The focus is not on the application to political philosophy but rather on Kant’s theory of judgement, and it is shown that whereas Kant’s aim was a unified theory of rationality, Arendt, mostly unintentionally, narrows the scope of the theory to conscious consideration of others in decision making. Textual evidence aside, the thesis of the article is supported by a reductive argument that distinguishes the purported theory of the meaning of judgements from Arendt’s approach, in order to show the latter’s conformist implication.

4

Pojem „common sense” u Thomase Reida

80%

Glombíček P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2014

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vol. 62

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issue 5

675-692

EN

The article interprets the not of "common sense" as presented in the works of Thomas Reid. The focus is not primarily on Reid's epistomology or metaphysics or even on the history of the notion or its influence. Rather, the article is strictly concerned with Reid's use of the term. The notion is considered vague by some interpreters and it is confused with the "principles of common sense". The "principles of common sense" play the role of axioms in the model of the human mind that Reid is aiming at, and thanks to that they play the role of criteria since they are the rules of our thinking. We must only distinguish them from widely-shared prejudices. The "principles of common sense" are propositions believed by every healthy adult who understands the propositions in question, considering them without any prejudice. They are integrated into the structures of different languages, they hold up against explicit criticism, and the acceptance of these propositions does not have any absurd consequences. By the term "common sense", on the other hand, Reid understands the faculty of judgment in the area of sensory experience.

5

Lumière naturelle jako common sense w ujęciu Błażeja Pascala

80%

Janeczek S.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

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2015

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vol. 27/t.t.

41-56

EN

This paper depicts one of the essential elements in the tradition of European philosophy, namely a belief in the commonsensical endowment of the human mind. This position founds the non-evidential beliefs with regard to fundamental questions in theoretical knowledge and in human action. In particular, it combines the approach typical of the Scottish common sense philosophy with the philosophy of Blaise Pascal. In each case it shows the integral character of human knowledge, transcending the set of truths accessible in the knowledge based on discourse (raison). It pinpoints the role Pascal attributed to intuition defined in the categories of sentir or even instinct, working on such categories as esprit de finesse, identified with sens droit or esprit de justesse, categories essential in relation to the knowledge of principes. At the same time thus understood endowment of the human mind (lumière naturelle) corresponds, in certain aspects, to the knowledge based on coeur, the knowledge set in opposition to the rationalistic interpretation of raison, where on the grounds of religion lumière naturelle is complementary to inspiration or révélation.

6

Unreasonable science

80%

Pierański P.

Nauka

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2007

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issue 1

EN

It is argued that most of the great discoveries in science, in particular in mathematics and physics, are from the point of view of the common sense unreasonable. A few examples of such discoveries are discussed, among them the Banach-Tarski paradoxical duplication of a sphere, the non-Euclidean geometry, the special theory of relativity and the quantum mechanics.

7

Původ zájmu o common sense : vznik Shaftesburyho eseje "Sensus Communis"

71%

Glombíček P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2019

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vol. 67

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issue 5

735-752

EN

The article explores the circumstances of writing and publication of the essay Sensus Communis by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, so as to fix its place in Shaftesbury’s body of work. Shaftesbury himself did not employ the eponymous term elsewhere in his works and the author argues that its introduction in the essay did not present a significant conceptual enrichment of Shaftesbury’s doctrine. The introduction of the term is interpreted as a tool for answering Shaftesbury critics. First, Jonathan Swift’s A Tale of a Tub is proposed as a stimulus for Shaftesbury’s concern with raillery in his Letter concerning Enthusiasm. Second, Mary Astell is singled out among the critics of the Letter as the one who put forth the most elaborate analysis, including an argument from common sense against Shaftesbury’s test by raillery.

CS

Cílem autora článku je alespoň zčásti objasnit místo eseje Sensus Communis v Shaftesburyho díle, resp. ukázat, jak dalece jsou při vysvětlení v něm vyložené koncepce zdravého rozumu nápomocny informace o okolnostech jeho vzniku. Ve svých dalších textech totiž Shaftesbury s tímto pojmem nepracuje. Autor zdůrazňuje, že zavedení tohoto pojmu nepředstavuje rozšíření Shaftesburyho filosofie ze systematického hlediska. Za Shaftesburyho zájmem o vtip a posměch spatřuje vliv Swiftovy Pohádky o kádi a samotný esej vykládá jako reakci na kritiku Dopisu o entusiasmu. Zdůrazňuje zejména vliv Mary Astellové, jež ve své zevrubné kritice Shaftesburyho Dopisu použila také argument z common sense.

8

Wady i zalety common sense w wyjaśnianiu i rozumieniu świata społecznego

71%

Mendeluk P.

Logos i Ethos

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2017

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vol. 45

EN

The article attempts an analysis of the so called common sense. It points to its advantages and disadvantages for the process of social world cognition. In its first part, it concentrates on selected philosophical concepts that disprove the meaning of informal reasoning. Further, the category of common sense is presented as a threat to political thought and reflection. In its second part, the article concentrates on philosophical concepts that value the influence of practical knowledge on construing identity of an individual and human cognition.

PL

W artykule podejmuję próbę analizy zdrowego rozsądku, czyli tak zwanego common sense. Wskazuję jego wady oraz zalety w perspektywie poznawania świata społecznego. W pierwszej części artykułu koncentruję się na wybranych koncepcjach filozoficznych, które podważają znaczenie myślenia potocznego. Następnie kategorie common sense ujmuję jako zagrożenie dla myśli oraz refleksji politycznej. Natomiast w drugiej części artykułu poświęcam uwagę koncepcjom filozoficznym, które doceniają wpływ wiedzy zdroworozsądkowej na budowanie tożsamości jednostki oraz poznanie człowieka.

9

Science and Different Images of the World

70%

Marsonet M.

Academicus. International Scientific Journal

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2016

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issue 14

14-27

EN

It has often been claimed in contemporary philosophy that the scientific world-view will necessarily replace the view of the world provided by common sense. It may be argued, however, that common sense holds a sort of methodological primacy over the aforementioned scientific world-view. For example, the thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation entails the impossibility of establishing what a scientific theory is talking about. We can say what a scientific theory deals with only by having recourse to our ordinary language, i.e., by assuming that we know and understand in advance what we are talking about normally, in our daily life. It follows that science cannot be conceived of as a form of knowledge which is totally independent of ordinary language and, therefore, alternative to it. According to such a stance, even scientific theories stem from the universe of meanings that belong to common language. On his part Davidson, in challenging the scheme-content dualism, mentions both “a dualism of total scheme (or language) and uninterpreted content”, and “a dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content”. What we have here is a real dichotomy between these two elements, in the sense that the (conceptual) scheme is “other than” the (non-conceptual) content that is opposed to it. Now, Davidson’s rejection of the scheme-content distinction is supported by a set of arguments purporting to reject, first of all, the thesis that totally different conceptual schemes can actually exist. To put things in a very sketchy manner, he equates having a conceptual scheme with having a language, so that we face the following elements: (1) language as the organizing force; (2) what is organized, referred to as “experience”, “the stream of sensory experience”, and “physical evidence”; and, finally, (3) the failure of intertranslatability. It follows that “It is essential to this idea that there be something neutral and common that lies outside all schemes”. If this is the situation, he goes on, then we could say that conceptual schemes that are different in a radical way from each other correspond to languages that are not intertranslatable. How can we, however, make sense of a total failure of intertranslatability among languages? For sure “we could not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own”. Davidson’s conclusion is that if one gives up the dualism of scheme and world, he will not give up the world, but will instead be able to “re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true”. Davidson’s solution is radical, but we are bound to ask at this point what the expressions “reality” and “world” mean for him. They seem to coincide with the world of common sense which is formed by the familiar objects whose antics - as he says - make our sentences and opinions true or false. These familiar objects are tables, chairs, houses, stars, etc., just as we perceive them in our daily life. One is not entitled to ignore, however, that the current discussions on the problem of scientific realism arise because there appears to be a strong asymmetry between the commonsense view of the world and the scientific one. For instance, the table that we see with our eyes is not the same table that we “see” through the mediation of scientific instruments, and this fact is not trivial. It is rather easy to reach a high level of inter-subjective agreement among the individuals present in a room about the color, size and weight of a table, and it can also be granted that we form our beliefs in this regard by triangulating with our interlocutors and the surrounding environment. Such an agreement, however, may turn out to be problematic when we try to reconcile this vision of the world with what today science tells us about it. So, being in touch with such familiar objects as tables, chairs and stars “all the time” - as Richard Rorty adds - has a fundamental bearing only on the ontology of common sense, since our actual science shows that quite a different representation of reality can actually be provided (or, even better, it shows that those objects might not exist as men perceive them). Naturally, one can always resort to an objection of the following kind: Why should we deem the table viewed as a collection of subatomic particles more important than the table that our eyes see in daily life? After all, we can conduct our life well enough even ignoring what science claims (just like men did for many thousand years). This, however, may be judged as a serious underevaluation of the scientific enterprise. As a matter of fact, in the last centuries we are confronted not by one world-view, but by two complex images, each of which means to be a complete picture of man in the world. Wilfrid Sellars called these two perspectives, respectively, the manifest and the scientific image of man in the world. They are both intersubjective and non arbitrary. What are, however, these two images, and are they really alternative? Let us note, from the onset, that the two images we just mentioned are both idealizations in the same sense of Max Weber’s “ideal types”. This means that, in order to discover their actual presence, we need having recourse to a good deal of philosophical abstraction. In other words, they are not disclosed by mere empirical recognition. For instance, we live in the commonsense view of the world, and only a complex process of reflection makes us understand that we, as human beings, share a common view of the world, which is in turn determined by the fact that our physical structure bounds us to conceive of reality in a certain way rather than in another. Think about the importance that light, for example, has not only in daily life, but even in our philosophical conceptualization of the world. The story is complicated by the fact that each image has a history, and while the manifest image dates back to pre-history, the scientific image is constantly changing shape.

10

COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO THE RESTORATION OF SACRED ART

70%

Lopez Pinto A.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2014

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vol. 3: supplement

537-545

EN

In this paper, Sacred Art is examined as an imitation of historia. Historia interprets historical human events as empirical, material and real while seeking to understand their moral and spiritual significance. It is from historia that sacred art can be understood, where Christ and the saints are portrayed in the integrity of their human natures united to symbols representing Divinity or grace in order to present a visual/contemplative narrative. Mortimer Adler rightly sees that the vision of the beautiful is inherently contemplative, thus sacred iconography provides a language that can form the common sense of men and women.

11

ETNOGRAFIA MYŚLI POTOCZNEJ W DZIEDZINIE POZAAKADEMICKICH RELACJI Z PRZESZŁOŚCIĄ. MYŚL POTOCZNA JAKO PRZEDMIOT BADAŃ HISTORII HISTORIOGRAFII

70%

PIASEK W.

Historia@Teoria

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2017

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vol. 2

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issue 4

53-65

EN

By distancing ourselves from the previous ways of thinking about non- academic forms of history within history of historiography and methodology of history, I suggest using cultural anthropology in the research. In my opinion that its traditional fi eld of study, e.g. the common sense, remains closely related to the study of history of historiography and methodology of history on non- academic forms of history.

12

Interpreters of the Constitution: The Problem of Typology

70%

Mesonis G.

Baltic Journal of Law & Politics

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2012

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vol. 5

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issue 2

27-42

EN

The significance of the most important legal act-the Constitution-to the social medium is evident. This constituent act of the nation determines the legal, political, moral and social life of the social medium. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the Constitution-the content of this constituent act-is the object of everybody’s attention. The Constitution is interpreted by lawyers, public leaders, state institutions, scholars and individual persons. The article analyses the wide-ranging subjects interpreting the Constitution and presents the types of its interpreters. The three most prominent groups of such subjects can be distinguished as: (i) institutions of constitutional justice, (ii) the scholarly doctrine, and (iii) other subjects. The article discusses the legal, scientific and social value of interpretations of the Constitution formulated by these interpreters. It is held that the most meaningful thing in this typology is distinguishing the interpretations according to the factor of their legal effects. The differing scientific, legal and social value of the interpretations does not deny the factor of the significance of their existence. It is recognised that a large number of interpretations of the content of the Constitution come from an immanently related state of discussions taking place in a state under the rule of law and democratic society.

13

Cold War (Post-)Truth Regimes: Radio Free Europe between “States of Affairs” and the Epistemology of Hope and Fear

70%

Grutza A.

Stan Rzeczy

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2019

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issue 2(17) A New Culture of Truth

125-160

EN

In accord with recent scholarly appeals, this article advocates a certain intellectual tolerance and modesty in regard to the juxtaposition of conflicting or even supposedly rival approaches to questions of epistemology and truth. By rejecting the idea of a fixed epistemological standpoint and by moving the reader along a multiplicity of frames and truth situations, the author argues that if the post-truth problematic can teach us anything new about truth, it is the necessity to (re-)acknowledge that there is no omniscient position for the scholar and that none of our scholarly approaches taken separately enable us to grasp the totality. Hence, truth is investigated in this article as a variable shaping and being shaped by a highly dynamic and uncertain social reality – a reality that is neither constituted of “hard facts” nor of a “soft relativism” alone. From a consideration of the selected Cold War context and the laboratory-like setting of the American broadcaster Radio Free Europe, it can be concluded that a new media-archaeology of the fact requires not only a revision of our understanding of truth but of agency, rationality, and objectivity as well.

14

W stronę teorii i historii kultury. Spojrzenie na teorię stylów myślowych Ludwika Flecka. Część III

70%

Rydlewski M.

Etnografia Polska

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2011

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vol. 55

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issue 1-2

179-198

EN

This article is the third and the last part of the discussion on Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought styles and collectives. According to his ideas every perception is conditioned by the thought style. There is no neutral perception, it is always determinated by the cultural context and particular thought collectives. It applies also to the perception based on the common sense. This article presents several examples of how human body might be perceived by different thought collectives. The first one shows how “dead” metaphor manipulates the content of the perception, the other one highlights the relationship between the invention of individual, European individualism and the perception of the face. This article series dedicated to Ludwik Fleck was supposed to discuss his ideas, which seem to be very interesting for ethnologists and anthropologists. From the theoretical point of view, Fleck ideas may inspire or supplement the theory of culture. His concepts might be used by various humanities, especially that he relates them to the context of ‘primitive cultures’. The theory of thought styles and collectives might be applied to the research on theory of cognition, cultural aspects of nature, theory of sight, common sense, cultural change, socialization, circulation of knowledge in the society, analysis of meanings, etc. The scope of problems discussed by Ludwik Fleck is very wide and quite interesting for social scientists.

15

Sociologies of Everyday Life: From Alienation to the Production of Meaning

70%

Terenzi P.

Stan Rzeczy

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2017

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issue 1(12) The Relational Turn in Sociology: Implications for the Study of Society, Culture, and Persons

243-259

EN

This paper analyses the concept of everyday life as formulated in relational sociology. It shows that Pierpaolo Donati’s historical analysis of the dualist nature of everyday life is similar to that of Alvin Gouldner but that the two authors’ approaches differ in terms of the possibility of overcoming this dualism. From the perspective of relational sociology, sociological interpretations of everyday life can be traced to two paradigms. The first is the Marxist paradigm, in which everyday life is primarily characterized by forms of alienation. The second is the phenomenological paradigm, in which everyday life primarily consists of producing meaning. The first paradigm examines stories and cultures of subordinate social groups, and denounces domination and alienation in everyday life. The second paradigm examines the common-sense world, and how it is taken for granted, structured, and inter-subjective. Relational sociology seeks to overcome these two paradigms by highlighting their aporias, and considers alienation to be the outcome of a deep division between the ultimate meaning of life and the culture of everyday life. While in order to overcome this dualism, Gouldner offers an immanent reading of everyday life, relational sociology tries to show how in everyday life the relationship between social practices and culture may give rise to a new form of secularism that is accepting of non-fundamentalist aspects of religious belief.

16

Common Sense of L2 Instruction in Early Education. Its Salience and Transferability

70%

Daszkiewicz M.

Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji

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2011

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vol. 7

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issue 15(3)

116-123

EN

The article discusses the degree in which a commonsensical approach to L2 lessons in early education complies with what relevant literature and research stipulate in this respect. Thus understood compliance is addressed on four levels: with reference to a general approach, affective aspects, cognition and behaviour. On each level substantial “seamlessness” is noted, i.e. a high level of common sense – science concordance. The text has been prompted by a never-ending search of many for a wonders-making method, with the belief in such a magical key to foreign languages being argued here to be an erroneous and misleading assumption. The article closes with a reflection on the transferability of common sense to higher levels of L2 education and several commonsensical implications for language teachers to follow.

17

The Epistemological Side of Ontology

70%

Marsonet M.

Academicus. International Scientific Journal

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2023

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vol. 14

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issue 27

11-19

EN

Is it possible to draw a border line between ontology and epistemology? A positive answer to this question looks attractive, mainly because it reflects convictions deeply entrenched in our common sense view of the world. However, anyone wishing to clarify the distinction between the ontological and the epistemological dimensions meets problems. This is due to the fact that the separation between factual and conceptual is not clean, but rather fuzzy. It is certainly correct to state that science means to offer correct information about the world, but the extent to which it succeeds in accomplishing this task is always questionable. We cannot claim that the picture provided by today science - our current scientific image of the world - is absolutely correct, because the history of science itself shows us that any such statement is likely to be rejected by future generations. While it may be recognized that science purports to offer a correct description of the real world, the past experience should also prompt us to accept its claims sub condicione, and to view them as merely provisional.

18

The “Archaeology” of Popular Culture: Common Sense and the Past

70%

Kaźmierczak M.

Poznańskie Studia Slawistyczne

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2023

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issue 24

85-115

EN

This paper demonstrates the influence of common sense on the perception of facts from the past. In order to understand the mechanisms of reduction, instrumentalisation and banalisation of the Holocaust in popular culture, we need to understand the influence of common sense on the understanding and misunderstanding of the past, represented in this paper by the testimonies of the massacre of 1500 Jews in the forest of Niesłusz-Rudzica.The main premise of the paper is that common sense is the dominant form of knowledge and the description of reality, which is reproduced by the mechanisms at function in popular culture. This paper is an example of ‘archaeological’ work in this context.

19

THE CULTURAL DANGERS OF SCIENTISM AND COMMON SENSE SOLUTIONS

61%

Delfino R. A.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2014

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vol. 3: supplement

485-496

EN

In his article the author begins by defining what is meant by ‘science’ and ‘scientism.’ Second, he discusses some of the cultural dangers of scientism. Third, he gives several arguments why scientism should be rejected and why science needs metaphysics. Fourth, and finally, he concludes by noting how some of the questions and arguments raised in the article can be appropriated to help the general public understand the limits of science and the dangers of scientism.

20

Zdravý rozum u Berkeleyho a Austina podle Marka Tomečka

61%

Mihálik J.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2018

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vol. 66

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issue 1

EN

In this review study I investigate an interpretation of Berkeley’s concept of common sense which has been recently advanced by Marek Tomeček. In his view, Berkeley understands common sense as a collection of beliefs held by the common man. Common sense, however, has to remain implicit, and is thus an ineffable standard by which philosophical systems can be assessed. The missing argument for the implicitness of common sense is found by Tomeček in Austin. I make a case for the view that the interpretation presented would be more convincing if its author informed us why we should reject the interpretation of Petr Glombíček, according to which Berkeley understood common sense in traditional terms as rationality. Moreover, the argument for the implicitness of common sense, which Tomeček finds in Austin, is not convincing, as I attempt to show, because it is not clear why a speech act that is unsuccessful from the illocutionary point of view may not yet express a meaningful proposition.

Refine search results

Ohledání Kantova zdravého rozumu

Джеймс. Привлекательность разумности и защита „common sense”

Obecný smysl u Arendtové a Kantův zdravý rozum

Pojem „common sense” u Thomase Reida

Lumière naturelle jako common sense w ujęciu Błażeja Pascala

Unreasonable science

Původ zájmu o common sense : vznik Shaftesburyho eseje "Sensus Communis"

Wady i zalety common sense w wyjaśnianiu i rozumieniu świata społecznego

Science and Different Images of the World

COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO THE RESTORATION OF SACRED ART

ETNOGRAFIA MYŚLI POTOCZNEJ W DZIEDZINIE POZAAKADEMICKICH RELACJI Z PRZESZŁOŚCIĄ. MYŚL POTOCZNA JAKO PRZEDMIOT BADAŃ HISTORII HISTORIOGRAFII

Interpreters of the Constitution: The Problem of Typology

Cold War (Post-)Truth Regimes: Radio Free Europe between “States of Affairs” and the Epistemology of Hope and Fear

W stronę teorii i historii kultury. Spojrzenie na teorię stylów myślowych Ludwika Flecka. Część III

Sociologies of Everyday Life: From Alienation to the Production of Meaning

Common Sense of L2 Instruction in Early Education. Its Salience and Transferability

The Epistemological Side of Ontology

The “Archaeology” of Popular Culture: Common Sense and the Past

THE CULTURAL DANGERS OF SCIENTISM AND COMMON SENSE SOLUTIONS

Zdravý rozum u Berkeleyho a Austina podle Marka Tomečka