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Self-Evident Experience: A Challenge to the Empirical Study of Religion

100%

Renner W.

Open Theology

2014

vol. 1

issue 1

Empirical psychology’s philosophy of science traditionally orients by Popper’s Critical Rationalism. This paradigm has been successful with observable behavior and some aspects of emotion and cognition. Still, phenomena like spirituality, empathy, or love have been neglected because they can neither be easily communicated nor instantly replicated. I propose to enlarge the scope of empiricism by accepting Self-Evident Experience (SEE) as a source of “soft” empirical data, as long as they (a) can be interpreted within a rationalist framework and (b) are supported by cumulative experiences by others in the course of time. Applying this approach to SEE of a spiritual or religious nature, the theological system of the individual’s denominational affiliation serves as the rational framework (a), and experiences similar to others serve as the accumulated “database” (b), both supporting the validity of the experience. In the sense of Critical Rationalism, apart from arguments (a) and (b), criteria for “falsifying” SEE are suggested: Experiences which are in line with an individual’s or society’s expectations and which lack an impact on the individual’s further course of life will be attributed less validity than experiences which put the individual at risk in today’s climate of skepticism and which substantially influence his or her life.

Filozofia wobec psychologii. Polemika Adama Mahrburga z Kazimierzem Twardowskim

63%

Dziedzic A.

Folia Philosophica

2017

vol. 38

In 1898, „Przegląd Filozoficzny” („Philosophical Review”) published AdamMahrburg’s polemic with Kazimierz Twardowski’s text Psychology in relation to physiology and philosophy (1897), as well as response of Twardowski and Mahrburg’sfurther polemic. In the background of this dispute were discrepant views on psychology, metaphilosophy and philosophy. Mahrburg, representative of critical positivism, supporter of Kantian agnosticism and Wundtian physiological psychology, didn’t understand Brentano’s program of empirical psychology, supported by Twardowski. Besides, Mahrburg had different views on philosophy’s function: for him philosophy was theory of science. Therefore he rejected both Twardowski’s idea of philosophy as a group of sciences and his specific concept of relations between psychology and philosophy.

W 1898 r. na łamach „Przeglądu Filozoficznego” opublikowano polemikę Adama Mahrburga z tekstem Kazimierza Twardowskiego Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii (1897), a także odpowiedź Twardowskiego i dalszą replikę Mahrburga. Tłem tego sporu były różnice w poglądach psychologicznych, metafilozoficznych i filozoficznych. Mahrburg, przedstawiciel pozytywizmu krytycznego, zwolennik kantowskiego agnostycyzmu i Wundtowskiej psychologii fizjologicznej, nie rozumiał Brentanowskiego programu psychologii empirycznej, zawartego w tezach Twardowskiego. Miał też odmienną wizję zadań filozofii: dla Mahrburga filozofia była teorią nauki, dlatego recenzent odrzucał zarówno zaproponowaną przez Twardowskiego koncepcję filozofii jako grupy nauk, jak i szczegółową tezę o związkach pomiędzy psychologią i filozofią.

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Self-Evident Experience: A Challenge to the Empirical Study of Religion

Filozofia wobec psychologii. Polemika Adama Mahrburga z Kazimierzem Twardowskim