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Defi niowanie przez uczniów znaczenia terminów „argument” i „kontrargument”

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Rytel J.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

2016

vol. 52

issue 3(209)

405-416

W niniejszym tekście przedstawione zostały wstępne wyniki analiz dotyczących sposobów defi niowania przez uczniów znaczenia terminów „argument” i „kontrargument”. Poddany analizie materiał obejmował 211 defi nicji słowa „argument” i 164 defi nicje słowa „kontrargument”. Defi nicje te uzyskano w badaniu, w którym uczestniczyło 240 uczniów (120 dziewcząt i 120 chłopców) w wieku od 9. do 18. roku życia. Byli to uczniowie: trzecich i szóstych klas szkół podstawowych oraz uczniowie ostatnich klas gimnazjum i ostatnich klas liceum. Wyniki badań wskazują, że do przekonywania jako funkcji argumentu uczniowie wraz z wiekem odwołują się rzadziej. Od momentu zakończenia edukacji na poziomie podstawowym coraz częściej wskazują oni na relacje łączące przesłanki z konkluzją. Znajomość znaczenia terminu „kontrargument” deklarowało mniej uczniów i najczęściej wskazywało na kontrargument jako przeciwieństwo argumentu.

In the paper, I present the preliminary results on how students defi ne the meanings of the terms “argument” and “counterargument”. The analysed material consists of 211 defi nitions of the word “argument” and 164 defi nitions of the word “counterargument”. The defi nitions were obtained from 240 students (120 girls and 120 boys) aged 9 to 18. The study covered the students of the third and sixth years of the primary school, as well as those in their fi nal year of the secondary school. In their defi nitions, the older students referred to a function of an argument less frequently than their younger counterparts: they relatively rarely conveyed that a role of an argument is to convince. Instead, the older students were increasingly inclined to refer to relations between a premise and a conclusion as they defi ned the term. The knowledge of the meaning of the term “counterargument” was less common among the students. They usually provided a fuzzy defi nition of a counter-argument, contrasting it with an argument.

Motivated Doubts: A Comment on Walton’S Theory of Criticism

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Laar J. A. v.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

2014

vol. 36

issue 1

221-230

In his theory of criticism, D. N. Walton presupposes that an opponent either critically questions an argument, without supplementing this questioning with any reasoning of her own, or that she puts forward a critical question and supplements it with a counterargument, that is, with reasoning in defense of an opposite position of her own. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of in-between critical option for the opponent that needs to be taken into account in any classification of types of criticism, and that should not be overlooked in a system of dialogue norms, nor in a procedure for developing a strategically expedient critique. In this third option, an opponent questions and overtly doubts a statement of the proponent and supplements her doubts with a counterconsideration that explains and motivates her position of critical doubt, yet without supporting any opposite thesis, thereby assisting, as it were, the proponent in his attempt to develop a responsive argumentation, tailor-made to convince this particular opponent. First, I elaborate on the notion of an explanatory counterconsideration. Second, I discuss Walton’s distinction between premises that can be challenged by mere questioning (“ordinary premises” and “assumptions”) and premises that must be challenged by incurring the obligation to offer counter-argumentation (somewhat confusingly labeled “exceptions”). I contend that the latter type of premises, that I would label “normality premises,” can be attacked without incurring a genuine burden of proof. Instead, it can be attacked by means of incurring a burden of criticism (Van Laar and Krabbe, 2013) that amounts to the obligation to offer an explanatory counterconsideration, rather than a convincing ex concessis argument. Of course, providing the opponent with the right to discharge her burden of criticism with explanatory counterconsiderations brings a clear strategic ad- vantage to her. It is much less demanding to motivate one’s doubts regarding proposition P, than to convince the proponent of not-P. If we want to encourage opponents to act critically, and proponents to develop responsive arguments, the importance of the notions of an explanatory counterconsideration and of a motivated doubt should be emphasized in the theory of criticism.

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1 Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

1 Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

1 Laar J. A. v.

1 Rytel J.

1 2016

1 2014

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Defi niowanie przez uczniów znaczenia terminów „argument” i „kontrargument”

Motivated Doubts: A Comment on Walton’S Theory of Criticism