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EN
Civil-defence resilience capacities focus on man-made threats to national security. While terror attacks like 9/11 drove civil-defence efforts throughout the 2000s, the Russian invasion of portions of Ukraine in 2014 forced nations to build resilience against new threats. These included covert grey-zone and disinformation operations. Additionally, the 2014 events forced nations bordering or within the sphere of influence of revisionist nations to begin to prepare for possible invasion and occupation. Recognition of these threats resulted in two multinational doctrinal concepts that set the stage for what is collectively referred to as resilience and resistance (R&R). Resilience is the efforts by a nation prior to a conflict to build pre-crisis capacity to resist a host of threats, including invasion and occupation, in hopes of deterring threat actions. If deterrence fails, then the efforts transition into resistance to invasion and occupation. The Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the need for R&R and the strengths and weaknesses of national resistance in action. This event is a strategic R&R inflection point. Nations developing R&R should reflect on and apply the lessons learned from Ukraine’s efforts and ultimately establish R&R 2.0 as an irregular deterrent on par and mutually supporting conventional and nuclear deterrents.
EN
Special operations forces (SOF) have a history of integrating with voluntary-based formations (VBF) overseas against a wide variety of threats. Despite the historical record, the current doctrine does not provide any applicable concepts to inform SOF-VBF integration. This study aims to fill this doctrinal gap and explores the concepts of a nation applying its SOF-VBF to its own comprehensive defence or total defence to make any territorial incursion or occupation too costly for an adversary. Using a mixture of qualitative and comparative research methodologies, based on secondary historical resistance sources, this study achieves four goals: defining the purpose behind SOF-VBF integration during resilience and resistance; establishing a seven-option SOF-VBF integration framework at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; assessing these options based on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each to inform the implementation; and finally addressing overarching risks common to all options to inform broader risk mitigation measures. The result is seven integration options focused specifically on resilience and resistance to invasion and occupation. This paper will assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each. This study sets the stage for future analysis and additional research on this important topic.Special operations forces (SOF) have a history of integrating with voluntary-based formations (VBF) overseas against a wide variety of threats. Despite the historical record, the current doctrine does not provide any applicable concepts to inform SOF-VBF integration. This study aims to fill this doctrinal gap and explores the concepts of a nation applying its SOF-VBF to its own comprehensive defence or total defence to make any territorial incursion or occupation too costly for an adversary. Using a mixture of qualitative and comparative research methodologies, based on secondary historical resistance sources, this study achieves four goals: defining the purpose behind SOF-VBF integration during resilience and resistance; establishing a seven-option SOF-VBF integration framework at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; assessing these options based on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each to inform the implementation; and finally addressing overarching risks common to all options to inform broader risk mitigation measures. The result is seven integration options focused specifically on resilience and resistance to invasion and occupation. This paper will assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each. This study sets the stage for future analysis and additional research on this important topic.
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EN
Russia has been employing old methods of warfare in innovative ways with the help of new technologies. At the same time, it has been looking to exploit non-military means to achieve political objectives. Among these are psychological, information, and influence operations, including financing pseudo-NGOs for achieving political goals, disinformation campaigns, and strong military posturing near the Baltic Countries’ borders. The Russian strategy for the Baltic States is multi-layered and chiefly determined by Russia considering them part of the West. As a result, since the threat is multi-layered and presents a comprehensive challenge, Latvia developed a comprehensive defence strategy. This article analysis the evolution of Latvia’s security and defence strategy towards a system that may be characterized as comprehensive defence. Its main features include several initiatives where society’s role is fundamental. The results are already noticeable. These actions have been focussing on both enlarging enlistment in the National Guard, but also in increasing the society’s awareness and resilience in case of military or non-military crisis.
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