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Mnohorelační teorie soudu Bertranda Russella

100%
Soutor M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2013
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vol. 61
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issue 1
51-69
EN
The multiple-relation theory of judgement was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1910 as the upshot of a critique of propositional realism which, in revolt against idea­lism, he took over from G. E. Moore. The target of the critique is founded on a binary theory of judgement. Russell attacks the binary theory indirectly by a critique of the identity theory of truth which goes hand in hand with this conception of judgement. In the first part I interpret this critique and then, in the part that follows, I present the multiple-relation theory. In the remainder of the piece I will consider the question of which theory of truth adoption of the multiple-relation theory leads us to. I will also address the question of whether this theory avoids the problems of the binary theory of judgement. In answer to the first of these questions I propose, in the third part, the contextual theory of truth. I will defend this proposal against the thesis that it is actually a congruent version of the correspondence theory. As I will argue in the fourth part, those passages where Russell speaks of correspondence should be treated with caution – in fact, these passages should be positively disregarded. In conclusion I return to the multiple-relation theory as such, and I indicate the difficulty which arises when, in the framework of this theory, we seek to make sense of the synthetic unity of judgement.
CS
Mnohorelační teorii soudu Betrand Russell uvedl v roce 1910 jako výsledek kritiky propozičního realismu, který v revoltě proti idealismu přejal od G. E. Moora. Kritizovaná koncepce se zakládá na binární teorii soudu. Binární teorii Russell napadá nepřímo skrze kritiku identitní teorie pravdy, jež jde s tímto pojetím soudu ruku v ruce. V prvním oddílu tuto kritiku vyložím a v tom, který následuje, představím mnohorelační teorii. Ve zbytku práce se budu zamýšlet nad otázkou, k jaké teorii pravdy přijetí mnohorelační teorie vede. Také zodpovím otázku, zda se tato teorie vyhýbá problémům binární teorie soudu. V odpovědi na první z těchto otázek předložím ve třetím oddílu kontextuální teorii pravdy. Tento návrh budu hájit proti tezi, že šlo o korespondenční teorii kongruenčního typu. Jak budu argumentovat ve čtvrtém oddílu, ty pasáže, kde Russell hovoří o korespondenci, je nutno brát s rezervou, ba dokonce je nezbytné tyto pasáže škrtnout. V závěru se vrátím k mnohorelační teorii jako takové a naznačím potíž, která vyvstává tehdy, když máme v této teorii zajistit syntetickou jednotu soudu.
2
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Karteziánský reprezentacionalismus, nebo kognitivní realismus?

86%
Heider D.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2014
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vol. 62
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issue 1
101-123
EN
This review study looks at David Clemenson’s book Descartes’ Theory of Ideas from both the historical and systematic points of view. From the historical point of view, the theme of the (late) scholastic influences on Descartes’ theory of ideas is tackled, while from the systematic point of view Descartes’ theory is interpreted dealing with the question of Cartesian representationalism or direct (cognitive) realism. An analysis of the immediate Scholastic texts, written by Jesuits (and taught at the Jesuit college La Flèche, where the young Descartes studied) is used by Clemenson to support his argument for a so-called weak version of direct realism, actually identical with a weak version of representationalism. The author of this review study, despite appreciating the connection of these two levels, making possible a consistent interpretation of some of Descartes’ ostensibly contradictory statements, draws attention to certain deficiencies and obscurities concerning, primarily, the scholastic dimension of the subject-matter.
3
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Počátky vědecké filosofie v USA : nový realismus

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Zámečník H. L., Vrabeľ O.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2019
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vol. 67
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issue 2
183-206
EN
This article aims to present the philosophical conception of the New Realism movement which formed at the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States in reaction to the thinking of the idealist consensus, whose foremost representative was Josiah Royce. It also aims to reconstruct the basic procedure of argumentation of the programme of reform of philosophy proposed by the New Realism, and to subject to critical scrutiny the epistemological conception of direct realism. The New Realists were significantly influenced in their opinions by the work of Bertrand Russell, something which explains certain visible parallels with the programme of the Vienna Circle and with thinking that anticipates the philosophy of science. Last but not least, we aim to argue in favour of the view that New Realism is not a comprehensive philosophical conception, but rather the sum of the approaches found in the different New Realist thinkers. Despite this, however, some views of the New Realists are shown to be a still relevant and inspiring source for further philosophical investigation.
DE
Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags ist es, das philosophische Konzept der Bewegung des Neuen Realismus vorzustellen, die sich Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts in den USA als Reaktion auf die Gedanken des idealistischen Konsens mit seinem führenden Vertreter Josiah Royce formte. In diesem Beitrag soll auch die grundlegende Argumentationsweise der vom Neuen Realismus angeregten Philosophiereform rekonstruiert werden. Des Weiteren wird das epistemologische Konzept des direkten Realismus einer kritischen Analyse unterzogen. Die neuen Realisten gehen in ihren Ansichten insbesondere vom Werk Bertrand Russells aus, wodurch wir gewisse Parallelen zum Programm des Wiener Kreises sehen, bzw. zu den Gedanken, die die Wissenschaftsphilosophie antizipieren. Nicht zuletzt ist es unser Ziel, jene Interpretation argumentativ zu unterstützen, der gemäß der Neue Realismus kein abgeschlossenes Philosophiekonzept darstellt, sondern die Summe der Ansätze einzelner neorealistischer Denker. Dennoch erweisen sich einige Ansichten der Neorealisten als nach wie vor aktuelle und inspirative Quelle der weiteren philosophischen Untersuchung.
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