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EN
This article presents the discussion on the character of precontractual liability (so-called culpa in contrahendo) on grounds of the Code of Obilgations of 1933. Since the beginning of this regulation being in force, the concepts of tortious and contractual character of this liability were being disputed. Also the issue of the compensation related to this liability was subject of discussions (the differences concerned in particular the admissibility of inclusion of the lost profit – lucrum cessans - within the scope of the so-called negative interest of the contract). The author systematized the views of the authors of that period regarding this contentious issue, indicating that the then model of discourse could inspire the contemporary science of private law, while reference to historic arguments could enrich and deepen the discussion on precontractual liability in Poland.
EN
The doctrine of “culpa in contrahendo” constitutes an integral part of the legal systems of different states, although its content differs from one country to another. “Culpa in contrahendo”, as the states with a civil law system recognize, is bound by the obligation to act in good faith during the pre-contractual phase. It represents a responsibility that derives from the injurious behavior of the party during the stage of the contract. The common problem of various modern systems lies in classifying this responsibility, and the solution that states give is expanding the meaning of the contract or the meaning of non-contractual damage, since they do not categorize it as a sui generis responsibility. In Albanian law, there is no special provision for pre-contractual, however, the provision of Article 674 of the civil code may be considered as a basic provision that imposes liability at the negotiation stage. Regarding the nature of this responsibility, it is difficult to admit that it is of a contractual nature, when Albanian case law, despite the low number of cases, has considered it as extra contractual damage. Also, the European Court of Justice has foreseen pre-contractual liability as an extra contractual liability. The lack of unification regarding the rights, obligations and the way of protection against damage at the pre-contractual stage may cause uncertainty, especially in international trade relations.
EN
The present article addresses the issue, whether in international law there exists pre-contractual responsibility (culpa in contrahendo). If such a responsibility indeed exists it will play a significant role not only in State-to-State relations, but also in the relations between States and private investors, given the fact that currently, on the virtue of investment treaties, private entities have rights to lodge claims against states before arbitration tribunals, which employ international law in their judgements. Hence, determination whether responsibility for culpa in contrahendo exists in international law, will allow to establish, whether private entities may base the claims on that ground, and if such course of action is advantageous. The proposed analysis will be based upon sources of international law, such as treaties, custom, general principles of law, as well as judicial and scientific authorities – and additionally also relevant practice in chosen States’ legal practice.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy zagadnienia istnienia odpowiedzialności z tytułu culpae in contrahendo w prawie międzynarodowym publicznym. Pozytywna odpowiedź w tej kwestii będzie miała istotne znaczenie nie tylko z punktu widzenia relacji państwo–państwo, ale również państwo–inwestorzy. Inwestorzy prywatni dysponują bowiem możliwością pozywania państw przed sądy arbitrażowe, które stosują prawo międzynarodowe. Istnienie zatem odpowiedzialności z tytułu culpae in contrahendo w prawie międzynarodowym pozwoli na udzielenie odpowiedzi, czy podmioty prywatne mogą dochodzić roszczeń z tego tytułu przed sądami arbitrażowymi i czy droga ta jest dla nich korzystna. Proponowana analiza zostanie dokonana w oparciu o źródła prawa międzynarodowego, takie jak traktaty, zwyczaj międzynarodowy, ogólne zasady prawa, wypowiedzi orzecznictwa i doktryny oraz –pomocniczo – o praktykę w wybranych krajowych porządkach prawnych.
EN
This paper reflects on the justified reasons that underlay the continuation of the works on a new version of the Polish Civil Code. The author proposes a departure from the current method of the regulation of the civil code, which seems to be now exhausted and offering no hope of improvement. He justifies his views by indicating the necessity to face and challenge the imminent crises that affect the legislature (de-codification, hasty and not well thought over decisions of amendments, or departure from the law-making model based on negotiations) but also the science of civil law (the crisis of universities – the teaching focused on the needs and expectations of a mass student group and the dogmatic-views of the researchers) and the judicature in which the judges are brought down to the position of ‘higher level clerks’ working in work overloaded courtrooms. The paper identifies the insufficiencies of the current reflection on private law, and to illustrate this, two examples are offered: the recent and doubtful amendments to the Civil Code (to which a new provision of Article 72 § 2 was added) and the insufficient doctrinal reflection given to exploitation (Article 388 of the Civil Code). In conclusion the author proposes a departure from the current system in favour of a system whose roots are based on legal principles defined and precised by legal science and judicial decisions.
PL
W artykule podjęto refleksję nad zasadnością kontynuacji prac nad nowym kodeksem cywilnym. W tym względzie autor wskazuje na konieczność porzucenia dotychczasowej metody regulacji, gdyż ta już się wyczerpała i nie daje nadziei na poprawę sytuacji. Swoje zapatrywania autor uzasadnia koniecznością zmierzenia się z zasygnalizowanymi w tekście kryzysami, dotykającymi zarówno legislatywę (zjawisko dekodyfikacji, nieprzemyślane nowelizacje, odejście przez ustawodawcę od negocjacyjnego modelu tworzenia prawa), jak i naukę prawa cywilnego (kryzys uniwersytetów – prowadzenie dydaktyki zorientowanej na masowego studenta oraz nadmierne hołdowanie metodzie formalno-dogmatycznej przez badaczy), a także judykaturę (sprowadzenie sędziów do roli „lepszych urzędników”, nadmierne obłożenie sądów). W artykule wskazano nadto na niedomagania obecnej refleksji nad prawem prywatnym, a by to zilustrować, wykorzystano dwa przykłady: niedawnej wątpliwej nowelizacji Kodeksu cywilnego (dodanie nowego przepisu art. 72 § 2 k.c.) oraz niedostatecznej refleksji doktrynalnej nad zjawiskiem wyzysku (art. 388 k.c.). W konkluzji autor proponuje odejście od obecnego modelu, w którym centralną pozycję zajmuje pandektystyczny kodeks cywilny, na rzecz systemu ruchomego, którego rdzeniem są zasady prawne, doprecyzowane przez naukę i orzecznictwo.
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