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EN
This paper emphasises that Europeanisation of law contributes greatly to the phenomenon of decodification. The impact of European legislation on the position of the civil code as the main source of private law is clearly visible in the case of directly effective regulations. Also, implementation of directives can (and often does) lead to the creation of legislation regulating civil law matters, yet separate from the civil code. The Polish experience with implementation of directives concerning consumers protection makes for a good example. Regulation of timeshare contracts completely outside the civil code is – according to the Polish doctrine – a result of difficulties with integrating this particular provision into the codification of private law. If such difficulties are inevitable, so is also progressing decodification of civil law due to its advancing harmonization on the European level.
EN
A civil code and a written national constitution are the myths of the Age of Enlightenment and the legal positivism in legislation. Paradoxically, they were set against each other by the constitutionalisation of the subjective rights relating the area of private law, like ownership or the right of succession. The constitutionalisation of this type of subjective rights is an example of decodification. In the clear way, it symbolically diminishes the role of the civil code as a highest source of private law. Moreover, the basic aim of the codification – exclusion of uncertainty and arbitrariness in the application of law – was destroyed by allowing constitutional judges to creatively interpret the general terms and therefore, decide about the shape of valid law. „Right of succession” declared three times in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997 is an expression which can be understood in various, even quite conflicting ways. It introduces the uncertainty about the durability of some norms enclosed in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal clearly shows that the articles 21 and 64 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland are a central regulation of the Polish law of succession which (except Book IV of the Civil Code) also contains separate regulations of numerous special laws. Although sentences of the Constitutional Tribunal often lead to the agreement between these laws and the “spirit of the Code”, this happens only additionally when the Civil Code’s regulations are consistent with the received interpretation of the constitutional terms. It shows that in Polish private law the code’s centralism was replaced by the centralism of the constitutional guarantees for subjective rights. A constitutional regulation of the fundamental rights cannot include the whole of the private law with numerous and detailed regulations. However, the Constitutional Tribunal deduced the variety of fundamental (for present Polish law and European legal tradition) principles from the general guarantees of the right of succession. The examples include: the priority of the succession based on the will of a testator, the existence of the subsidiary order of succession based on family ties, the generality of the capacity to succeed and that the freedom of testation can be limited due to the family solidarity. By formulating these theses – which are not proclaimed in the Constitution, but are present in the European legal tradition – Polish constitutional judges have proven “thinking in the categories of the tradition”. It seems that the Polish legal system managed the problem of depreciation of the civil code’s position due to the existence of constitutions interfering with their fields. Because of this interference, some contradictions between the code and the constitution might have been present. The problem has been solved by filling the Constitution with “the spirit of tradition” from which also the code derives. This way, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal introduced general guidelines (created by the evolutionary development of the European tradition of the law of succession) to the legal system through the guarantee of subjective rights and granted them a higher rank than the code itself. Although the constitutionalisation of the private subjective rights is one of the elements breaking the clarity of the legal system, it probably gives a chance to overcome the crisis of the legal system by creating a new model – ridiculous from the Enlightenment’s dogmas of the age of codification point of view – in which a code is one of the special laws and is dependent directly on the general constitution regulation and indirectly, on the legal tradition which shows how constitution terms should be interpreted.
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Koniec ery kodeksów?

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PL
Autor stawia pytanie, czy współcześnie jest jeszcze miejsce na kodeksy w takiej formie, w jakiej były one tworzone w XIX wieku. Przede wszystkim zmieniły się warunki, w jakich powstawały ówczesne kodeksy, oraz postulaty wobec nich stawiane. Nie oczekuje się już obecnie, że akty te będą całkowicie i wyłącznie regulować daną dziedzinę życia społecznego. Nasiliło się zjawisko dekodyfikacji, polegające na regulowaniu materii właściwych kodeksom w innych ustawach, co rodzi problemy na tle ich wzajemnych relacji. Utrudnieniem dla procesu kodyfikacji jest także brak współpracy pomiędzy nauką prawa i sądami, które do tej pory wspólnie wypracowywały rozwiązania, wpisywane następnie do treści kodeksów. Zdaniem autora kodeksy mogą jednak nadal odgrywać ważną rolę i pełnić funkcję w pewnej mierze symboliczną. Najważniejszym zadaniem kodeksów jest bowiem tworzenie aksjologicznych podstaw danej dziedziny prawa, przede wszystkim formułowanie katalogu zasad decydujących o jej autonomii.
EN
The author of the article asks the question whether there is still space for codes in the form in which they were created in the nineteenth century. The conditions for the creation of codes have changed. Lawyers do not require codes in order to completely regulate a given field of social life. The occurrence of decodification is very strong. Lack of cooperation between legal science and the courts makes it difficult to create new codes. However, in the author’s opinion, codes can still play an important and symbolic role. The most important function of codes is to create the axiological foundations of a given branch of law.
EN
This paper reflects on the justified reasons that underlay the continuation of the works on a new version of the Polish Civil Code. The author proposes a departure from the current method of the regulation of the civil code, which seems to be now exhausted and offering no hope of improvement. He justifies his views by indicating the necessity to face and challenge the imminent crises that affect the legislature (de-codification, hasty and not well thought over decisions of amendments, or departure from the law-making model based on negotiations) but also the science of civil law (the crisis of universities – the teaching focused on the needs and expectations of a mass student group and the dogmatic-views of the researchers) and the judicature in which the judges are brought down to the position of ‘higher level clerks’ working in work overloaded courtrooms. The paper identifies the insufficiencies of the current reflection on private law, and to illustrate this, two examples are offered: the recent and doubtful amendments to the Civil Code (to which a new provision of Article 72 § 2 was added) and the insufficient doctrinal reflection given to exploitation (Article 388 of the Civil Code). In conclusion the author proposes a departure from the current system in favour of a system whose roots are based on legal principles defined and precised by legal science and judicial decisions.
PL
W artykule podjęto refleksję nad zasadnością kontynuacji prac nad nowym kodeksem cywilnym. W tym względzie autor wskazuje na konieczność porzucenia dotychczasowej metody regulacji, gdyż ta już się wyczerpała i nie daje nadziei na poprawę sytuacji. Swoje zapatrywania autor uzasadnia koniecznością zmierzenia się z zasygnalizowanymi w tekście kryzysami, dotykającymi zarówno legislatywę (zjawisko dekodyfikacji, nieprzemyślane nowelizacje, odejście przez ustawodawcę od negocjacyjnego modelu tworzenia prawa), jak i naukę prawa cywilnego (kryzys uniwersytetów – prowadzenie dydaktyki zorientowanej na masowego studenta oraz nadmierne hołdowanie metodzie formalno-dogmatycznej przez badaczy), a także judykaturę (sprowadzenie sędziów do roli „lepszych urzędników”, nadmierne obłożenie sądów). W artykule wskazano nadto na niedomagania obecnej refleksji nad prawem prywatnym, a by to zilustrować, wykorzystano dwa przykłady: niedawnej wątpliwej nowelizacji Kodeksu cywilnego (dodanie nowego przepisu art. 72 § 2 k.c.) oraz niedostatecznej refleksji doktrynalnej nad zjawiskiem wyzysku (art. 388 k.c.). W konkluzji autor proponuje odejście od obecnego modelu, w którym centralną pozycję zajmuje pandektystyczny kodeks cywilny, na rzecz systemu ruchomego, którego rdzeniem są zasady prawne, doprecyzowane przez naukę i orzecznictwo.
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