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Problem subsystencji w "Logice" Marcina Śmigleckiego

100%

Pawlikowski T.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

2016

vol. 5

305-328

Marcin Śmiglecki (1564-1618) was one of the most famous Polish representatives of the second scholastics. His work Logica, originally published in Ingolstadt (1618), was followed by three times published at Oxford (1634, 1638 and 1658).This work includes a series of logical and metaphysical problems, issue of subsistence among them the. This issue belongs to the metaphysical problematics of the substance and is associated with the concept of being. An outline of the issues of subsistence, which we find in The Logic (1618), is very important, because in the earlier lectures in Vilnius (1586/1587), our thinker barely mentioned it. The problem was discussed in the Christian tradition. On the manner its consideration influenced mainly views of Boethius (c. 480-525), who understood the subsistence as a substance take on the aspect of independent existence. This idea developed St. Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1275) in accordance with its metaphysics of existence. The concept of subsistence meant for him independence in existence understood as the act of being. Generally, the second scholasticism, which was founded on the tradition of “pure” Aristotelianism, marginalized this question. We find this expressed in the views of Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), who claimed that “to subsist” means only one of many properties of the substance and that does not matter for the theory of being. However, for Śmiglecki, the concept of subsistence was essentially important. In the field of contingent beings it enabled him to positive statement the substance as being able to exist by itself. It was a generally valid definition of subsistence, especially referring to substances created. In this meaning “the subsistence” marked the independent existence, not inherent in the substrate. In the second and the crucial meaning, the subsistence is characterized by independence from any cause. This is the case of God’s Substance, Existence itself by itself. It seems that the great advantage of the concept of subsistence in Śmiglecki’s theory was that it allowed to accurately distinguish between substance created and the uncreated. The solution of this difficult problem was made possible by drawing attention to the existential aspect of being. Aquinas’ theory of being suggested this solution, but in the period of second scholasticism Aristotelian metaphysics was favorited. Thomistic accents were probable the cause that Śmiglecki’s Logic was initially negatively censured in Roma (1615). This is the fact, in his fundamental work our author walked away from some interpretations introduced by F. Suárez and masters of Jesuits school, but finally that gave great effects.

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57%

Kacprzak A.

Zeszyty Prawnicze

2019

vol. 19

issue 1

203-240

Che la libertà contrattuale, espressa nel broccardo pacta sunt servanda, fosse diventata un principio pressoché indiscutibile nelle teorie giusnaturalistiche dell’Illuminismo, è conoscenza comune. Le sue radici sono tuttavia molto più profonde, in quanto risalgono al pensiero dei giuscanonisti medievali – i primi sostenitori della forza obbligatoria delle promesse informali. quello che ha portato al riconoscimento defnitivo del principio in questione è stato però un processo lungo e complesso. L’obbiettivo del presente articolo consiste nell’individuare i momenti cruciali di questo sviluppo, al quale hanno contribuito molte correnti intellettuali – dalla canonistica, attraverso la seconda scolastica, fino al giusnaturalismo dell’età dei Lumi. Senza tentare di decidere quale di queste correnti abbia portato il contributo decisivo alla creazione del principio in questione, come ha fatto la letteratura precedente, si propone la tesi che è stata la somma dei detti contributi, ciascuno di pari importanza, a portare all’aﬀermarsi della libertà contrattuale nel pensiero giuridico dell’età moderna. Le presenti considerazioni sono focalizzate sullo sviluppo dei concetti, quali la nozione generale del contratto, il suo rapporto al concetto della promessa, la volontà umana come la fonte dell’obbligatorietà del contratto, nonché la giustifcazione morale di tale forza obbligatoria.

It is generally known that freedom of contract, as expressed by the pacta sunt servanda rule, became an unquestionable principle of contract law in the theories of natural law developed in the Enlightenment. However, the roots of this principle go back much further in time, to the doctrine formulated by the medieval Canonists, who were the first to say that unilateral promises, even informal ones, were binding. Nevertheless, a long process led from these early beginnings to the definitive recognition of the principle. Te aim of the present article is to identify the crucial moments in this development, to which many diﬀerent intellectual traditions contributed: from the doctrine of natural law formulated by the Canonists, through the Second Scholastic teachings pursued at the School of Salamanca, to the theories of natural law developed in the early Enlightenment. Unlike the general practice in the literature produced on the subject hitherto, my intention is not to pinpoint the exact time when the principle was created, and still less to ascribe it to any one of these intellectual movements. My argument is that it was only the overall outcome of these contributions, each of them equally important, that led to the recognition of the principle. My article focuses on its conceptual evolution, considering themes such as the creation of the general notion of the contract, its relation to the concept of a promise, the capacity of the human will to bind itself by a promise, and the moral grounds for its binding force.

Jak powszechnie wiadomo, swoboda umów awansowała do rangi podstawowej zasady prawa kontraktowego w doktrynach prawnonaturalnych epoki oświecenia. Jej korzenie są jednak znacznie głębsze, sięgają bowiem myśli średniowiecznych kanonistów, którzy jako pierwsi głosili tezę o wiążącym charakterze jednostronnych przyrzeczeń, nawet tych nieformalnych. Od tych pierwszych początków do pełnego uznania zasdy swobody umów prowadziła jednak długa droga. Celem przedłożonego artykułu jest ustalenie kluczowych momentów tego rozwoju. Przyczynili się do niego przedstawiciele wielu różnych nurtów myślowych: od wczesnośredniowiecznej kanonistyki, poprzez drugą scholastykę ze szkoły w Salamance, po teorie prawnonaturalne początków oświecenia. Inaczej niż w dotychczasowej literaturze, nie jest intencją autorki ustalenie dokładnego momentu powstania omawianej zasady ani tym bardziej przypisanie jej autorstwa jednemu ze wskazanych nurtów. Zgodnie z proponowaną tezą zasada swobody umów w jej współczesnym kształcie powstała w wyniku interakcji wszystkich tych tradycji, przy czym wkład intelektualny każdej z nich był równie istotny. Artykuł skupia się na historii pojęć, takich jak ogólne pojęcie kontraktu, jego relacja do przyrzeczenia, koncepcja woli jako źródła zobowiązania kontraktowego oraz moralne uzasadnienie mocy wiążącej kontraktów nieformalnych.

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Problem subsystencji w "Logice" Marcina Śmigleckiego

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