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Remarks on the Dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland

100%
Piotrowski R.
Studia Iuridica
|
2016
|
vol. 68
279-292
EN
Where a system of constitutional judicial review is in place, the concept of democracy is understood as rejecting claims about an unlimited will of the sovereign as the source of state authority, and confining democracy to such manifestations of the majority will which enjoy Constitutional legitimacy – meaning that they are in compliance with the version of a human rights culture that has been inscribed in the Constitution and which is embraced by Constitutional judges when delivering their adjudication. Following the recent parliamentary and presidential elections, the political significance of the Constitutional Tribunal has increased enormously. Only the Constitutional Tribunal is capable of preventing the centre of political power (which governs over the legislative and executive branches) from pursuing its plans. According to parliamentary majority in order to change Poland and fulfil commitments to the electorate, the ruling party had to see to it that the Tribunal’s make-up is pluralistic. Otherwise, all their efforts would be exposed to destruction by the Constitutional Tribunal. This way of thinking, though, implies that the Constitutional Tribunal can be changed in an ordinary law in such a way as to render it incapable of opposing the ruling majority. Regarding the ongoing Constitutional crisis over the Constitutional Tribunal, a scenario involving the observance of the basic law does not appear to be a likely one – unless such scenario leads to the expectation, however mistaken, that political gains can thus be scored and that the operation of the Constitutional Tribunal will no longer pose a threat to plans of the parliamentary majority.
2

Remarks on the Dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland

100%
Piotrowski R.
Studia Iuridica
|
2016
|
vol. 68
279-292
EN
Where a system of constitutional judicial review is in place, the concept of democracy is understood as rejecting claims about an unlimited will of the sovereign as the source of state authority, and confining democracy to such manifestations of the majority will which enjoy Constitutional legitimacy – meaning that they are in compliance with the version of a human rights culture that has been inscribed in the Constitution and which is embraced by Constitutional judges when delivering their adjudication. Following the recent parliamentary and presidential elections, the political significance of the Constitutional Tribunal has increased enormously. Only the Constitutional Tribunal is capable of preventing the centre of political power (which governs over the legislative and executive branches) from pursuing its plans. According to parliamentary majority in order to change Poland and fulfil commitments to the electorate, the ruling party had to see to it that the Tribunal’s make-up is pluralistic. Otherwise, all their efforts would be exposed to destruction by the Constitutional Tribunal. This way of thinking, though, implies that the Constitutional Tribunal can be changed in an ordinary law in such a way as to render it incapable of opposing the ruling majority. Regarding the ongoing Constitutional crisis over the Constitutional Tribunal, a scenario involving the observance of the basic law does not appear to be a likely one – unless such scenario leads to the expectation, however mistaken, that political gains can thus be scored and that the operation of the Constitutional Tribunal will no longer pose a threat to plans of the parliamentary majority.
3
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Państwo prawa w klasycznej tradycji zachodniej i późnej nowoczesności w kontekście sporów wokół klauzuli demokratycznego państwa prawnego

100%
Krzynówek-Arndt A.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2018
|
issue 3(146)
79–102
EN
The purpose of the article is to indicate the possible directions for clarifying the modern model of a state both democratic and ruled by law. To seriously take those two qualities, they must be regarded as mutually related. This is possible, when the democratic-political and legal-constitutional dimensions of the state can be related to an external dimension determining both the boundaries of the content of law and the decisions made by the Nation-sovereign (also in the Constitution) or specified by the will of the current majority of its representatives. Such perspective can be obtained primarily via considering the natural law in the disputes on a democratic state ruled by law. Taking into account transformations of the state and the law typical for the period of late modernity, as well as various traditions of neo-Positivist approach to law, four models of a democratic state ruled by law as a modern political form may be distinguished: constitutional democratic state ruled by law (in liberal-political and discursive versions), agonistic democratic state ruled by law, neorepublican democratic state ruled by law, personalistic democratic state ruled by law.
4
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Meandry praworządności na przykładzie orzekania w sprawie zasiłku celowego z tytułu poniesienia strat w wyniku klęski żywiołowej lub ekologicznej

75%
Lisowski P.
Przegląd Prawa i Administracji
|
2018
|
vol. 114
139-148
EN
The organisation and functioning of a democratic state ruled by law is based on the system of principles and legal institutions. The sine qua non condition of the effective implementation of this concept is the coherence (unification) of legal order. The latter presupposes, in turn, the systemic approach to positive law. The paper analyses the provisions of the Social Assistance Act which do not meet these requirements. This allows the author to specify the most serious threats resulting from the described deficit (these primarily involve non-compliance with the standards which define the legal bases for administrative decisions and the provisions allowing for the interventions in the area of municipal activities). The conclusion off ers suggestions as to how the diagnosed deficiencies could be corrected.
5
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Z teorii i praktyki samorządu terytorialnego

75%
Kiczka K.
Przegląd Prawa i Administracji
|
2018
|
vol. 114
311-326
EN
The legal issues of territorial self-government are the subject of interest in jurisprudence. Territorial self-government forms an important and permanent part of the organizational structure of a democratic state ruled by law, which is aff ected by constitutional and international legal factors. Determining of the status of territorial self-government by means of parliament statutes and ordinances sometimes results in departing from the relevant constitutional and international requirements. That is why it is so important to guarantee the functioning of an impartial, independent and efficient judicial power in the field of the organization and functioning of territorial self-government in a modern state.
6
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The concept of the State of Law

62%
Oniszczuk J.
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
|
2015
|
vol. 2
|
issue 2(6)
57-77
PL
Współcześnie ustroje wielu państw są opisywane jako ustroje państw prawnych, praworządnych czy demokratycznych państw prawnych. Zwykle zauważa się, że cechą państwa prawnego, inaczej niż w wypadku państwa rządzonego przez ludzi (np. rozkaz jednostki), jest to, że władzę sprawuje system abstrakcyjnych reguł, które kierują postępowaniem wszystkich ludzi (generalna norma) na jednakowych zasadach. Takie państwo działa na podstawie i w granicach prawa. Powyższe stwierdzenie odpowiada w zasadzie pojmowaniu państwa praworządnego. Państwo praworządne formalnie cechuje bowiem działanie na podstawie i w granicach prawa, zaś jego wymiar materialny oznacza, że prawo jest jednakowe (równe) dla wszystkich. Opis ten nie wystarczy dla scharakteryzowania państwa prawnego. Jest więc też tylko fragmentem opisu jeszcze szerszej koncepcji, jaką jest demokratyczne państwo prawne.
EN
Political systems of various states are currently described as the rule of law states, lawabiding states, democratic states ruled by law, lawful states, or law-governed states? Mostly, it is noticed that the states ruled by law are characterized by the fact that the power is exercised by the set of abstract principles which govern the conduct of all people (a general norm) by equal rules, in opposition to the state governed by people (the order of an individual or group of individuals). Such a state acts on the basis of law and within its limits. The above statement corresponds with the apprehension of the law-abiding state. The law observing state is formally characterized by functioning on the basis of, and within the limits of law whereas its substantial dimension means that the law is equal (equal for everyone). This description is not sufficient to characterize the rule of the law state. It is only a fragment of even broader concept of the democratic state ruled by law.
7
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Rysa na obliczu Temidy

51%
Gomułowicz A.
Kwartalnik Prawa Podatkowego
|
2022
|
issue 2
29-38
EN
The article concerns the assessment of the thesis of the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of November 4, 2021 (no. III FSK 3626/21) as well as its justification. It focuses on the fundamental flaws, namely: 1) on the erroneous assumption made by judges that the National Judiciary Council is a constitutional collegiate body (the content of Article 187 (1) of the Constitution contradicts this); 2) on the erroneous recognition that the dismissal of elected members of the Council, judges, before the end of their 4-year term of office, is a defect in the procedure, while it is a clear and indisputable breach of Article 187, paragraph 3 of the Constitution; 3) on the unsubstantiated assumption that the President of the Republic of Poland has legal grounds to conduct his own substantive proceedings, which will verify the candidates for judicial posts submitted by the Council; 4) on the unauthorized equation between the NCJ and the neo-NCJ; 5) on a faulty application of the Astradsson test.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy tezy wyroku Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego z dnia 4 listopada 2021 r., sygn. III FSK 3626/21, a także jej uzasadnienia. Koncentruje się na fundamentalnych wadach, a mianowicie na: 1) błędnym założeniu, że Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa jest organem konstytucyjnym samorządu sędziowskiego (przeczy temu treść art. 187 ust. 1 Konstytucji RP); 2) błędnym uznaniu, że odwołanie wybieranych członków Rady, sędziów przed upływem ich czteroletniej kadencji jest wadliwością postępowania, podczas gdy jest to jaskrawe i bezdyskusyjne złamanie art. 187 ust. 3 Konstytucji RP; 3) bezpodstawnym przyjęciu, że Prezydent RP ma prawne podstawy do prowadzenia własnego merytorycznego postępowania, które weryfikuje zgłoszone przez Radę kandydatury na stanowiska sędziowskie; 4) nieuprawnionym stawianiu znaku równości pomiędzy KRS a „nową KRS”; 5) wadliwym zastosowaniu testu Astradssona.
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