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Studia Semiotyczne
|
2017
|
vol. 31
|
issue 1
45–66
EN
The paper aims at providing an argument for a deflationary treatment of the notion of public language meaning. The argument is based on the notion of standards of correctness; I will try to show that as correctness assessments are context-involving, the notion of public language meaning cannot be treated as an explanatory one. An elaboration of the argument, using the notion of ground is provided. Finally, I will consider some limitations of the reasoning presented.
EN
In this paper, I aim to characterize the pragmatist and anti-deflationist notions of truth. I take Habermas’s rather recent discussion (1999) and present the interpretation that his notion of truth relies on the reliabilist conception of knowledge rather than the internalist conception that defines knowledge as a justified true belief. Then, I show that my interpretation is consistent with Habermas’s project of weak naturalism. Finally, I draw some more general implications about the pragmatist notion of truth.
PL
Artykuł jest rekonstrukcją późnych poglądów Ludwiga Wittgensteina na kwestię prawdy zaprezentowanych w Dociekaniach filozoficznych oraz O pewności. Następnie podjęta zostaje próba zaklasyfikowania wittgensteinowskiej koncepcji prawdy. Odrzucone zostają interpretacje Wittgensteina jako koherencjonisty oraz deflacjonisty. Główną tezą artykułu jest uznanie Wittgensteina jako zwolennika korespondencyjnej koncepcji prawdy, jednakże jego rozumienie zarówno korespondencji, jak i rzeczywistości jest dalekie od tradycyjnej wykładni realistycznej.
EN
This article is a reconstruction of late Wittgenstein’s views on the notion of truth, found in the Philosophical Investigations and On certainty. I attempt to classify Wittgenstein’s theory of truth. I reject interpretations of Wittgenstein as an advocate of either the coherence or the deflationary theory of truth. My main thesis is that Wittgenstein’s thought can be understood as a form of the correspondence theory of truth, but his understanding of correspondence and reality is very distinct from that of the traditional realist interpretation.
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