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EN
The development of biomedicine causes a situation when health care providers are compelled to decide on various medical, moral or even religious matters. The conflict between their conscience (their beliefs and views on what is right and what is wrong) and the duty that they are under, has appeared increasingly in the recent years. The especially difficult situation occurs when their duties are conflicting with their perceptions of the nature of medical services, including abortion and euthanasia. To conclude – the question arises as to whether the medical doctor is a servant (or hostage) of patients or he has the right to refuse to treat a patient when he believes that the requested treatment is morally wrong (conscientious objection). The main theme of the article is an analysis of the regulations of Council of Europe in the matter of conscientious objection.
EN
A reminder of the main assertions of the spectacular and — as it turned out — extremely current judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 1994 in the Otto-Preminger-Institut vs. Austria Case has become a pretext and a counterpoint for presenting a critical analysis of the judgement of 2018 in the E.S vs. Austria Case. The conflict between freedom of expression (including artistic expression) and freedom of thought, conscience and religion was again resolved by the Court in favor of the latter, showing both the lack of dynamics in terms of modification of the original assessment made many years ago, and discrepancy as to the contemporary opinions of other EU bodies.
EN
In the article a controversial judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice is discussed, passed in the case of S.A.S. v. France of 1 July 2014, where the areligious French ban against face covering in public space was considered — with reference to protecting the value of living together — consistent with the European for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Especially important in the case are both legal circumstances accompanying the introduction of the controversial ban and arguments included in the statement of reasons of the analyzed judgment, particularly doubts related to applying univocal judicial techniques and a comprehensible axiological system of weighing opposite interests.
EN
The article offers an analysis into the French Council of State’s ruling of 26 August 2016, which suspended a ban – imposed by a decision of a mayor of a coastal resort town – on wearing the burkini on local beaches. “The burkini issue” has been also dealt with in Belgium, which is why the analysis presented in this article and the accompanying reflections serve as a good opportunity to offer a brief comparison of the French and the Belgian specificities of the constitutional form of the relationships between the state and churches, and a range of relevant references to the ECHR’s judicial decisions concerning the problem of the presence of symbols – being manifestations of one’s beliefs – in the public sphere of a democratic state.
PL
Wolność myśli, sumienia i wyznania to jedna z podstawowych wolności jednostki, która musi być i jest chroniona przez prawo międzynarodowe i krajowe, co ukazano na przykładzie polskiej konstytucji. Pod pojęciem wolności sumienia kryje się prawo wyboru przez jednostkę ludzką swojego światopoglądu i prawo do jego zmiany. Wolność wyznania daje jednostce prawo do uzewnętrzniania i manifestowania poglądów i przekonań przysługujących jednostce w kwestiach religijnych indywidualnie i zbiorowo, prywatnie lub publicznie. Można tę wolność ograniczać, ale musi to być określone w ustawie i tylko w szczególnych okolicznościach. Polska w tym zakresie jest zgodna z prawem międzynarodowym.
EN
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the fundamental freedoms of individual, which has to be and is protected by international and national law, as shown on the example of the Polish Constitution. Freedom of conscience includes both the right of individual to choose the worldview and the right to change it. Freedom of religion ensures the right to express and manifest the views and convictions on religion individually and collectively, privately or publicly. Considering derogation of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, international law states that it may be restricted, but only in specific circumstances and under the legal act. The Polish Constitution is in line with international law in terms of restricting the above freedom.
EN
The article provides an analysis of judgment of Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights of 7 July 2011 in the case of Bayatyan v. Armenia, in which the Court, based on the “living instrument” doctrine, gives — inter alia — a new creative interpretation of Article 9 of the Convention. In this interpretation the Court broadened its scope of protection to include conscientious objectors, to autonomous extent, within the full meaning of this prerequisite not functionally limited to matters relating to the armed service, which might be indicated by the scope of the case considered.
7
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Zmiana przepisów wyznaniowych Konstytucji RP z 1997 r.

67%
PL
Possible change of religious regulations of the Constitution should take place in cooperation with churches and world-wide organizations. The legislator limits Poland’s international obligations to protect freedom and human rights in religious matters. The Concordat of 1997 is also a limitation. At present there is an unfavorable political situation for liberal changes. The most important changes should be to increase the protection of non-believers and philosophical organizations. The neutrality of public authorities in religious matters must also be better guaranteed. The beginning of the constitutional debate on religious issues, however, risks the change for the worse. This debate does not start.
EN
The article offers an analysis into the French Council of State’s ruling of 26 August 2016, which suspended a ban – imposed by a decision of a mayor of a coastal resort town – on wearing the burkini on local beaches. “The burkini issue” has been also dealt with in Belgium, which is why the analysis presented in this article and the accompanying reflections serve as a good opportunity to offer a brief comparison of the French and the Belgian specificities of the constitutional form of the relationships between the state and churches, and a range of relevant references to the ECHR’s judicial decisions concerning the problem of the presence of symbols – being manifestations of one’s beliefs – in the public sphere of a democratic state.
PL
Artykuł analizuje postanowienie francuskiej Rady Stanu z 26 sierpnia 2016 r. zawieszające obowiązywanie decyzji mera jednej z miejscowości nadmorskich o zakazie noszenia „burkini” na miejscowych plażach. „Problem burkini” zaistniał także w Belgii, dlatego przedmiotowa analiza i towarzyszące jej rozważania stanowią także doskonałą okazję do krótkiego scharakteryzowania francuskiej i porównawczo belgijskiej specyfiki konstytucyjnego kształtu stosunków między państwem i Kościołami, a także szeregu adekwatnych odwołań do orzecznictwa ETPC dotyczącego problemu obecności – stanowiącej wyraz przekonań – symboliki, w przestrzeni publicznej państwa demokratycznego.
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