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EN
This paper provides a detailed review of evaluation standards for the legal assessment of tying. This practice, which constitutes an abuse of a dominant position, is a significant breach of competition law. The mechanism of this type of abuse is based on taking advantage of market power in the supply of one product to create packed offerings capable of precluding competition from superior rival solutions. Tying occurs when one product, the “tying product”, is sold only with another product, the “tied product”. In the prevailing number of cases, tying serves to consolidate the company’s dominant position on the tied product market, which usually aims to share the tying product’s large customer group with the less-desired product. However, tying is not illegal per se. In many cases, it does not lead to any anti-competitive concerns, and might be beneficial for consumers. This is why each assessment of this conduct must be carefully evaluated with special attention given to the effects, in accordance with the generally applied effect-based approach, and also potential efficiencies. An analysis of the case-law and literature reveals the basic mechanisms for conducting a legal assessment of tying. However, the use of these mechanisms will not be possible without their adaptation to the ongoing changes caused by technological development. Digital markets not only generate incremental revenues, but are also the sources of new or unusual legal arrangements. It will more frequently be the case that existing provisions will not be able to address every new practice accurately without new acts. The Digital Markets Act aims to adapt the existing legal framework to contemporary market realities and to become a modern tool for enforcing competition law rules on digital markets. The European Commission is seeking to broaden its powers to intervene at the earliest possible stage, before an undertaking affects the competition on a market.
FR
L’article examine la littérature sur les théories du préjudice dans les marches numériques ainsi que les difficultés spécifiques liées à la quantification du dommage dans le cadre d’une action en dommage concurrentiel. Ensuite, le développement timide d’une jurisprudence des actions privées sur les marches numériques dans l’Union Européenne est étudié en comparaison avec la pratique antitrust américaine, en faisant la distinction entre les plaintes introduites par des entreprises ou des consommateurs. Enfin, le document soulève les problématiques spécifiques à l’introduction d’actions en dommages et intérêts concurrentiels sur les marchés numériques, et explore les propositions suivantes : étendre la présomption du dommage aux abus de positions dominantes sur les marchés numériques, inciter les parties privées à requérir des injonctions et encourager la mise en oeuvre de remèdes dans le cadre d’actions privées.
EN
The paper reviews literature on theories of harm in digital markets, and the specific difficulties in quantifying the damage in private enforcement of competition law. The development of a tentative case-law on private enforcement in digital markets in the European Union is studied next, in comparison to the US antitrust practice, differentiating between businesses or consumers filing damages claims. Finally, the paper raises the specific issues posed by the digital economy for competition law claims for damages, and explores the idea of extending the presumption of harm also to abuse of dominance in digital markets, as well as making private parties aware of cease and desist injunctions or filing for private enforcement remedies.
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