Search results

1

Executive Compensation. A Review of the Latest Research

100%

Aluchna M.

Management and Business Administration. Central Europe

|

2013

|

vol. 21

|

issue 3(122)

3-14

XX

Purpose: The paper presents a review of the latest research on executive compensation and indicates the main problems and weaknesses of the existing solutions as well as trends for the future. Methodology: In the analysis executive compensation constitutes a crucial element of corporate �governance. The analysis is based on a review of the latest studies and research on the effectiveness of executive compensation referring to its size, structure and disclosure. Findings: The paper presents the latest fi ndings in the practice of executive compensation and it points to the extension of the period of time giving rise to the payment of cash bonuses, the introduction of a range of different indicators, based on which executives are evaluated, simplifying compensation packages, the implementation of deferred payments, the introduction of the “say on pay” rule and clawbacks. Practical implications: The analysis points out the main weaknesses of executive compensation, which were particularly emphasized in research studies on companies affected by the fi nancial crisis. The paper presents a wide range of suggested solutions that could be implemented in the fi eld of executive compensation in order to provide for a better alignment of the interests of executives with those of shareholders and for the increase in shareholder value. Originality/value: The paper attempts to identify the most severe corporate governance problems with reference to executive compensation and to confront them with research results as well as the recently proposed and implemented reforms and recommendations.

2

Aligning Executive Incentives with Global Public Health Goals

80%

Pearce J., Denkenberger D.

Progress in Health Sciences

|

2015

|

vol. 5

|

issue 2

16-23

EN

Introduction: The World Health Organization (WHO)estimates that together tobacco and alcohol kill about 9 million people annually despite aggressive and widespread public health controls. These legal industries persist because of the demand for their products and their substantial economic influence, which is magnified by the concentration of wealth in the executives of leading corporations that profit from increased legal drug sales.Materials and methods: This preliminary study quantifies the link between global premature deaths from these legal addictive drugs as a function of executive compensation in order to provide the necessary data to make more effective policy recommendations for preventing legal drug-related deaths.Results: The results indicate a need to incentivize chief executive officers(CEOs), such that they have a constant marginal utility per life saved.Conclusions: An executive compensation incentive that moves to eliminate tobacco use is achieved by a pay structure that increases exponentially with the number of lives saved.Key words:tobacco control; alcohol control; global public health; executive compensation

3

Executive compensation and comprehensive income: evidence from Polish listed companies

70%

Sajnóg A. R.

Oeconomia Copernicana

|

2019

|

vol. 10

|

issue 3

493-509

EN

Research background: The literature of Economics presents the agency problem, which can be mitigated through executive compensation, especially when it is connected with company profits. This relationship has been repeatedly analysed in the corporate governance literature, which shows both positive and negative correlations between these categories. Thus, another approach is presented with comprehensive income, which (in contrast to net income) is generally beyond the control of managers and hinders active earnings management. Purpose of the article: This article presents the evaluation of three stages of the relationship between executive compensation and profitability ratios (RoS, RoA, RoE), which are based on comprehensive income and net income. The main research hypothesis states that in economic practice, it can be assumed that there is a stronger positive correlation between executive compensation and comprehensive income than net income. Methods: The research covered companies listed on the WSE from the industry sector (between 2009 and 2017). The first part of the paper contains the results of correlations between profitability ratios and executive compensation (conducted by means of Pearson?s correlation coefficient). The second part presents the results of three regression models in two versions ? the influence that RoS, RoA and RoE have on companies? executive compensation, based on comprehensive income and net income. Findings & Value added: The analysed companies were characterised by a diversity correlation between the executive compensation and profitability ratios calculated with net profit and comprehensive income. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the results of the estimation show, in this case, the slightly greater role of comprehensive income than net profit. One can emphasise a certain advantage of comprehensive income over net profit, as the former can inhibit the effects of managers' intentional influence on the value of the reported earnings.

4

Executive compensation and the financial performance of Polish listed companies from the corporate governance perspective

70%

Sajnóg A., Rogozińska-Pawełczyk A.

Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy

|

2022

|

vol. 17

|

issue 2

459-480

EN

Research background: The level of compensation earned by CEOs and the relationship between executive pay and companies? performance is one of the most widely studied issues in the corporate governance literature. Studies conducted in the last several decades have provided evidence that CEO pay should be aligned with accounting financial measures. Purpose of the article: The main purpose of this paper is to determine the relationship between executive compensation and organizational financial performance. In particular, the effect of net income and comprehensive income as the accounting measures of financial performance on executive compensation is compared. Methods: The research comprised listed companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). The role and effect of accounting financial measures on executive compensation are analyzed based on three regression models. The period of analysis spanned ten years, from 2009 to 2018. Findings & value added: There are three conclusions that can be drawn from the study. Firstly, executive compensation in the analyzed companies largely depends on the accounting measures of financial performance, based on net income and comprehensive income (excluding ROE). Secondly, its level is significantly and positively influenced by the company?s size, Tobin?s Q ratio, debt ratio, and dividend rate. Thirdly, comprehensive income has a stronger effect on executive compensation than net income. Our findings add some potentially noteworthy dimensions to the economic literature on corporate governance, which is especially important to apply in the CEE region and other emerging economies. The Anglo-American assumption of corporate governance and executive compensation policy might not be suitable for the realities in much of the world.

5

Wynagrodzenie najwyższej kadry menedżerskiej a etyka. Perspektywa kryzysu finansowego

51%

Aluchna M.

Problemy Zarządzania

|

2014

|

issue 2/2014 (46)

99-113

EN

Executive compensation is one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms which plays an incentive function suggesting the adequate size, structure and various components of the pay. Despite the fact that the evidence of executive remuneration motivational function is viewed as the crucial solution to the principal agent conflict, its pre-crisis practice indicated severe shortcomings. The inefficiencies of executive compensation practice related to the package size, bonus policy, incentive programs and the proportion of the variable component are viewed as the significant contributor to the outbreak of the financial crisis. The aim of the paper is to identify these elements of executive compensation which proved to be detrimental for shareholders and to relate them to business ethics. The article intends to show that that the misuse of executive remuneration is not only the corporate governance problem but incorporates severe ethical dilemmas questioning the fundamental assumption of the company functioning.

PL

Wynagrodzenie najwyższej kadry menedżerskiej zalicza się do najważniejszych mechanizmów nadzoru korporacyjnego i, rekomendując określoną wielkość, strukturę i rolę poszczególnych komponentów płacy, odgrywa istotną funkcję motywacyjną. Pomimo iż dorobek płacy menedżerskiej wraz z jej funkcją motywacyjną stanowi jedno z najistotniejszych osiągnięć dla łagodzenia konfliktu między pryncypałem a agentem, praktyki przedkryzysowe wskazują na poważne słabości stosowanych rozwiązań. Słabości dotyczące kwestii wielkości pakietów wynagrodzenia, polityki przyznawania premii, konstrukcji programów motywacyjnych i udziału komponentu ruchomego są uznawane za czynniki, które przyczyniły się do wybuchu kryzysu finansowego. Celem artykułu jest zidentyfikowanie głównych słabości praktyki wynagrodzenia najwyższej kadry menedżerskiej oraz odniesienie ich do aspektów etyki biznesu. Intencją autorki jest wykazanie, iż nieodpowiednia implementacja rozwiązań w zakresie płacy menedżerskiej stanowi nie tylko problem nadzoru korporacyjnego, lecz także obejmuje poważne dylematy etyczne i kwestionuje fundamentalne założenie funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstwa.

6

System wynagradzania menedżerów jako kluczowy czynnik determinujący politykę zarządzania ryzykiem banku. Studium przypadku Lehman Brothers Holding

41%

Klepczarek E.

Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne

|

2014

|

vol. XCI (91)/2

155-173

EN

The article presents an analysis of the importance of the executive compensation system’s structure for the bank risk management policy. The case of Lehman Brothers proves that the construction of remuneration schemes for the bank executives should require the specific problems arising from the Agency Theory. The level of payment must be associated with long-term objectives and the strategy of sustainable growth. To achieve that it is necessary to formulate new guidelines and rules dedicated to the banking sector. It turns out that current forms of managers’ participation in the ownership do not provide sufficient protection against the so-called moral hazard. Recent studies show that managers are in fact rewarded for winning highly levered bets on the value of banks’ assets. While in the case of losing they make only a kind of ‘paper losses’.

Refine search results

1 Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy

1 Management and Business Administration. Central Europe

1 Oeconomia Copernicana

1 Problemy Zarządzania

1 Progress in Health Sciences

1 Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne

2 Aluchna M.

1 Denkenberger D.

1 Klepczarek E.

1 Pearce J.

1 Rogozińska-Pawełczyk A.

1 Sajnóg A.

1 Sajnóg A. R.

1 2022

1 2019

1 2015