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Tomaszowy argument „z blokowania” za niematerialnością działań intelektu.

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Zembrzuski M.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2017

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vol. 6

77-98

EN

Argument for spirituality of soul appears in a few places of Aquinas’ text and is sometimes called “the impediment argument”, “the argument for plasticity of intellect”, “the argument from common dimension”. The names differ as far as Thomas did not establish himself any name for his reasoning in this matter. There is no doubt that the argument derives from the Aristotelian On the soul, however, Aquinas does not develop it. The argument is present in four places and its most important presumptions would be summarized as follows: (1) man can cognize the nature of all bodies by his own intellect; (2) that what is able to cognize everything can not in itself have a nature of the cognized object – the nature of body would block a process of cognition; (3) it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body – it would not be possible for the principle of intellectual action to act through a bodily part; (4) the intellectual principle which is called the intellect or the mind acts per se does not contain any bodily involvement in its action. Hence, according to Aquinas, soul is something subsisting with regard to actions which are not the acts of body. However, this statement is disturbingly mistaken. In Summa, nevertheless, Thomas develops this issue further. In response to some objections he would emphasize that none of parts (as far as part is understood as a part of a whole) could not exist separately and act separately – neither soul nor body (as well as an eye or a hand). This is for the fact that soul is something subsisting (quod est) and inherited in matter (quo aliquid aliud est). Aquinas tries to explain the status of soul significantly, nevertheless left some questions open to make analysis on a whole human being possible, including body for which soul serves as a form. Thus, through the intellect we would observe a unique characteristic of human soul as a rational being.

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Krytyka koncepcji reinkarnacji w Summa contra Gentiles św. Tomasza z Akwinu

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Mandrela A.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2016

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vol. 5

263-275

EN

The theory of reincarnation is one of the elements of eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism, however in recent decades this concept have become very popular in Europe and North America Greek philosopher Plato also believed in reincarnation, however his theory was criticized by Aristotle. This article discusses the main philosophical assumptions that need to be accepted by those who believe in reincarnation. Then these assumptions are compared with the concept of soul described by St. Thomas Aquinas. In Summa Contra Gentiles some arguments against the theory of reincarnation can be found. St. Thomas Aquinas believed that each soul can be connected only to one body, whereas Plato argued that the soul can travel from one body to another. People who believe in reincarnation often claim that the animals possess immortal soul. According to Aquinas animals do not have immortal soul. Plato believed that the soul loses memory while entering new body, yet according to St. Thomas Aquinas people don’t lose any memories when there are born but rather they start acquiring new information. This aspects are further explained and evaluated.

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Prawda o intelekcie. Mieczysława Gogacza rozumienie intelektu możnościowego i czynnego

80%

Zembrzuski M.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2016

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vol. 5

75-89

EN

The aim of the article is presentation the problems of possible intellect and agent intellect in philosophy Mieczyslaw Gogacz, founder of consequent version of thomism (Warsaw School of Thomism). His understanding of the intellect was dictated by the successive publications. Difference between intellects, was first shown in the context of fundamental metaphysical positions - realism and idealism. According to M. Gogacz realistic proposition is depends on the distinction between two intellects, and idealistic related with the acceptance of a single intellect with passive and active function, and identification of the faculties of the soul with itself. M. Gogacz presented the metaphysical description of the nature of the intellect, emphasizing its being, as well as the very essence. He underlined that the possible intellect should be defined as the possibility of the soul, which is it imperfection (intellect is principle of individuation of the soul), located in the soul, but not identical with its essence. Agent intellect in his opinion should be defined as an accident of the possible intellect. Distinction between possible intellect and agent intellect allowed to remark the difference between knowing confused and clearly, and to build the theory of “speech of the heart”, which describes the most important way of knowing a principle of being – act of being.

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3 Rocznik Tomistyczny

2 Zembrzuski M.

1 Mandrela A.

1 2017

2 2016

Tomaszowy argument „z blokowania” za niematerialnością działań intelektu.

Krytyka koncepcji reinkarnacji w Summa contra Gentiles św. Tomasza z Akwinu

Prawda o intelekcie. Mieczysława Gogacza rozumienie intelektu możnościowego i czynnego