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Reflexivity and the Codification of Legal Ethics. Remarks on the Basis of Paul Ricoeur’s “Little Ethics” Theory

100%
Pieniążek M.
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
|
2016
|
vol. 2(13)
39-50
EN
Codes of legal ethics encounter constant waves of criticism. It is pointed out that their disadvantage is, on the one hand, the excessive casuistry, limiting the possibility of taking independent decisions in cases of ethical and professional conflicts, and, on the other hand, the exaggerated declarative character of perfectionist ethical and professional virtues. The gap between the abovementioned perspectives, easily perceived in such codes, results in a dysfunctionality of professional ethics in the actions undertaken by members of the legal profession. The article, apart from the critical-comparative part, includes a proposal of reading and interpreting the content of the codes in a way that transgresses the above opposition. The theoretical basis of the presented position is provided by the concept of “little ethics” formulated by Paul Ricoeur in his work Oneself as Another. The ethical theory developed by Ricoeur combines the elements of Aristotelian ethics of virtues with Kantian ethics of duty. For this reason, it sets a uniform perspective for opposing elements, namely: subordination to the norm of the code and pursuit of ethical and professional self-improvement by legal professionals. The proposed solution belongs to the “reflexive” paradigm of the lawyer’s professional ethics proposed on the basis of Ricoeur’s onto-ethical theory.
2
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Dimensions of Legal Ethics in the Light of Paul Ricoeur’s ‘Petite Éthique’

67%
Pieniążek M.
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
|
2019
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vol. 2(20)
20-28
EN
The article investigates the multidimensional phenomenon of legal ethics, whose complexity justifies looking for adequate tools for its systematization in philosophy. An attempt is made to characterize a number of aspects of legal ethics in the perspective of Paul Ricoeur’s “little ethics” (French: la petite éthique). The concept makes it possible to order the reflection on the phenomenon of ethics in, among others, the teleological and deontological dimensions, as well as in the intrapersonal (i.e. within a person), interpersonal, and institutional (corporate) dimensions. The article also refers to the question of the textual dimension of legal ethics, including the co-conditioning of the substance of the codes of ethics and the personal “text of action” of a barrister, legal advisor, etc. This provides context for discussing the question of the dialectic of the prescriptive and descriptive aspects of codes of ethics on the basis of Ricoeur’s narratological considerations against a broader background of the dispute between cognitivism and noncognitivism.
PL
Przedmiotem analizy podjętej w artykule jest wielowymiarowość zjawiska etyki prawniczej. Stopień złożoności powyższego fenomenu powoduje, iż uzasadnione staje się poszukiwanie adekwatnych narzędzi filozoficznych, umożliwiających jego systematyzację. W tekście próba charakterystyki szeregu aspektów etyki prawniczej podjęta jest w perspektywie „małej etyki” (oryg. la petite éthique) Paula Ricoeura. Koncepcja Ricoeura pozwala uporządkować refleksję nad zjawiskiem etyki prawniczej, inter alia w wymiarze teleologicznym i deontologicznym oraz w wymiarze intrapersonalnym (wewnątrzosobowym), interpersonalnym oraz instytucjonalnym (korporacyjnym). W artykule podnosi się także kwestię wymiaru tekstualnego etyki prawniczej, w tym współwarunkowania treści kodyfikacji etycznej i osobistego „tekstu działania” adwokata, radcy, etc. W tym kontekście na gruncie rozważań narratologicznych Ricouera dyskutowana jest kwestia dialektyki aspektu preskryptywnego i deskryptywnego kodyfikacji etycznej, na szerszym tle sporu kognitywizmu z nonkognitywizmem.
3
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Omezení svobody projevu soudců a jeho morální zdůvodnění v judikatuře ESLP a NSS

59%
Stehlíková J.
Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)
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2021
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vol. 160
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issue 8
350-663
EN
Freedom of speech enjoys protection and judicial freedom of speech is not an exception. However, judges are limited in their speeches by legal and ethical requirements of judicial office, by contrast to other people in society. It is not always clear what those requirements really mean, how the ethical requirements differ from the legal ones and what consequences are connected with certain types of speeches. Judges thus often face a difficult task not to breach limits of their freedom of speech, unless they know what guideline to follow in controversial situations. This article therefore analyses three judicial decisions (of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Supreme Administrative Court) in which courts dealt with judicial speech that were not in compliance with legal or ethical norms. In the first case, the judge, due to his speech failed the requirement of impartiality. In the second case, the judge became a target of justified public criticism, and in the third case, the judge committed a disciplinary offence. Courts used moral arguments (deontological and consequentialist) in their decisions to justify their statements concerning faults of these three judges. By revealing these moral arguments in each judicial decision, the article points out how the courts reflect upon requirements posed on judiciary. It also shows a guideline which can be followed be judges when they try not to breach any norm.
CS
Svoboda projevu je chráněna a svoboda projevu soudců není výjimkou. Na rozdíl od ostatních lidí ve společnosti jsou však soudci ve svých projevech limitováni zákonnými i etickými požadavky na výkon funkce soudce. Není ale vždy zřejmé, jaký je skutečný obsah těchto požadavků, v čem se od sebe profesně etické a zákonné požadavky liší a jaké následky se s konkrétními projevy pojí. Soudci tak mnohdy čelí nesnadnému úkolu nepřekročit meze své svobody projevu, aniž vědí, podle čeho se mají ve sporných situacích orientovat. Tento článek proto rozebírá tři soudní rozhodnutí (Evropského soudu pro lidská práva a kárného senátu Nejvyššího správního soudu), v nichž soudy řešily případy, kdy se soudci provinili svými projevy proti zákonným či etickým normám. V jednom případě soudce svým projevem narušil zdání své nestrannosti, ve druhém se stal terčem oprávněné kritiky ze strany veřejnosti a ve třetím spáchal kárné provinění. Soudy v těchto třech rozhodnutích odůvodnily pochybení soudců různými morálními argumenty (deontologickými a konsekvencialistickými). Odhalením těchto morálních argumentů v jednotlivých rozhodnutích článek poukazuje na to, jak soudy uvažují o požadavcích na výkon soudcovské funkce a podle čeho se tedy mohou soudci samotní orientovat, když přemýšlejí, zda se svým projevem neprovinili proti nějaké normě.
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