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EN
The author points out that the possibility of access to evidence in the course of work of the Constitutional Accountability Committee depends on the consent of a body conducting the proceedings, i.e. Constitutional Accountability Committee. According to him, the Committee is obliged to make all evidence (including classified information) accessible to the person subject to initial application and his/her defence council. Nevertheless, he emphasizes that access to evidence composed of classified information should be provided in the office for confidential documents of the Chancellery of the Sejm. In the authors view, the defence council should not be required to have an adequate security clearance level or a valid certificate of training in the field of classified data protection.
EN
The author argues that the inconsistency between the Budget Act and other statutes can be eliminated by way of amendment of the Budget Act or amendment of the relevant implementing provisions. The accountability for adoption of the Budget Act cannot be assigned to any of the entities, unless in the course of work on the Bill constitutionally provided procedural requirements have been breached. The author points out that some participants in the legislative procedure cannot be held accountable before the Tribunal of State due to material incompatibility of parliamentary mandate.
EN
According to the author’s opinion, the Constitutional Accountability Committee is entitled to request written explanations or documents from public authorities, as well as the files of each case conducted by them. The Committee is therefore entitled to obtain an audio recording for evidentiary purposes. According to the author, it is also permissible for the Committee to carry out such evidence, if it is requested by a person who is the subject of a preliminary motion to hold the person accountable before the Tribunal of State. Transcriptions and other documents made on the basis of the recordings may also serve as evidence in proceedings pending before the Constitutional Accountability Committee.
EN
The purpose of the opinion is to examine whether the preliminary motion for constitutional accountability action against former Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński for violation of Polish Constitution and the Penal Code meets the formal requirements for such motions. The author points out numerous formal defects of the preliminary motion and opts for their immediate elimination. Nevertheless, in his view, the existing deficiencies do not disparage the motion, as they may be corrected later.
EN
Formal requirements, which must be met by the resolution of the Sejm on constitutional accountability of the persons referred to in Article 1, para. 1, subparas 2–7 of the Act on the Tribunal of State, must be reconstructed under the provisions of that Act, as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure which is applicable – as appropriate – in the proceedings before the State Tribunal and the Committee on Constitutional Accountability, unless specified otherwise in the Act. The resolution of the Sejm to hold a person constitutionally accountable and the accompanying resolution of the Constitutional Accountability Committee should meet the requirements for an indictment, resulting from the Code of Criminal Procedure, which regulates the matter of the indictment.
EN
The purpose of the opinion is to examine whether the preliminary motion for constitutional accountability action against former Minister of Justice and Public Prosecutor General Zbigniew Ziobro for violation of Polish Constitution and the Penal Code meets the formal requirements for such motions. The author points out numerous formal defects of the preliminary motion and opts for their immediate elimination. Nevertheless, in his view, the existing deficiencies do not disparage the motion, as they may be corrected later.
EN
The purpose of the opinion is to examine whether the above mentioned preliminary motions for constitutional accountability action before the Tribunal of State are consistent with the requirements specified in the Act on the Tribunal of state and the Code of Penal Procedure. The author points out numerous formal defects of the motions, including the failure to indicate the place of commission of the act and failure to submit a list of persons that the applicants demand to be summoned before the Constitutional Accountability Committee.
EN
The opinion points out that a key role in the preparation of preliminary motions to hold persons accountable before the Tribunal of State is played by the Constitutional Accountability Committee acting in corpore. The Commission has an exclusive power to take substantive decisions concerning the conduct of proceedings relating, e.g., to an assessment of the validity of the submitted motions as to evidence. The tasks of presidium and chairperson of the Committee are, in principle, limited to organizational and technical issues, such as planning a timetable of committee meetings and proposing the agenda of the debate (presidium) and representing the Committee in external events, as well as hearing witnesses and experts (chairperson). The performance of the presidium or chairperson is reviewed by the Committee. In the event of a negative assessment of the work of these authorities, the Committee has the power to make appropriate changes in membership of the presidium, including changing its chairperson.
Prawo
|
2018
|
issue 325
105-120
EN
The author analyses the establishment and development of the Sejm Court (Parliamentary Court) over the several centuries of its history, and illustrates its final (in pre-partition Poland) legal form as the highest jurisdiction in cases of high treason, leaving aside the constitution of the Grodno Sejm of 1793, as it contributes little to the matter in question. When describing the history of the Sejm Court, presenting suggestions and opinions, and formulating them almost exclusively on the basis of the sources contained in Volumina Legum, the author seeks to describe the evolution of this jurisdiction from the times when it was merely the royal court to the period when it became a professional tribunal ruling in cases of high treason. He also refers to selected literature on the subject and other sources, but only to a limited extent. To demonstrate the evolution of one of the most important judicial institution in pre-partition Poland was the main inspiration for the author in tackling the subject and presenting his final conclusions.
DE
Der Verfasser der Publikation versucht, den Entstehungsprozess und die Entwicklung des Sejm-gerichtes im Zeitraum von mehreren Hundert Jahren seiner Geschichte zu analysieren und seine endgültige, in Polen vor den Teilungen, Rechtsgestalt als höchste Gerichtsbarkeit in Sachen wegen Verbrechen gegen Staat und Regierung zu veranschaulichen. Nicht berücksichtigt wurden dabei die nicht viel in diese Materie einbringenden Verfassungen des Sejm von Grodno aus dem Jahre 1793. Er versucht, unter Beschreibung der Geschichte des Sejmgerichtes, mit seinen Vorschlägen und Meinungen, die fast ausschließlich auf Grund von Quellen formuliert werden, die in Volumina Legum zusammengefügt wurden, den Prozess der Evolution dieser Gerichtsbarkeit seit der Zeit, als es nur ein königliches Hofgericht bildete, bis in die Zeit zu schildern, als es zu einem professionellen in Standessachen erkennenden Tribunal wurde. In einem begrenzten Umfang bedient er sich gewählter Fachliteratur und anderer Quellen. Die Evolution einer der wichtigsten Gerichtsinstitutionen des alten Polens zu schildern, war die grundlegende Inspiration für den Verfasser, diese Frage zu bearbeiten und Schlussfolgerungen zu formulieren.
EN
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 is one of the latest (apart from Albanian and Hungarian) constitutional acts adopted after the transformation of the 1990s. Its external inspirations were not uniform. As concerns the arrangement of regulations, it is modelled on the constitutions of: Italy of 1948, Greece of 1975, Portugal of 1976 and Spain of 1978. These solutions were also followed by the legislatures in other countries of the region. The following standard of arrangement was developed: general principles — freedoms and rights of the individual — central organs of the state — public fi nances — extraordinary measures — amending the constitution — transitional regulations. The regulations of individual freedom and rights were based (with some modifi cations) on the standards established in the Universal Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of December 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. The constitutional legislator could also draw on the case law of the Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. Varied are the inspirations for adoption of the system of government. Given the party disintegration and the precariousness of preferences, it was imperative to stabilize the system. Regarding the election of the president of the Republic, the constitutional legislator copied the approach used in the Fifth Republic of France (after the 1962 amendment), that is the procedure of universal and direct elections, with extended term and exclusion of accountability to parliament. The solutions taken after the German Basic Law of 1949, such as (1) the parliamentary responsibility of the government limited to the collective one, (2) constructive vote of no confidence in place of an ordinary vote of no confi dence, (3) strong position of the head of government, contributed to ensuring the government stability. Some regulations deserve further consideration: the demarcation of roles in the dualistic executive, the dissonance between imposing performance targets on ministers by the prime minister and their individual responsibility, the defi nition of the Senate’s function and composition. The institution of revision of the constitution, known in Polish tradition, and not present in the Constitution of 1997, also deserves consideration.
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