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EN
The significance of the most important legal act-the Constitution-to the social medium is evident. This constituent act of the nation determines the legal, political, moral and social life of the social medium. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the Constitution-the content of this constituent act-is the object of everybody’s attention. The Constitution is interpreted by lawyers, public leaders, state institutions, scholars and individual persons. The article analyses the wide-ranging subjects interpreting the Constitution and presents the types of its interpreters. The three most prominent groups of such subjects can be distinguished as: (i) institutions of constitutional justice, (ii) the scholarly doctrine, and (iii) other subjects. The article discusses the legal, scientific and social value of interpretations of the Constitution formulated by these interpreters. It is held that the most meaningful thing in this typology is distinguishing the interpretations according to the factor of their legal effects. The differing scientific, legal and social value of the interpretations does not deny the factor of the significance of their existence. It is recognised that a large number of interpretations of the content of the Constitution come from an immanently related state of discussions taking place in a state under the rule of law and democratic society.
EN
In its jurisprudence, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland often uses the comparative law method. For it, comparative material is not only the normative acts in force in other countries, but also foreign jurisprudence. This article presents the results of a quantitative and qualitative study of the judgments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in terms of the presence of references to the judgments of other constitutional courts. Reference by the Tribunal to foreign constitutional jurisprudence is a relatively rare practice, but not an occasional one. It was intensified after Poland’s accession to the European Union. Although the main point of reference for the Tribunal in its comparative analysis is still the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court and constitutional courts of other Western countries, it also increasingly frequently reaches to the judgments of the constitutional courts of Central European and Baltic countries. The subject issue is part of the progressive process of the so-called transnational judicial discourse or judicial globalization. The reluctance of the Tribunal to reach in its rulings to judgments of foreign constitutional courts, which has been observed since 2017, may be the beginning of its assumption of an exceptionalistic attitude similar to the U.S. Supreme Court.
EN
The article is a reply to polemic comments from Bartosz Skwara (“Sejm Review” 2017, no. 1) to my article Horyzontalne działanie praw podstawowych w Niemczech, [w:] Oddziaływanie współczesnych konstytucji na stosunki między podmiotami prywatnymi, red. M. Florczak-Wątor, Krakow 2015 [Horizontal effects of fundamental laws in Germany, in: The impact of modern constitutions on legal relationships between private entities, ed. M. Florczak-Wątor, Krakow 2015]. As stressed in the article and in accordance with the objective of the book, my interest lay in the analysis of applying the Drittwirkung concept in the constitutional jurisprudence of the FRG; it was not my goal to thoroughly discuss approaches to the issue of horizontality of human rights as presented in the German dogmatic theory. This stems from the fact that courts tribunals ultimately set the standard for the protection of rights of an individual, both in vertical and horizontal relations. The article presents arguments disproving the thesis proposed by the author of the polemic that in the FRG there dominates the direct version of Drittwirkung. It is unfound both as regards the German jurisprudence and the doctrine of law.
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