Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  ens rationis
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Petr Nigri z Kadaně a jeho pojetí „pomyslného jsoucna“

100%
Jindráček E.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2011
|
vol. 59
|
issue 5
717-732
EN
Petrus Nigri (Peter Schwarz) was born in Kadaň, a town in western Bohemia, before 1435, and along with his three brothers joined the Dominican Order in Germany. His academic formation spanned a large part of Europe (Germany, Italy, Spain, Bohemia, Hungary), and he eventually became Rector of the Studium Generale in Buda (1481). Although he is known primarily as an important Medieval Hebraist, his place in the history of philosophy derives from his work: Clipeus thomistarum (before 1474), a philosophical commentary on Porphyry’s Introduction (Isagoge), and a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories in the form of questions. While Nigri’s discussion of the concept of being of reason (Clipeus thomistarum, part I, qq. 3-4) is not original, his work is important for contributing to this concept’s reception, and with it the teaching of Hervaeus Natalis (died 1323) in his treatise De secundis intentionibus, in the transalpine countries. Being of reason (ens rationis) is conceived as one of second intentions. It is not a categorial being, nor is it an intellectual operation, nor is it caused, but is only identifiable by the human intellect. Nigri’s being of reason has no subjective existence, but only an objective character, which differs both from categorial being and from mere nothingness.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

The Compatibility of Evolution and Thomistic Metaphysics: A Reply to Dennis F. Polis

31%
Delfino R. A.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2021
|
vol. 10
|
issue 1
71–102
EN
In this article the author discusses Dennis F. Polis’ defense of the compatibility of biological evolution and Thomistic metaphysics. Some of Polis’ methodological and metaphysical arguments are examined and it is explained why they are unfaithful to the Thomistic tradition of metaphysics. There is a discussion of why metaphysics can, within certain parameters, critique the science of evolutionary biology, as well as a discussion of the role of metaphysics in the hierarchy of the sciences. The relationship between biological species to the notion of species in philosophy, including related metaphysical topics, such as essences and Divine ideas in God, is discussed. It is determined that Polis’ view suffers from a kind of relativism and nominalism that is incompatible with the moderate realism of Aquinas. Some of Aquinas’ key existential insights in metaphysics are discussed in this context as well. In addition to being corrective, this essay helps point the way to a better defense of the compatibility of biological evolution and Thomistic metaphysics.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.