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1

Phenomenology of Evidence: Promises, Problems, and Prospects

100%
Heffernan G.
Dialogue and Universalism
|
2015
|
issue 3
9-24
EN
According to Ricoeur, phenomenology is “for a good part the history of Husserlian heresies.” In this paper, I argue that, at the crossroads between a possible “topography of heresies” and a potential “geography of horizons,” phenomenology of evidence takes “the road to renewal” in pursuit of knowledge of knowledge and truth about truth. In doing so, I suggest that phenomenology of evidence is not “heresy” against “orthodox” or “analytical” theory of knowledge. Rather, in so far as it is required by a phenome-nological description of knowledge, phenomenology of evidence represents critical heterodoxy in the face of dogmatic orthodoxy. As such, it serves as a first step on “the road to renewal” of reflection on truth. Thus phenomenology of evidence emerges as one of “the many faces of contemporary phenomenology,” and as a very bright one indeed. In support of this position, I present arguments in the form of ten lessons from phenomenology of evidence for contemporary theory of knowledge.
2

Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject

75%
Trybulec B.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
|
2015
|
vol. 40
|
issue 1
111-128
EN
The concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second wave of arguments for the extended mind thesis. I argue that the position of Cognitive Integration represented by Richard Menary is much more intuitive and fruitful in analyses of cognition and knowledge than the early argument formulated by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. Cognitive Integration is compatible with virtue epistemology of John Greco’s agent reliabilism. The epistemic subject is constituted by its cognitive character composed of an integrated set of cognitive abilities and processes. Some of these processes are extended, they are a manipulation of external informational structures and, as such, they constitute epistemic practices. Epistemic practices are normative; to conduct them correctly the epistemic subject needs to obey epistemic norms embedded in the cultural context. The epistemic subject is not extended because of the casual coupling with external informational artifacts which extend his mind from inside the head and into the world. Rather, cognitive practices constitute the subject’s mind, they transform his cognitive abilities, and this is what makes the mind and epistemic subject “extended”.
3

Understanding Others: The Coherentist Method in Intercultural Communication

75%
Ivanova A. M.
Dialogue and Universalism
|
2015
|
issue 2
191-202
EN
The article introduces theories of epistemic justification to the problems of under-standing in communication. Two dominant approaches in contemporary epistemolo-gy—foundationalism and coherentism—are applied in intercultural discourse. Since the intended meaning of utterances in communication is reached through inference, beliefs about the intended meaning are justified with respect to the evidence of communicative behaviour and context. Tracing the difficulties of intercultural dialogue, the article ar-gues that the coherentist method of justification is more useful than foundationalist one. Coherentism is consistent with the open-mindedness and unprejudiced reasoning, both of which are crucial parts of intercultural competency.
4
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Is epistemological reliabilism consistent with grammatical evidentiality and conjunct/ disjunct marking?

65%
Łukasiewicz E.
Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia
|
2020
|
vol. 20
PL
The paper discusses how evidentiality and conjunct/disjunct marking in grammar are related to reliabilism, a contemporary theory of epistemic justification developed within the Anglo-American analytic tradition. It is assumed that many problems and ideas concerned with theories of knowledge, and with justification of beliefs in particular, which are widely discussed in contemporary philosophical debates, are worth reconsidering in the light of what grammars of natural languages impose on the epistemic agent. Section two explains how the notions of knowledge, belief and justification are understood in the paper. The section also outlines the major problems concerning the internalist justification of beliefs. Section three presents an externalist view on the problem of justification: process reliabilism. The reliabilist theory of justification is set in the context of two grammatical categories: evidentiality and conjunct/disjunct marking (egophoricity). Since the two categories are still little known, section four offers a brief presentation of evidentiality and egophoricity in grammar, illustrated with data from two languages. Finally, section five addresses the problem whether the premises of reliabilism are reconcilable with ‘natural epistemology’ encoded in grammar. The final conclusion says that the externalist premises of reliabilism are certainly not congruent with grammatical evidentiality and evidentialityrelated categories, but they are not logically inconsistent therewith. Furthermore, since the reliabilist program declares interest in ‘folk epistemic practices’, the approach might greatly benefit from what ‘natural epistemology’ tells us about epistemic folk concepts and epistemic practices employed by speakers of diverse world languages.
5
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Neutralność światopoglądowa

63%
Chrudzimski A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2016
|
vol. 34
45-69
EN
In this paper I focus on the concept of neutrality taken in the meaning typical for political discussions concerning e.g. the religious neutrality of the state. I take it for granted that the huge majority of educated people belonging to the so called “western culture” would agree that the most important institutions of our social life – such as schools, courts, and parliaments – should be neutral in this sense. But on the other hand it is extremely difficult to formulate a set of precise and reliable criteria allowing us to exclude particular statements, arguments or kinds of discourse as violating this principle of neutrality. The sad truth is that the term “neutrality”, even if restricted to the meaning that is relevant to this paper, is rather vague. Nevertheless I want to propose three types of criteria that can be helpful in attaining this goal. They will be termed: (i) content criterion, (ii) epistemic criterion, and (iii) pragmatic criterion. It seems that if we apply all these criteria together, we will be able to secure a reasonable degree of neutrality in our public debates.
6
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Using Kreisel’s Way Out to Refute Lucas-Penrose-Putnam Anti-Functionalist Arguments

55%
Buechner J.
Studia Semiotyczne
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2020
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vol. 34
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issue 1
EN
Georg Kreisel (1972) suggested various ways out of the Gödel incompleteness theorems. His remarks on ways out were somewhat parenthetical, and suggestive. He did not develop them in subsequent papers. One aim of this paper is not to develop those remarks, but to show how the basic idea that they express can be used to reason about the Lucas-Penrose-Putnam arguments that human minds are not (entirely) finitary computational machines. Another aim is to show how one of Putnam’s two anti-functionalist arguments (that use the Gödel incompleteness theorems) avoids the logical error in the Lucas-Penrose arguments, extends those arguments, but succumbs to an absurdity. A third aim is to provide a categorization of the Lucas-Penrose-Putnam anti-functionalist arguments.
7
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Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji

51%
Zięba P.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2016
|
vol. 35
87-111
EN
This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysicaland epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logicalstructure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two mainconclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is notsuch a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of theseviews could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests,disjunctivism can be correctly expressed without the employment of disjunction.
8
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Projekt jako kryterium demarkacji

45%
López M. A.
Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy
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2016
|
vol. 13
75-100
PL
Naturalizm metodologiczny, chociaż w sposób niejawny za sprawą wykluczenia odwołań do celowości, funkcjonuje całkowicie w zgodzie z założeniami naturalizmu ontologicznego i dlatego operuje jedynie w sferze tego, co empiryczne i naturalistyczne. Bardziej neutralna epistemologia w mniejszym stopniu opiera się na założeniach, pozwalając nauce na rozkwit bez ograniczeń narzucanych przez takie filozoficzne zobowiązanie. Zadanie oddzielenia nauki od naturalizmu metodologicznego wymaga porzucenia idei, że struktura wiedzy, czy też uzasadnione przekonanie, nie potrzebuje żadnego epistemicznego fundamentu i że uzasadnianie inferencyjne ma w nauce zdecydowanie wyższy status poznawczy niż uzasadnianie nieinferencyjne. W moim przekonaniu odwieczny problem nauki, a tym samym kryterium demarkacji, wiąże się z dwoma kwestiami. Po pierwsze, zakłada się, że tylko wiedza zdobywana inferencyjnie jest prawdziwie uzasadniona i, po drugie, że teorie muszą być — co najmniej — teoretycznie falsyfikowalne. W tym artykule zamierzam zaproponować kryterium demarkacji nauki pełniące praktyczną i heurystyczną rolę jako bodziec rozwoju nauki. Moja propozycja nie zakłada odgórnie mocy przyczynowej przypadku i konieczności, lecz zmusza naukowca do uznania ontologicznych cech przyrody i przyjęcia, że kwestia przyczynowości jest całkowicie otwarta. W ten sposób propozycja ta unika problemów, jakie na naukę nieubłaganie sprowadza naturalizm ontologiczny, a także jego wierny sprzymierzeniec — naturalizm metodologiczny.
EN
Methodological naturalism, though inexplicit in the denial of purpose, operates exclusively under the tenets of ontological naturalism and, therefore, proceeds only by way of the empirical and naturalistic. A more neutral epistemology is less presumptive and would allow science to flourish without the strictures of such a philosophical commitment. The task of divorcing science from methodological naturalism requires the abandonment of the idea that the structure of knowledge, or justified belief, requires no epistemic foundation and that inferential justification possess a uniquely superior epistemic status in the sciences than that which is non-inferentially known. As I see it, the persistent problem of science, and thus the criterion of demarcation that undergirds it, is two-fold. First, it is assumed that only inferential knowledge is genuinely justified, and second, that theories must be, at the very least, theoretically falsifiable. In this paper, I intend to provide a criterion of demarcating science that is practical and heuristically useful to spur scientific progress. My proposition does not presuppose the causal powers of chance and necessity. Instead, it forces the scientist to appreciate the ontological characteristics of nature and to leave the question of causation completely open, thereby, avoiding the pitfalls that ontological naturalism, and its faithful ally, methodological naturalism, habitually impose on science.
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