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EN
The problem of threat to international politics and global peace has undermined the effectiveness of the power of dialogue. The world seems to be in the condition of will to power derivable from the mutually assured destructive (MAD) tendencies. Is it possible to extend global peace? How can this be achieved? In this paper, we posit that dialogue is a fundamental medium for conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence in a diverse world. We contend that monologue in international politics understood in terms of might is right undermines the effectiveness of dialogue and often leads to violent conflicts within and between countries. Our world today is at a crossroads. Dialogue, however, foregrounds the medium of conflict resolution and the social consciousness of human communication. We present a hermeneutic understanding of dialogue that follows from relevant works of Hans Georg Gadamer and Jurgen Habermas. This paper espouses the power of dialogue as a basis for the normative foundation of an emancipated social global order. The dialogical sequence has a cobweb of social interconnectedness and the ethics of global peace. We present a literal and philosophical understanding of dialogue and a contextual understanding of dialogue within the hermeneutic tradition.
EN
The idea of rational understanding lays very close to the heart of Professor Janusz Kuczynski, an advocate of universalism as well as dialogue between diverse philosophical schools and worldviews, and doctoral advisor to the present paper’s author. This idea’s theoretical conceptualisation—a conceptualisation that has proven to be convincing and adequate to the conditions of the modern world—was developed by Professor Jürgen Habermas, whose ideas and theories were also the subject of a doctoral thesis written by this paper’s author in the latter half of the 1970s under Professor Kuczynski’s tutelage. The author shares some grateful memories of his doctoral tutor, and also sets his one-time attempts to apply the theory of communicative action to two experiences of the real socialism era in Poland (the events of 1980/1981 and 1989) against his efforts to analyse contemporary Polish realities through the prism of the communicative rationality conception. This comparison shows that the application of a conception of rationality funded by communicative action to the turbulent transformations under real socialism was to a certain extent naïve—though not devoid of critical significance—and also reveals the preconditions (in the sphere of understanding oneself and the world) for the implementation of the rules of communicative rationality in social and political reality. The paper is in part dedicated to the memory of Professor Kuczynski, therefore it contains a somewhat extensive account of the circumstances which led the author to study the thought of Habermas under Kuczynski’s tutelage, as well as the consequences of this choice, which proved of considerable significance for his further life. However, the main themes are, first, the validity (and naivety) of applying a conception of rationality funded by communicative action to two significant experiences of the real socialism era, and, secondly, the need—revealed by diagnosing contemporary Polish reality with the help of the communicative rationality conception—for certain preconditions enabling the implementation of this type of rationality in social and political reality. One such precondition is the transition of sufficiently broad parts of society from thinking in terms of worldviews (Weltaunschauungen) to post-metaphysical thinking in terms of the “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt).
EN
The paper examines communicative grounds of philosophical reflection in the context of post-metaphysical paradigm. It is shown that the characteristic of reflection is the ontologisation of language. Drawing on the basic questions of the linguistic and communicative transformation of metaphysics, such as the subject-object dichotomy replaced with intersubjectivity, and substantive rationality replaced with a formal conception, the author deals primarily with the problem of communicative rationality and intersubjective being-in-the-speech.
EN
The aim of the paper is to reconsider Habermas’ discourse approach in terms of its usefulness in the realm of public healthcare where, on a microscale, intersubjective communicative situations arise between defined participants, i.e., patients and healthcare providers, patients’ family members, and further eligible contributors to patient-related decision making. A need for more “communicative interaction,” and explicative and practical discourse, is illustrated by two empirical examples of medical decision making which reveal both communicative and discursive deficits (Section I). To empower and enable the patient as a rational and autonomous speaker and discourse participant, a Habermasian emancipatory argument and ‘the power of the better argument’ is recalled (Section III). The possibility of equal communicative and discursive rights in the light of real inequalities is discussed in the context of a ‘competence gap’ between participants (Section IV). Further sections focus on the importance of informed consent on the side of the patient and the communicative competences as an important factor of healthcare system.
EN
In this paper we would like to present a certain philosophical concept, which may be related to some contemporary philosophical controversies (and to political philosophy’ controversies included) concentrated around such problems as, the meaning of metaphysics and as the understanding of freedom. We are going also to say a word about the particularity of the philosophical understanding of reality, including the status of intention for agreement. The concept we present further for additional foundation of the Habermas’ idea of communicative action is a compound of metaphysics itself, and of our own concept of metaphysics, and of the two particular questions – interpretation of Plato’s philosophy as well as interpretation of the Biblical message about anthropogenesis.
EN
The relationship between religious faith and public reason has occupied an increasingly central role in  Jürgen Habermas’s mature work. Yet this recent engagement with questions of  religious meaning also illuminates a  significant area of development in Habermas’s thought. While his earlier writings emphasized a  need to  subordinate religious beliefs to  rational critique and to translate religious truth claims into publicly accessible forms of reasoning, his later writings signal a shift to a more cooperative understanding of religious faith and critical reason that highlights the ongoing potential of religion to advance rational discourse and social criticism in the public sphere. This essay traces this growing recognition of the irreducibility of religious meaning in Habermas’s writings, and it attends to the non-translatable dimension of religious faith as a source of its ongoing contemporary significance.
PL
Artykuł, w oparciu o wybrane aspekty konkretnych teorii społecznych, zwięźle przedstawia trzy rodzaje wpływu myśli psychoanalitycznej Zygmunta Freuda na teorię socjologiczną. W pierwszej części pracy ukazane zostały wpływy psychoanalizy freudowskiej na sposób ujmowania dynamiki zjawisk oraz procesów społecznych na przykładzie niektórych komponentów teorii Jürgena Habermasa. Następnie pokazano rodzaj oddziaływania, polegający na zapożyczeniu pojęć i konstruktów teoretycznych opracowanych przez Freuda do analizy i opisu zjawisk społecznych. Do zilustrowania tego rodzaju oddziaływania posłużono się elementami myśli Talcotta Parsonsa. Artykuł zamyka syntetyczna analiza trzeciego rodzaju oddziaływania, przyjmującego formę samodzielnego paradygmatu, a przejawiającego się w ramach ukształtowania nowego sposobu myślenia o zjawiskach społecznych.
EN
This article concisely outlines three types of influence that Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytical thought has had on sociological theory, based on selected aspects of various social theories. In the first part of the paper the impact of Freudian psychoanalysis is shown with regards to describing the dynamics of social phenomena and processes, as illustrated by chosen components of Jürgen Habermas’ social theories. The next influence discussed consists of adopting concepts and theoretical constructs developed by Freud for the purpose of analyzing and describing social phenomena. The argument is exemplified by elements of Talcott Parsons’ social thought. The paper concludes with a synthetic analysis of the third type of influence, which manifests itself in the form of a separate paradigm, which can be observed as a completely new way of thinking about social phenomena.
EN
In the paper Habermas’ epistemology is viewed in two dimensions. In the dimension of the history of philosophy Habermas represents the widespread view claiming that epistemology has superseded the general ontology or metaphysics, and the more peculiar view that epistemology has been superseded by the linguistic philosophy, or rather transformed in it as the result of linguistic turn. In the dimension of the evolution of Habermas’ epistemological views, and his attitude towards epistemological questions in general, several phases are to be distinguished. In the first one, theory of knowledge appears as a favoured aspect of the social theory practiced in the “interest of social emancipation”, and it consists in the slashing criticism of empiricism, especially as a standpoint that determines the research perspectives of social sciences; and not the so slashing criticism of hermeneutics on account of its conservative orientation. In the second phase, Habermas gives up the epistemological perspective of critical social theory on behalf of a social ontology where he performs the rational reconstruction of the whole spectrum of “cultural knowledge”, that is, composed of the three “validity dimensions” of communicative action and three types of communicative rationality: cognitive-instrumental, normative and expressive rationality, each of them being characterized by “co-originality” (Gleichursprünglichkeit) (the first type of rationality is only partially communicative). In the third phase, standing on this new ontological ground, he returns to the classical epistemological problems, to elaborate an attitude toward empiricism and hermeneutics, and to define anew his own position in the field. His criticism toward empiricism is now markedly toned down; Habermas’ own pragmaticist position (referring to natural sciences) is corrected in the spirit of “weak transcendentalism” (which seems to bring Habermas’ position closer to the correspondence theory of the truth). As for social sciences and social philosophy, an opening toward hermeneutics under the banner of “hermeneutical reconstructionism” occurs, in connection with “interpretative turn” in sociology.
PL
W tekście mowa jest o Habermasowskiej epistemologii w dwóch wymiarach. W wymiarze historii filozofii Habermas reprezentuje szeroko uznawany pogląd, że epistemologia jest dziedziną, która wyparła ontologię ogólną, czyli metafizykę, a także dość szczególny pogląd, że sama została wyparta przez filozofię określoną przez paradygmat lingwistyczny; lepiej byłoby mówić, że uległa przekształceniu w wyniku zwrotu lingwistycznego. W wymiarze ewolucji Habermasa poglądów epistemologicznych i w ogóle stosunku do kwestii epistemologicznych odnotowuję kilka faz. Najpierw teoria poznania występuje jako wyróżniony aspekt teorii społecznej uprawianej w „interesie emancypacji” społecznej i polega na ostrej krytyce empiryzmu, zwłaszcza jako stanowiska określającego perspektywy badawcze nauk społecznych, i nie tak ostrej krytyce hermeneutyki, z powodu jej konserwatywnej orientacji. Następnie Habermas porzuca teoriopoznawczą perspektywę krytycznej teorii społecznej na rzecz ontologii społecznej, gdzie poddaje tak zwanej racjonalnej rekonstrukcji całe spektrum „wiedzy kulturowej”, na którą składają się trzy „wymiary ważnościowe” działań komunikacyjnych i typy komunikacyjnej racjonalności: kognitywnoinstrumentalny, normatywny i ekspresywny, charakteryzujące się „równym stopniem źródłowości” i autonomizujące się wobec siebie w epoce nowoczesnej (przy czym racjonalność pierwszego typu jest tylko po części komunikacyjna). Wreszcie, na tym nowym gruncie ontologicznym (mowa o ontologii regionalnej), wraca do klasycznej problematyki epistemologicznej, by jeszcze raz zająć stanowisko wobec empiryzmu i hermeneutyki, i określić własne. Krytyka empiryzmu (a raczej krytyka Poppera, którego dystans wobec empiryzmu zostaje dostrzeżony) jest teraz znacznie stonowana, własne stanowisko pragmatystyczne (odnoszące się do nauk przyrodniczych) skorygowane w duchu „słabego transcendentalizmu” (który wydaje się zbliżać Habermasa do korespondencyjnej teorii prawdy), a co do nauk społecznych i filozofii społecznej, następuje, w nawiązaniu do tak zwanego „zwrotu interpretatywnego” w socjologii, otwarcie wobec hermeneutyki pod hasłem „hermeneutycznego rekonstrukcjonizmu”.
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