Since 1990s when liberalization and deregulation processes first opened the social security field to market forces, the EU competition law has had to cope with the situations of clash between values of social welfare and free competition. In the post-crisis period the European Union wants and needs to be more socially responsive, as the strengthening of social justice and social rights, the fight against poverty and social exclusion has become the key to political legitimacy of the European integration as well as of its Member States. A question hence arises how the call for a more social EU would cohabit with the free and undistorted competition. The paper tries to remedy on the fact that the EU so far has no accepted methodology of how to integrate public policy considerations in competition decisions. After sketching out such a methodology based on the CJEU’s pre-Lisbon case law, the present analysis deals with the post-Lisbon developments inquiring whether the CJEU is paying now more consideration to social security measures.
In his theory of criticism, D. N. Walton presupposes that an opponent either critically questions an argument, without supplementing this questioning with any reasoning of her own, or that she puts forward a critical question and supplements it with a counterargument, that is, with reasoning in defense of an opposite position of her own. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of in-between critical option for the opponent that needs to be taken into account in any classification of types of criticism, and that should not be overlooked in a system of dialogue norms, nor in a procedure for developing a strategically expedient critique. In this third option, an opponent questions and overtly doubts a statement of the proponent and supplements her doubts with a counterconsideration that explains and motivates her position of critical doubt, yet without supporting any opposite thesis, thereby assisting, as it were, the proponent in his attempt to develop a responsive argumentation, tailor-made to convince this particular opponent. First, I elaborate on the notion of an explanatory counterconsideration. Second, I discuss Walton’s distinction between premises that can be challenged by mere questioning (“ordinary premises” and “assumptions”) and premises that must be challenged by incurring the obligation to offer counter-argumentation (somewhat confusingly labeled “exceptions”). I contend that the latter type of premises, that I would label “normality premises,” can be attacked without incurring a genuine burden of proof. Instead, it can be attacked by means of incurring a burden of criticism (Van Laar and Krabbe, 2013) that amounts to the obligation to offer an explanatory counterconsideration, rather than a convincing ex concessis argument. Of course, providing the opponent with the right to discharge her burden of criticism with explanatory counterconsiderations brings a clear strategic ad- vantage to her. It is much less demanding to motivate one’s doubts regarding proposition P, than to convince the proponent of not-P. If we want to encourage opponents to act critically, and proponents to develop responsive arguments, the importance of the notions of an explanatory counterconsideration and of a motivated doubt should be emphasized in the theory of criticism.
Analiza prawnicza z konieczności posługuje się pojęciami, rozróżnieniami i typologiami. Narzędzia te napotykają na trudności, gdy przedmiotem analizy lub zastosowania jest kryzys lub sytuacja nadzwyczajna. Artykuł analizuje dwa przykłady typologii prawniczych sytuacji kryzysowych w pracach Grossa i Ní Aiolaín oraz Agambena w ujęciu respektywnym. Na tej podstawie proponuje się cztery poziomy prawniczej analizy odpowiedzi na sytuacje kryzysowe: 1) wyraźne opisy działań samych aktorów, 2) pozytywistyczne kategorie prawne dostępne w danym kontekście, 3) kategorie meta/porównawcze oraz 4) filozoficzne/ontologiczne koncepcje i kategorie, które kwestionują lub badają wszystkie poprzednie kategorie. Artykuł kończy się dyskusją na temat tego, w jaki sposób te poziomy analizy nakładają się na siebie, przenikają i muszą być połączone, aby uchwycić złożone zjawiska prawa w kryzysie.
EN
Legal analysis necessarily uses concepts, distinctions and typologies. These tools suffer challenges when the object of analysis or application is a crisis or emergency. The article looks into two examples of legal typologies of emergencies in the works of Gross and Ní Aiolaín and Agamben respectively. Based on this four levels of analysis for legal responses to emergencies is proposed: 1) explicit descriptions of actions by actors themselves, 2) positivist legal categories available in the context, 3) meta/comparative categories, and 4) philosophical/ontological concepts and categories that question or inquire into all the previous categories. The article concludes by discussing how these levels of analysis overlaps, merge and needs to be combined in order to grasp the complex phenomena of law in crisis.
The conspiracy mission of Marin Držić is being analysed in the context of sovereignty and political state of exception, from Schmitt to Agamben, as well as in the light of recent historical interpretations, from Jeličić and Pupačić to Tatarin and Kunčević. Držić’s letters to Cosimo I. and Francesco Medici are thus situated in the context of renaissance diplomatic thought. Based on some possibilities in their Croatian stylizations (Čale vs. Batistić), their political and theological semantics is revised.
HR
Rad se bavi pismima koja je Marin Držić uputio Cosimu I. i Francescu Mediciju. Nastoji se istražiti književnohistoriografski i političko-teološki habitus tih pisama, u dvama kontekstima — u kontekstu dosadašnjih Držićoloških istraživanja, bilo onih književnohistoriografske ili historiografske naravi, i, detaljnije, u kontekstu novijih pristupa problemu suvereniteta, političke iznimke i izvanrednog stanja, osobito kroz prizmu teoretičara kao što su Schmitt, Benjamin i Agamben.
This article presents an attempt to focus on the category of exception in the discourse on freedom of expression of religious minorities in addition to naming religious groups as dominant and non-dominant ones. It is noteworthy that the ombudsman of Georgia mentions the word “exception” several times in her 2020 report. Assuming something as an exception does not only mean that one group is given a privilege over another one and the principle of equality is violated. Making an exception to the restrictions imposed by the pandemic in general and in particular means creating a situation in which the government goes beyond the legal order endangering the sovereignty of law. On the other hand, it is without a doubt that even in a sanitary-epidemiological state, the rule of law must act and it is necessary to protect it.
PL
W niniejszym artykule podjęto próbę określenia kategorii wyjątku w dyskursie na temat wolności wyrażania przekonań przez mniejszości religijne, a także nazwanie grup wyznaniowych jako dominujące i niedominujące. Warto zauważyć, że rzecznik praw obywatelskich Gruzji kilkakrotnie wymienia słowo „wyjątek” w swoim raporcie z 2020 r. Zakładanie czegoś jako wyjątku nie oznacza tylko, że jedna grupa otrzymuje przywilej nad inną i naruszona jest zasada równości. Dokonanie wyjątku od ograniczeń nałożonych przez pandemię w ogóle, w szczególności oznacza stworzenie sytuacji, w której rząd wykracza poza porządek prawny zagrażając suwerenności prawa. Z drugiej strony nie ulega wątpliwości, że nawet w stanie sanitarno-epidemiologicznym praworządność powinna być przestrzegana i trzeba jej chronić.
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