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EN
This paper presents the pre-and-post-reflections of English language instructors concerning the incorporation of a new pedagogy in English as foreign language (EFL) writing classes in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This approach is to integrate and blend wiki-mediated writing into a different course plan, with tasks that fit with the normal syllabi used for teaching writing skills. The methodology took a qualitative approach, specifically by conducting semi-structured pre-and-post-interviews. The qualitative analysis focused on the most frequent themes which occur in both cohorts. The participants, who were faculty members in the chosen institution, gave their reflections after they were shown the processes, thoughts and outcomes produced by the participants who actually applied the course and relevant tasks. It is important to identify instructors’ perspectives as this practice can be applied to enhance (novice) non-native learners of writing in English for academic purposes (EAP). Accordingly, this paper intends to shed light on three vital elements: merits, demerits and some principles for implementation.
EN
The article touches on the question of the autonomy of tax law, i.e. the question of how far this law is dependent on/linked with the other branches of law. Specifically, there have been distinguished two versions of such autonomy, a stronger and weaker one. The former prescribes that the meaning of all notions and terms present in tax law is, by definition, independent from the meaning of the identical notions/terms occurring in the other fields of law. The latter, in turn, stipulates that independence of that kind takes place only in instances in which tax laws clearly state so. As it has been demonstrated, the stronger version of the tax law autonomy has to be rebutted. It is mainly due to the need to provide the tax law with legal certainty and predictability, whose values would be seriously jeopardized otherwise. Another reasonis that this version of tax law autonomy precludes the possibility of being punished for not abiding by the tax law regulations, which the possibility seems to be crucial from the perspective of tax law policy. The weaker version is permissible, however, only insofar as it does not mislead citizens (taxpayers). Moreover, since the main goal of tax law is to determine in which circumstances one should pay a tax, not to refer to the other branches of law, the autonomy of tax law in such a non-absolute sense appears to be even desirable lest the contents of tax law should be too complex.
EN
The article addresses some of the specific issues that concern reasoning by analogy in the context of precedential law. It specifically touches on such questions as the necessity of the mediation of a general rule (norm) in an analogical pattern of inference, ways of resolving conflicts between competing analogies, the process of searching for potential analogies as well as the reasons for applying judicial precedents in concrete instances by recourse to analogy. The latter is done against the background of the merits and demerits of the so-called rule-based model of judicial precedent and its core notion: ratio decidendi. All the aforementioned issues have been analysed from the perspective of two basic approaches to analogical reasoning in precedential law – i.e. the factual and rational model of legal analogy, which have been described in the previous article. The analyses take into account the stances and opinions of leading past and contemporary logicians, philosophers and legal theorists mainly, but not exclusively, from Anglo-Saxon countries. 
PL
W artykule zostały przedstawione bardziej szczegółowe – aniżeli same możliwe jego modele/ujęcia – zagadnienia, jakie wiążą się z rozumowaniem per analogiam w prawie precedensowym. Należą do nich w szczególności takie kwestie, jak: a) konieczność pośrednictwa we wnioskowaniu z podobieństwa generalno-abstrakcyjnej reguły (normy), b) zjawisko określane mianem „konkurencji” („współzawodnictwa”) analogii oraz c) propozycje dotyczące mierzenia siły (mocy) poszczególnych wniosków postawionych na podstawie rozumowania a simile. Ponadto został tu poruszony problem tego, w jaki sposób „poszukuje się” precedensów nadających się do zastosowania per analogiam w danym przypadku. Podjęta została również próba uzasadnienia, dlaczego prawo precedensowe warto stosować właśnie drogą analogii, a nie za pośrednictwem ogólnych (generalno-abstrakcyjnych) reguł występujących w tym prawie pod nazwą rationes decidendi – wraz z nakreśleniem wad i zalet każdej z tych dwóch opcji.
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