Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  compensatory liability
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
In contemporary contract and consumer law, obligations to inform are an example of instruments (protective ones) which imposes on business entities a duty to make a statement of knowledge (a representation), the content of which is determined by regulations and the purpose of which is to aid the consumer in taking a well-informed, rational decision. Appropriate regulations referring to liability for failing to carry out this obligation to inform aim to maintain optimal trust between the contracting parties and, as a result, lead to a balance in the parties’ position, at the same time upholding the principle of the freedom of contract. In accordance with the fundamental assumption in European consumer law, one’s liability towards a consumer should meet the criteria of both efficiency and proportionality, which means that one should not strictly consider such liability purely formally, i.e., as maintaining an economic balance between the parties. The sanction the company shall incur is to serve the actual satisfaction of the interests of the consumer, and not only to make a profit. Additionally, the sanctions for neglecting the obligation to inform are expected to encourage companies to comply with them. Neglecting this obligation to inform in the pre-contractual phase may take the form of not providing information which is required and explicitly defined by law or providing incomplete information. A large amount of detail in determining a business’s responsibility is presumedto guarantee the consumer knowledge of his/her rights and to enable him/her to evaluate the risks resulting from entering into a particular transaction. One must not, however, ignore the fact that providing excessive, thus illegible, information must be treated equally to non-disclosure of such information, which may result in infringement of the aforementioned regulations. Neglecting the obligation to inform may also arise in such a case where the consumer is not provided with a particular piece of information, despite the lack of a definite legal basis in this regard – such as a detailed regulation contained in an act – but such a duty would result from a general loyalty duty between the contracting parties. In the beginning, it should be noted that the liability for an infringement of the pre-contractual obligation to inform is characterised by system heterogeneity. In particular, it refers to the distinct consumer protection regime. It is very often the case that depending on the contractor’s status (professional or nonprofessional) the legal consequences of failing to inform or improperly informing are framed in different ways. One must bear in mind the difference between solely the failure to inform or to improperly carry out the pre-contractual obligation to inform (pursued within pre-contractual liability, fundamentally according to an ex delicto regime) and the consequences arising from the content of the delivered information, i.e., the guarantee of definite elements in the legal relationship of an obligatory nature (assigned to the classic liability in an ex contractu regime). The subject of civil liability for the infringement of duties to inform can be analysed from two perspectives: firstly, from an economic point of view, i.e., whether for the aggrieved party and for the market at large it would be more favourable for the infringement of the duty to inform to be pursued within an ex contractu or ex delicto regime, and secondly, from the perspective of the theory of law, whether for the system of contract law it would be better for this liability to be pursued within an ex contractu or ex delicto regime. In response to the second question, the position of academics is that the liability for the violation of trust due to failing to properly inform the consumer should be pursued in an ex delicto system in order to maintain the internal cohesion of contract law.
|
2020
|
vol. 13
|
issue 21
71-98
FR
L’objectif de la loi polonaise sur les actions en dommages et intérêts pour les infractions au droit de la concurrence, qui se base sur le droit de l’UE et le transpose était de permettre aux entreprises d’utiliser efficacement l’exécution privée de leurs demandes de dommages et intérêts auprès des auteurs d’infractions au droit de la concurrence. La violation du droit de la concurrence est qualifiée comme un délit civil selon la loi sur les demandes d’indemnisation. Par conséquent, la loi sur les demandes d’indemnisation renvoie aux règles de responsabilité délictuelle. Les conditions de la responsabilité délictuelle classique en droit national n’ont pas exactement la même signification et portée dogmatique que les conditions de la responsabilité publique ou privée pour les infractions au droit national et européen de la concurrence. Dans la pratique, leur application par les tribunaux nationaux peut soulever de nombreuses questions concernant la conformité entre le droit national et le droit de l’UE. Le présent document vise à analyser l’une des principales conditions de la responsabilité délictuelle, à savoir la faute de l’entreprise ainsi que la faute de ses organes et dirigeants. Si on voulait comprendre la notion de faute dans les limites fixées par le droit civil, et suivre la formulation littérale des dispositions du code civil polonais relatives à la condition de faute, l’efficacité de l’exécution privée des demandes de dommages et intérêts résultant d’infractions au droit de la concurrence serait incertaine. Par conséquent, le présent article vise à fournir aux lecteurs une interprétation de la notion de faute, en tant que condition de la responsabilité des entreprises, qui permette d’atteindre l’objectif législatif de la loi sur les demandes d’indemnisation et de respecter les principes d’efficacité et d’équivalence du droit de l’UE. Afin de présenter un cadre complet, cet article examine également la jurisprudence de la CJUE concernant la “faute antitrust”, accompagnée d’une analyse comparative des approches allemande et française de la condition de faute ainsi que des lois antitrust américaines dans le même domaine.
EN
The purpose of the Polish Act on Claims for Damages for Remedying the Damage Caused by Infringements of Competition Law, based on and implementing EU law – the Damages Directive, was to enable undertakings to effectively use private enforcement of their damages claims from competition law offenders. Infringement of competition law is classified as a tort according to the said Act on Claims. Therefore, the Act on Claims refers to tort liability rules. The conditions of classic tort liability in domestic law do not have exactly the same dogmatic meaning and scope as the conditions of public or private liability for the infringements of domestic and EU competition law. In practice, their application by national courts may rise many questions regarding conformity between domestic and EU law. This paper aims to analyse one of the key conditions of tort liability, that is, the fault of both the undertaking – the offenders, as well as the fault of their governing bodies and officers. If one were to understand the notion of fault within the limits laid down by civil law, and follow the literal wording of the Polish Civil Code’s provisions referring to the fault condition, the efficiency of private enforcement of damage claims arising from infringements of competition law would be doubtful. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to provide the readers with such an interpretation of the notion of fault, as a condition of liability of undertakings, that the legislative purpose of the Act on Claims is achieved and that the principles of efficiency and equivalence of the EU law are observed. In order to present a comprehensive picture, this paper will also discuss the case law of the CJEU concerning ‘anti-trust fault’, accompanied by a comparative analysis of the German and French approach to the fault condition as well as United States antitrust laws in the same area.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.